PROBLEM -FLINT IN ITS RECENT PAST HAS BEEN UNDER THE CONTROL OF AN EMERGENCY FINANCIAL MANAGER, CURRENTLY A REVIEW HAS BEEN TRIGGERED THAT COULD CAUSE THE SAME RESULT. NOW IS THE TIME TO CALL FOR THE ELECTION OF A FLINT CHARTER COMMISSION .
SOLUTION-FLINTS CHARTER HAS FAILED US AND NOW IS THE TIME FOR A FULL REVIEW OF ITS PROVISIONS BY A CHARTER REVIEW COMMISSION WITH THE POWER TO BRING TO THE CITIZENS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION OR WHOLESALE CHANGE.
By: Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert, former Flint Ombudsman and City Clerk. 810-235-1970 http://www.attorneybankert.com/
Revision of city charters may be initiated by a resolution adopted by 3/5 of the legislative
body or by petition signed by at least five percent of the registered voters, unless the
present charter provides otherwise.[cc-1]
CONTENTS-
[I] THE CHARTER
[II] THE LOCAL POWER SHIFTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
[1] THE CHARTER
You can find the Flint City Charter posted at
Your current Flint City Charter was adopted in 1974. Ironic that one of my first political acts was to be a volunteer speaker for adopting the 1974 Flint City Charter. 37 years later my last political act may be revoking it.
Following are the sections in the charter to give you a sense of what a charter does .
Preamble
Declaration of Rights
Article I. In General
1-101 Name
1-102 Boundaries
1-301 Form of government
1-401 Powers of the city
1-402 Liberal construction
1-403 Severability
1-404 Definitions
1-501 Qualifications of appointed officers
1-502 Compensation of officers and employees
1-503 Retirement benefits
1-601 Oath of office
1-602 Ordinances required in the public interest
1-603 Forfeiture of office and removal for cause
1-604 Conflict of interest
1-701 Intergovernmental relations
1-801 Rule making procedure
1-802 Compilation of rules, policies and procedures
1-803 Hearing procedure
Article II. Elections
2-101 Qualifications for elective office
2-201 Wards
2-202 Boundaries of wards
2-203 Boundaries of precincts
2-301 Time of elections
2-302 Nonpartisan ballot
2-303 Method of nomination
2-304 Nominees
2-305 State law to apply
2-401 Initiative and referendum
2-402 Petitions for initiative and referendum
2-403 Time of filing
2-404 Council action on initiatory or referendary petitions
2-405 Suspension of ordinance
2-406 Amendment, repeal and reenactment
2-407 Submission by Council
2-408 Determining result of election
2-409 Special elections
2-410 Vacancy in the office of Councilperson
2-411 Vacancy in the office of Mayor
2-412 Recall elections
Article III. Legislative Branch
3-101 City Council
3-102 Term of Council office
3-103 Organization of City Council
3-201 Meetings
3-202 Special meetings
3-203 Quorum
3-204 Voting
3-205 Investigation
3-206 Investigative powers
3-207 Prohibition of interference in administration
3-301 Introduction of ordinance
3-302 Publication of summary before public hearing
3-303 Publication of ordinances and resolutions after enactment
3-304 Veto
3-305 Effective date of ordinance
3-306 Emergency ordinances
3-307 City action requiring an ordinance
3-308 Codification of ordinances
3-309 Public peace, health and safety
3-401 City Clerk, appointment and tenure
3-402 General duties of Clerk
3-403 Election duties of the City Clerk
3-404 City Auditor, appointment and tenure
3-405 Conduct of audit
3-501 Ombudsman
3-502 Term of office
3-503 Vacancy
3-504 Jurisdiction
3-505 Powers of investigation
3-506 Delegation of powers
3-507 Correspondence from person detained
3-508 Consultation required
3-509 Reports
3-510 Duty to report illegal acts
3-511 Obstruction
3-512 Immunity
3-513 Limitations
3-514 Remedies cumulative
3-515 Salary and other compensation
3-516 Staff
3-517 Referendum
Article IV. Executive Branch
4-101 Mayor
4-102 Term of office
4-103 Obligation of leadership
4-201 City administrator
4-202 Executive staff
4-203 Executive departments
4-301 General purpose of personnel chapter [Secs. 4-301 – 4-305]
4-302 Development and application of personnel policy
4-303 Duties and responsibilities of the Chief Personnel Officer
4-304 Labor relations duties and responsibilities
4-305 Unlawful acts prohibited
4-401 Appointment of City Treasurer and City Assessor
4-501 Duties and responsibilities of the Chief Planning Officer
4-502 Development matters
4-503 Purpose of plan
4-504 Comprehensive plan
4-505 Periodic review of plan
4-506 Public hearings
4-507 Prohibition on sale of park land
4-601 Responsibilities and duties of Chief Legal Officer
4-602 Form of documents
4-603 Drafting
4-604 Settlement of litigation
4-605 Advice and opinions
4-606 Penal matters
Article V. Civil Service
5-101 Civil service commission; membership, terms, removal
5-102 Staff
5-103 Appropriations
5-104 Rule making
5-201 Duties
5-202 Powers
5-203 Hearings
5-204 Jurisdiction
4-205 Employee grievances
5-301 Employee organization
5-401 Classified service
5-402 [Residency requirement]
Article VI. Multiple Member Bodies
6-101 Multiple member bodies
6-102 Transfer of governmental functions
6-103 Review of existing multiple member bodies
6-104 Meetings
6-201 Board of Hospital Managers
6-202 Powers and duties
6-301 Planning Commission and Board of Zoning Appeals
6-401 Standards of Conduct Board
6-402 Purpose of Standards of Conduct Board
6-501 Human Relations Commission
Article VII. Finance
7-101 Budget
7-102 Budget adoption
7-103 Item veto on budget amendments
7-104 Amendments after adoption
7-105 Uniform system of accounts
7-201 Taxing power
7-202 Board of Review
7-203 Duties of the City Assessor
7-204 Delinquent tax collection procedure
7-205 Tax becomes lien
7-206 State, county and school taxes
7-207 Installment payment of taxes
7-301 General borrowing power
7-302 Limitations on borrowing
7-303 Use of borrowing funds
7-304 Execution of obligations
7-305 Bonds to finance local public improvements
7-306 Emergency bonds
7-307 Budget bonds
7-308 Transportation bonds
7-309 Sewer bonds
7-401 Power to assess
7-402 Procedure ordinance
7-403 Special assessment lien
7-404 Contest of assessments
Article VIII. Regulatory Powers
8-101 Regulatory power
8-102 Appellate review
8-201 Limitations on a franchise
8-202 Standard provisions of a public utility franchise
8-301 Purchase and supplies
Article IX. Transition
9-101 Effective date of charter
9-102 First election for Mayor
9-201 Adjustment in budget
9-202 Compensation of officers
9-203 Compensation of appointed officials
9-204 Previous charter retirement system
9-205 Existing City legislation and rules
9-301 Status of officers under old charter
9-302 Succession to rights and property
9-303 Transition of status of employees
9-304 Ordinances for transition
9-401 Election to adopt charter
9-402 Form of question
To review information on changing a Charter in Michigan I suggest starting at http://www.mml.org/pdf/charter_revision/city1.pdf
[cc-1]
Charter Revision and Amendment for Home Rule Cities and Villages by Daniel C. Matson [cc-1]
Background for Change [cc-1]
Michigan cities and villages exist within a framework that is part of a greater system of
state and federal law. The system is described in governing documents which fit into a
hierarchy of importance and must be kept current. Constitutions, statutes and charters
are primary examples of these documents. [cc-1]
Most Michigan cities are incorporated under the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279
(HRCA) (MCL 117.1 et seq.). Home rule villages are created through the Home Rule
Village Act, 1909 PA 278 (HRVA) (MCL 78.1 et seq.) The HRCA and HRVA are statutes
that were authorized by the Michigan Constitution of 1908, and currently by Article VII,
Section 22, of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. [cc-1]
Locally, the city or village charter is the principal governing document. This article
addresses existing charters of home rule cities and villages. As each community
changes in various ways over time, its charter has to change with it. [cc-1]
The same is true at the state and federal levels. The U.S. Constitution has been amended 27 times to date. [cc-1]
Michigan has had four constitutions and numerous amendments. Statutes are being
enacted and amended constantly. [cc-1]
When a charter becomes outdated it hinders the ability of local government to serve
properly. [cc-1]
A charter that is no longer current is one with provisions that are illegal,
obsolete or missing. Changes are needed to correct misleading, unreliable or
unresponsive charters. [cc-1]
…
Obsolete Charter Provisions
The mere passage of time contributes to charter obsolescence.
Provisions that once made sense in the history of a community may later be irrelevant or
too restrictive. [cc-1]
…
To Revise or to Amend
The two forms of legally authorized changes are by revision or amendment of the
charter. [cc-1]
The home rule acts allow communities to make substantial or nominal changes in their
charters by different routes. Charter revision implies re-examination of the entire
document and that it may be recreated without obligation to maintain the form, scheme,
or structure of the former charter. Amendment implies that the general plan and scope of
the former will be maintained, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Revision
suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail, according to
the Michigan Supreme Court. [cc-1]
A change in the form of government will require charter revision and not merely
amendment. What constitutes such a change may require in-depth study. Legal advice
should be sought if that question arises. [cc-1]
Charter Revision
Revision of city charters may be initiated by a resolution adopted by 3/5 of the legislative
body or by petition signed by at least five percent [ about 5,000] of the registered voters, unless the
present charter provides otherwise. [cc-1]
In any case, the decision to revise is for the electors
to approve or reject. [cc-1]
They must also select a nine member charter commission to revise
the charter, none of whom may be an elected or appointed city officer or employee. Both
matters may be voted upon at the same or separate elections. An advisory vote may
also be taken on the question of a change in the form of government. [cc-1]
The initiation of a home rule village charter revision requires a 2/3 approval vote by the
legislative body, or by electors’ petition of at least 20 percent of the total vote cast for
president (village) at the last preceding election, unless otherwise provided by charter.
The village charter commission consists of five elected members. [cc-1]
The municipal legislative body determines the place of meeting, the compensation of
charter commission members, and provides funds for expenses and ballots. [cc-1]
The city charter commission convenes on the second Tuesday after the election. The
city clerk presides at the first meeting. The clerk administers oaths of office and acts as
the clerk of the commission. [cc-1]
The village charter commission convenes within ten days after its election, and frames a
charter within 60 days thereafter. [cc-1]
The city and village charter commissions assess the qualifications of their members,
choose their officers, determine their rules of proceeding, keep a journal, and fill their
vacancies. City charter commission members are compensated for attending a
maximum of 90 meetings (one per day). A majority of city charter commission members
constitute a quorum. Three or more village charter commission members are a quorum.
Commission sessions are public. [cc-1]
It is generally advisable for a city charter commission to engage a legal consultant
experienced in these matters as there are numerous legal issues at stake. [cc-1]
The county prosecutor is required by statute to advise village charter commissions. [cc-1]
A proposed revised charter is submitted to the governor for approval. The attorney
general reviews it and advises the governor regarding its legality. The governor signs the
charter if approved; otherwise the charter is returned to the charter commission with a
commentary of recommended corrections. [cc-1]
An approved proposed city charter is to be published in full as prescribed by the charter
commission. The attorney general’s position is that publication is to be in a newspaper in
general circulation within the community, which is the statutorily required method of
publication of village charters. [cc-1]
The adoption of the revised charter is for the electorate to decide by a simple majority of
those voting on the question. Specific provisions for a city charter may also be decided
as separate ballot propositions. The ballot questions are to be approved for clarity and
impartiality by the attorney general. The ballot contains voting instructions and explains
the effect of each proposal. [cc-1]
If a proposed city charter revision is rejected, the charter commission reconvenes and
determines whether to take no further action or to proceed with a further revision. If no
action is taken, the city charter commission ceases to exist. Proposed revised city
charters may be submitted to electors by a charter commission three times within a
three-year period. A new proposal to revise a charter may be voted upon at any time
after termination of the charter commission. [cc-1]
A proposed revised village charter must be filed with the village clerk not less than 90
days before the election. A revision may be submitted to the electors only once in two
years. [cc-1]
Legal References
The sections of the Home Rule City Act that directly relate to charter revision are 18, 19,
20, 22, 23, 24, 26, and 28. Those that govern amendment are 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and
28. The corresponding sections of the Home Rule Village Act are 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21,
and 26 for revision and 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 for amendment.
The remaining provisions of each of the acts, respectively, must be referred to in
considering changes to a city or village charter. Certain features of each municipal
charter are mandatory and are not subject to exclusion. Others as noted above are
permissive or restrictive and deliberate consideration is to be given to them.
Constitutional provisions and a host of statutory laws also bear upon what may appear in
charters, and to what extent and content.
Courts have interpreted the validity of various charter provisions and the statutes that
dictate their use. The Michigan attorney general has also rendered opinions, when
requested, for guidance in areas of specific legal concern.
All sources of law that bear upon charter issues need to be consulted in any effort to
reform charters, to achieve the desired benefit to the communities served by them.
...
Charter Revision Strategies
To do justice to the charter revision process, it is well to project an 18-month time frame
after the election of the charter commission in order to complete the task. Each
commission will set its own pace. It should meet regularly and assign a chapter of the
charter at a time to be considered at a subsequent meeting or meetings. The review of
each provision should be by all members so that each participant has a grasp of the
issues involved. The entire charter document is subject to revision and improvement.
Officeholders are to be consulted for views regarding the effect of current charter
provisions upon their duties and performances. [cc-1]
It is well for the commission members to wrestle with and to dispose of the most volatile
issues first and to resolve them expeditiously and to then close ranks. The charter
commission must present to the public a unified approach and avoid divisions caused by
single or limited issue positions, which tend to discourage voters and lead to defeat of
the product of countless hours of study, debate and drafting. It is also well to have one
person draft all segments of the document, to preserve continuity of style and form. Until
the commission approves a final version, each draft should be regarded as tentative to
allow the entire work product to evolve into a cohesive whole. [cc-1]
The election cycle is a foremost consideration in the timing of charter submission to the
electorate. To achieve timely completion of the charter is to also allow sufficient
opportunity for review by the attorney general on behalf of the governor. It is prudent and
a courtesy to those offices to request their optimum timing in advance. The review of
total charter language is given expert, in-depth analysis by the highly experienced
assistant attorney general in charge of that service. The reviewer may need to refer
various articles of the charter to other state agencies for inspection. Further
consideration must be given to the prospect that added time will be needed for
adjustment if objections are raised. [cc-1]
Revised charters and amended charter provisions approved by the electorate with the
vote for and against are filed in duplicate with the county clerk and the secretary of state,
within 30 days after the vote is taken. They become effective upon filing, unless a
different effective date is specified in the document, in the case of a city charter.
….
[II] THE LOCAL POWER SHIFTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
SOME IN PUBLIC SERVICE ,CALL IT POLITICS IF YOU MUST, ARE NOT COMFORTABLE IN COALITION BUILDING AND RESPONSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE THEY ARE MORE COMFORTABLE IN THE EXERCISE OF RAW POWER.
On March 16 of this year, Governor Snyder signed into law the Local Government and
School District Accountability Act (hereafter referred to as Public Act no. 4). This law allows the governor to put local governments and schools under financial review.[2] FLINT IS CURENTLY UNDER FINANCIAL REVIEW
THE GOVERNOR CAN DISBAND THE CITY OF FLINT
If the appointed financial reviewers determine that the local entity is in sufficient financial trouble, the local government or school board will be disbanded and governance will be assumed by appointed officials—the so-called Emergency Managers. [2] OUR MAYOR HAS TAKEN THE EMERGENCY FINANCIAL MANAGER TRAINING.
A recently enacted Michigan law permitting the state's governor to appoint emergency managers to replace the governments of municipalities in dire financial straits violates the Michigan Constitution according to the plaintiffs in litigation. We will see.This statute allows for enhanced powers for a Mayor with conditions.
RAW POWER IS THE ABILITY TO DISBAND UNIONS LOCAL PUBLIC SERVANTS COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH
L. Brooks Patterson said the legislation, though reviled by labor unions because it allows contracts to be set aside by the appointed managers, has “teeth” so that state-appointed managers can pull struggling districts and cities out of their financial holes.[5]
RAW POWER TO SET ASIDE YOUR RIGHTS TO LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT
These managers will have the authority, without public input, to do what they deem necessary to get the municipality or school back in the black. This could presumably include deciding to sell off key assets, close schools, raise taxes [according to the FAQs about the act posted on Treasury's site, "An Emergency Manager cannot impose taxes, over and above those already authorized, without the approval at an election of a majority of the qualified electors voting on the question. However, an Emergency Manager is authorized to order one, or more, millage elections for the unit of local government."—Ed.], cut programs and commissions, and eliminate other expenses.[2]
L.BROOKS AND PEOPLE LIKE HIM LIKE THIS...there’s tremendous powers,” Patterson said in an interview with The Oakland Press.
“He can go in and say, ‘OK, fine, this contract’s too expensive, these legacy costs are too expensive, these contracts are all gone,’” Patterson said. “That’s where the collective bargainers scream, ‘Hey, you can’t undo our contracts.’
“The law now has been changed and that’s exactly what can happen,” he said.[5]
PONTIAC IS IN THE HOPPER
The city’s police department dissolved its union once it was clear the legislation would pass. Pontiac’s emergency financial manager has advocated turning police protection over to the Oakland County Sheriff’s Office.[5]
WILL THE EMERGENCY MANAGER PUT THE BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THEIR CHEER LEADERS PUBLICLY IN CHARGE OF FLINT?
Critics call the law an anti-democratic attack on voters' rights, making it easier for corporate interests to have their way in the city. Labor leaders worry the expanded emergency manager powers might next be used to unilaterally modify or toss out union contracts negotiated with public employees. Some labor activists see the law as Michigan's way to attack collective bargaining and public employees similar to what's been attempted in Wisconsin, Ohio and Indiana.[6]
They challenge the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, which states in part that the governor, upon determining the existence of a “local government financial emergency” without a satisfactory resolution in place, shall appoint emergency managers from the state's executive branch “to act for and in the place and stead of” the local government's governing body.[3]
AN EMEGENCY MANAGER CAN STOP THE CHARTER REVISION PROCESS, OR AT LEAST FUNDING IT. IF ELECTED THEY CAN CONTINUE THEIR WORK AND PRODUCE A LEGITIMATE PRODUCT. THIS BODY WOULD ALSO CRATE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO CHALLANGE THE EMF. A ROLE I FEEL IS AS IMPORTANT AS CHARTER REVISION.
“On its face and in practice, the Act violates the rights of local voters by delegating law-making power and the power to adopt local acts to unelected emergency managers, by suspending the rights of local electors to establish charters and to elect local officials, and by imposing new costs and expenses upon local municipalities without providing new revenue,” the complaint says. After the bill was passed by the state Senate on March 9 and the House on March 15, Snyder signed it into law on March 16, and it went into effect that day (51 DLR A-7, 3/16/11).[3]
HOW IS THIS PROCESS TRIGGERED?
A few examples of trigger events include: (a) The Council might actually request that it be preliminarily reviewed; (b) a creditor may write to the state claiming that a payment from the Village is six or more months past due; (c) the local government might fail to “timely file” an annual financial budget; (d) the CITY may end a fiscal year in a deficit condition.[SEE 2]
OUR CITY could fall prey to Governor Rick Snyder and the GOP-controlled Michigan legislature’s controversial Local Government and School District Accountability Act. [ SEE 1]
The Congressional Research Service reported on March 30 that the act could run afoul of the U.S. Constitution's contract clause (66 DLR A-6, 4/6/11). On April 18, two Detroit municipal pension funds filed a lawsuit challenging a portion of the Act that allegedly would unlawfully alter the Detroit City Charter and bargaining contracts (76 DLR A-8, 4/20/11).[3]
This means that debt-ridden and financially troubled FLINT could fall under government financial review and, hypothetically, the CITY could be disbanded and turned over to non-elected Emergency Managers. [SEE 1]
Suit HAS BEEN FILED [ATTACHED BELOW] WHICH Claims Law Misallocates Lawmaking Powers
The act violates the Michigan Constitution's Article III, § 2, and Article IV, § 1, which confine legislative powers to the state legislature, the residents' complaint asserts. It says the act impermissibly gives emergency managers the “sole discretionary power” to repeal, amend, and enact local laws and provides for consent agreements allowing the state treasurer to grant local government executive officers such power to adopt local laws, all without “reasonably precise limiting standards.”
The complaint claims that these granted powers also are at odds with Article IV, § 29, which stipulates that a local law shall not take effect without the approval of both two-thirds of the members of each house of the state legislature and a majority of the electors in the affected municipality. A majority of each house of the state legislature is required to repeal a local law, the section adds.
The residents contend the act also breaches Article VII, § 22, which exclusively provides municipal electors with the power to frame, amend, and adopt municipal charters, as well as Article IX, § 29, which bars the state from imposing new activities or services on local government units without the disbursement of funds to cover any increased costs.
Additionally, the complaint asserts, the act violates Article I, § 17's due process clause; Michigan residents' “right to a republican form of local government and to choose the officials of local government by democratic elections throughout the time that corporate body of local government remains in existence,” as recognized by Article I, § 23; and residents' similar inherent rights to local government, established by Article VII, §§ 21, 22, and 34.[3]
In addition to declaratory relief holding that the act is unconstitutional, the plaintiffs seek an injunction barring present and future emergency managers from using powers the act grants them, attorneys' fees and costs, and further equitable relief.[3]
Law Alters Local Government Norms, Official Says
“The core problem with the law is that it removes from local citizens their right to local representative government,” Tova Perlmutter, executive director of the Detroit-based Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice, an organization representing the residents, said June 23. “It's an affront against the values of democracy and local control that are enshrined in the Constitution and in our society.”[3]
“Fundamentally, the law allows individuals with no accountability to the community they control to sell off community assets, destroy infrastructure and mechanisms for service delivery, and in fact even dissolve local communities entirely.”[3]
But Sara Wurfel, Snyder's press secretary, said June 23 that attacks on the act have ignored one of its key goals—to provide “early warning indicators” to prevent local government financial emergencies in the first place—that both Democratic and Republican governors have appointed emergency managers in the past, and that the state is constitutionally obligated to protect its residents' welfare. “Not only do we think [the Act is] constitutional, but we think it's vitally necessary to ensure the health of Michigan's communities,” she said. “The governor would be happy never to appoint an [emergency manager] if at all possible.”
By Elliott T. Dube[3]
---Copy of Complaint CHALLENGING SNYDERS ACTIONS
STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF INGHAM
_____________________________________
Elizabeth Brown, Tameka Ramsey,
Emma Kinnard, Hon. Juanita Henry,
Barbara Ford, Edith Lee-Payne,
Evelyn Foreman, Jacqueline Steingold,
Leslie Little, Michelle Martinez,
Suzanne Sattler IHM, Barbara Davenport,
Irene Wright, Patrick O’Connor, Paul Jordan,
Michael Merriweather, Marcia Sikora,
Ahmina Maxey, Maryion Lee,
Lisa Oliver-King, Kimberly Spring,
Brenda Reeber, George Reeber,
David Frederick, John David Ivers,
Lori Christenson, Betsy Coffia
and James Clancey,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. __________
vs. Hon. _____________
RICHARD D. SNYDER, as Governor of the
STATE OF MICHIGAN, and ANDREW DILLON,
as the TREASURER OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN.
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________/
John C. Philo (P52721)
Anthony D. Paris (P71525)
SUGAR LAW CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL JUSTICE
4605 Cass Avenue, Second Floor
Detroit, Michigan 48201
(313) 993-4505/Fax: (313) 887-8470
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Herbert A. Sanders (P43031)
THE SANDERS LAW FIRM PC
615 Griswold St Ste 913
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 962-0099/Fax: (313) 962-0044
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Richard G. Mack, Jr. (P58657)
Keith D. Flynn (P74192)
Robert D. Fetter (P68816)
MILLER COHEN PLC
600 W Lafayette Blvd Fl 4
Detroit, MI 48226
Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)
William H. Goodman (P14173)
Brandon M. Stump (P74418)
GOODMAN & HURWITZ PC on behalf of
the DETROIT & MICHIGAN NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD
1394 E Jefferson Ave
2
(313) 964-4454/Fax: (313) 964-4490
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Detroit, MI 48207
(313) 567-6170/Fax: (313) 567-4827
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Darius Charney
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway 7th floor
New York, NY 10012
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
_____________________________________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
NOW COME Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Brown, Tameka Ramsey, Emma Kinnard, Hon.
Juanita Henry, Barbara Ford, Edith Lee-Payne, Evelyn Foreman, Jacqueline Steingold, Leslie
Little, Michelle Martinez, Suzanne Sattler IHM, Barbara Davenport, Irene Wright, Patrick
O’Connor, Paul Jordan, Michael Merriweather, Marcia Sikora, Ahmina Maxey, Maryion Lee,
Lisa Oliver-King, Kimberly Spring, Brenda Reeber, George Reeber, David Frederick, John
David Ivers, Lori Christenson, Betsy Coffia, and James Clancey and by and through their
attorneys and for their Complaint, do hereby allege as follows.
NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
1. This lawsuit arises from violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the
Constitution of the State of Michigan of 1963.
2. The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4,
Public Acts of 2011, MCL §§ 141.1501 et. seq. (the Act) effectively establishes a new form of
local government within the State of Michigan. The new form of government allows Michigan
cities, villages, townships, and other forms of municipal corporations to be ruled by one
3
unelected official and that this official’s orders, appointments, expenditures, and other decisions
are not reviewable by local elected officials or local voters.
3. On its face and in practice, the Act violates the rights of local voters by delegating
law-making power and the power to adopt local acts to unelected emergency managers, by
suspending the rights of local electors to establish charters and to elect local officials, and by
imposing substantial new costs and expenses upon local municipalities without providing new
revenue.
4. The Act thereby violates Art. I, § 17, Art. I, § 23, Art. III, § 2, Art. IV, §§ 1 & 29,
Art. VII, §§ 21, 22, & 34, and Art. IX, § 29 of the Michigan Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. Jurisdiction is conferred by MCL § 600.601 and § 600.605 and by MCR, Rule
2.605.
6. Venue is proper pursuant to MCL §600.1615, since the offices of the Governor
and State Treasurer exercise governmental authority within this county and judicial circuit.
PARTIES
7. Plaintiff Elizabeth Brown is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Jackson, County of Jackson, and State of Michigan.
8. Plaintiff Tameka Ramsey is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Pontiac, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
9. Plaintiff Emma Kinnard is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Benton Harbor, County of Berrien, and State of Michigan.
10. Plaintiff Hon. Juanita Henry is a current City Commissioner of the City of Benton
Harbor and is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of Benton Harbor, County
4
of Berrien, and State of Michigan.
11. Plaintiff Barbara Ford is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of
Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
12. Plaintiff Edith Lee-Payne is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
13. Plaintiff Evelyn Foreman is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
14. Plaintiff Jacqueline Steingold is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
15. Plaintiff Leslie Little is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of
Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
16. Plaintiff Michelle Martinez is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
17. Plaintiff Suzanne Sattler IHM is a citizen of the United States and a resident of
the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, and State of Michigan.
18. Plaintiff Barbara Davenport is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Pontiac, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
19. Plaintiff Irene Wright is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of
Pontiac, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
20. Plaintiff Patrick O’Connor is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Pontiac, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
21. Plaintiff Paul Jordan is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of
Flint, County of Genesee, and State of Michigan.
5
22. Plaintiff Michael Merriweather is a citizen of the United States and a resident of
the City of Ann Arbor, County of Washtenaw, and State of Michigan.
23. Plaintiff Marcia Sikora is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Farmington Hills, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
24. Plaintiff Ahmina Maxey is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Ferndale, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
25. Plaintiff Maryion Lee is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of
Flushing, County of Genesee, and State of Michigan.
26. Plaintiff Lisa Oliver-King is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Grand Rapids, County of Kent, and State of Michigan.
27. Plaintiff Kimberly Spring is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Grand Rapids, County of Kent, and State of Michigan.
28. Plaintiff Brenda Reeber is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Ludington, County of Mason, and State of Michigan.
29. Plaintiff George Reeber is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Ludington, County of Mason, and State of Michigan.
30. Plaintiff David Frederick is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Montague, County of Muskegon, and the State of Michigan.
31. Plaintiff John David Ivers is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of St. Clair Shores, County of Macomb, and State of Michigan.
32. Plaintiff Lori Christenson is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the
City of Southfield, County of Oakland, and State of Michigan.
6
33. Plaintiff Betsy Coffia is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Traverse
City, County of Grand Traverse, and State of Michigan.
34. Plaintiff James Clancey is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City
of Negaunee, County of Marquette, and State of Michigan.
35. Defendant Richard D. Snyder is the Governor of the State of Michigan. Governor
Snyder maintains his principal office at the Office of the Governor, 111 S. Capitol Avenue,
George W. Romney Building in the City of Lansing, County of Ingham, and State of Michigan.
36. Defendant Andrew Dillon is the Treasurer of the State of Michigan. Treasurer
Dillon maintains his principal office at the Department of Treasury, 430 W. Allegan Street in the
City of Lansing, County of Ingham, and State of Michigan.
COMMON FACTS
37. Through its provisions, the Local Government and School District Fiscal
Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011, MCL §§ 141.1501 et. seq. (the Act)
establishes a new form of local government, previously unknown within the United States or the
State of Michigan, where the people within local municipalities may be governed by an
unelected official who establishes local law by decree.
38. On its face and in practice, the Act flagrantly violates the Constitution of the State
of Michigan by:
a) Delegating legislative powers without limiting standards to emergency managers;
b) Granting unelected emergency managers the power to enact local law without the
constitutional restraints placed on state and local governments;
c) Usurping the vested rights of local electors to adopt and amend local charters
which govern cities and villages within Michigan;
7
d) Suspending the rights of local electors to a republican form of government and to
elect the officials of local government through democratic elections; and
e) Imposing substantial new costs upon local municipal corporations without
providing offsets or additional revenue streams to affected communities.
39. Prior to 1988, local government was placed into receivership by the courts, not
the state legislature or executive branch. Compensation for court-appointed receivers was
derived from property that the courts placed within the care of the receiver. Fisk v Fisk, 333
Mich 513 (1952).
40. In 1990, the legislature passed the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act,
Act No. 72, Public Acts of 1990 (the former Act). This statute authorized state officials to
intervene when local governments were facing a financial emergency. Pursuant to the former
Act, when a financial emergency was found to exist and there existed no satisfactory plan to
resolve the emergency, an emergency financial manager could be appointed by a state board.
41. In February of 2011, the bill for the Local Government and School District Fiscal
Accountability Act (the Act) was enrolled and fast-tracked through the Michigan legislature.
42. The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act bill was
presented to the Governor for signature approximately one month after its introduction before the
legislature.
43. Governor Richard D. Snyder signed the Local Government and School District
Fiscal Accountability Act into law on March 16, 2011.
44. The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act (the Act)
replaced the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act (the former Act) and radically revised
state law.
8
45. The Act grants the Governor broad discretionary powers to declare that a local
government is in a financial emergency and to determine whether the local government has a
satisfactory plan to resolve the emergency. MCL §141.1515 (1).
46. The Act grants a state financial review team power to enter into a consent
agreement with local government to address local financial problems and purport to provide
financial stability to the local government without a finding that a financial emergency exists.
47. The Act further states that the consent agreement may grant the state treasurer
power to vest a local chief administrative officer, the chief financial officer, or other officers of
the local government with the powers and authority of an emergency manager under the Act.
MCL §141.1514a (9).
48. The Act further provides that once the Governor has unilaterally declared a
financial emergency and found that no satisfactory plan exists to resolve the emergency, the
Governor shall appoint an emergency manager to act for, and in place of, the governing body of
the local government. MCL §141.1515 (4).
49. The emergency manager is an appointed official of the executive branch of state
government. Alternatively, the emergency manager is a private contractor working as an agent
of the executive branch of state government.
50. The Act seeks to grossly expand the powers of emergency managers over all
operations of local government. The emergency manager’s powers extend not only to financial
policy and decision-making, but also to all other areas of local government. The Act seeks to
accomplish this expansion of powers without dissolving the corporate body of local government
and without first removing or suspending the offices of local elected officials.
9
51. The provisions of the Local Government and School District Fiscal
Accountability Act establish a form of local government that is repugnant to the constitutional
liberties of Americans under settled law, as well as the rule of law itself. Under this new form of
government, the people become subject to a form of governance where an unelected local
official wields absolute power over all aspects of local government and whose decisions are
without review by either local elected officials or local voters.
52. Without limiting standards, the Act delegates the state legislature’s general
legislative powers to emergency managers. The Act delegates such powers through provisions
that vest emergency managers with sole discretionary power and authority to:
a. Contravene, and thereby implicitly repeal, local laws such as city and
village charters and ordinances; and
b. Explicitly repeal, amend, and enact local laws such as city and village
ordinances.
53. The Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. III, § 2, prohibits executive branch
officials from exercising general legislative power granted to the state legislature by Art. IV, § 1.
54. The Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. IV, § 1, vests the state senate and house
of representatives with general legislative power.
55. The Act grants emergency managers greater power than the state legislature
possesses regarding the adoption and repeal of local acts. The Act grants such power through
provisions that seek to vest emergency managers with sole discretionary power and authority to:
a. Contravene, and thereby implicitly repeal, local laws such as city and
village charters and ordinances; and
10
b. Explicitly repeal, amend, and enact local laws such as city and village
ordinances.
56. The Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. IV, § 29, prohibits the state legislature
from adopting local acts without the approval of two-thirds of the members serving in the state
legislature and without the approval of a majority of the electors voting in the affected locality.
Furthermore, Article IV, § 29 only permits the repeal of local acts by a majority vote of the state
legislature.
57. The Act violates the exclusive constitutionally mandated rights of local electors to
adopt and amend local charters. The Act violates such rights through provisions that seek to vest
emergency managers with sole discretionary power to contravene local charter provisions.
58. The Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. VII, § 22, vests the sole right to frame,
amend, and adopt charter provisions in the electors of cities and villages. So long as the
corporate body of local government remains in existence, the charter exists as local law to be
followed by all persons within the local jurisdiction.
59. The Act usurps the constitutionally mandated rights of local electors to a
republican form of government and to choose the officials of local government by democratic
elections. The Act usurps such rights through provisions that seek to vest emergency managers
with sole discretionary power and exclusive authority to act for, and in the place of, local
government.
60. The Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. I, § 17, grants due process rights to all
persons in the state. Due process rights include a right to procedural due process during the
repeal of local charter provisions and during the repeal, amendment, and adoption of local
ordinances. Due process rights further include, a substantive right to a republican form of local
11
government and to choose the officials of local government by democratic elections throughout
the time that corporate body of local government remains in existence.
61. Under the Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. VII, §§ 21, 22, and 34, local
electors possess an inherent right to a republican form of local government and to choose the
officials of local government by democratic elections throughout the time that corporate body of
local government remains in existence.
62. Under the Michigan Constitution of 1963, Art. I, § 23, local electors possess a
retained right to a republican form of local government and to choose the officials of local
government by democratic elections throughout the time that corporate body of local government
remains in existence.
63. The Act requires local governments to increase activities and incur necessary
expenses by requiring local governments to fund emergency managers, their staffs, auditors,
financial review teams, technical advisors, consultants, firms, and other expenses incurred when
complying with the mandated activities of the Act.
64. In 1978, the Michigan Constitution was amended to include Art. IX, § 29, which
prohibits the state from mandating new activities or services upon units of local government
without making a state appropriation of funds to be disbursed to local government to pay for any
increased costs.
65. At the time of filing, emergency managers have been appointed over the cities of
Benton Harbor, Ecorse, and Pontiac and over the Detroit Public Schools. As such, these
emergency managers are currently exercising powers unconstitutionally granted by the Local
Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act.
12
COUNT I – Constitutional Violation
1963 Const. Art III, § 2 and Art. IV, § 1
Nondelegation Doctrine
66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 65 above as though fully
stated herein.
67. Article III, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 states: “No person exercising
powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as
expressly provided in this constitution.” Article IV, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963
vests the state senate and house of representatives with legislative power.
68. Pursuant to Article III, § 2 and Article IV, § 1, the Michigan legislature is
prohibited from delegating legislative powers, not only to executive branch agencies and
officials, but also to private contractors.
69. When delegating rule-making authority to executive branch agencies and
officials, the state legislature must articulate reasonably precise limiting standards to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legislative powers.
70. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the prohibitions of Article III, § 2. The Act violates the
nondelegation doctrine through provisions providing for consent agreements that, without a
finding of a financial emergency and without reasonably precise limiting standards, permit the
state treasurer to delegate sole discretionary legislative power to a local government’s chief
administrative officer, the chief financial officer, or other executive officers of the local
government. See MCL §141.1514a (9).
71. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the prohibitions of Article III, § 2 and the nondelegation
13
doctrine through provisions of the statute that, without reasonably precise limiting standards,
delegate to emergency managers sole discretionary legislative power and authority to:
a. Act for and in the place and stead of the local governing body of cities and
villages over matters unrelated to the financial emergency and unrelated to
the fiscal policies, practices, and circumstances of the local government.
See provisions including but not limited to MCL §141.1515(4);
§141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2);
b. Contravene, and thereby implicitly repeal, local laws such as city and
village charters and ordinances; See provisions including but not limited to
MCL §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2);
and
c. Explicitly repeal, amend, and enact local laws such as city and village
ordinances. See provisions including but not limited to MCL §141.1519
(1) (dd).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court order declaratory relief and declare that
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of
2011, MCL § 141.1501 et seq., unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the emergency
manager, and that this Court provide injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency
managers appointed under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers
purportedly conveyed by §141.1514a (9), §141.1515(4), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee),
and (ff) and §141.1519(2).
14
COUNT II – Constitutional Violation
1963 Const. Art. IV, § 29
Local Acts
72. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 71 above as though fully
stated herein.
73. Article IV, §29, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 prohibits the state from
enacting local acts “until approved by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving” in the
state legislature and until approved “by a majority of the electors voting” in the affected district.
The article further requires approval of a “majority of the members elected to and serving in each
house” of the state legislature before a local act can be repealed.
74. City and village charters, adopted by local electors, and ordinances, adopted by
local legislative bodies, are local laws – equivalent to local acts adopted by the state legislature.
75. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the prohibitions of Article IV, § 29. The Act violates
the local acts clause through provisions providing for consent agreements, without a finding of a
local financial emergency, that permit the state treasurer to delegate sole discretionary power to
adopt local acts to a local government’s chief administrative officer, the chief financial officer, or
other executive officers of the local government. See MCL §141.1514a (9).
76. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the prohibitions of Article IV, §29. The Act violates the
local acts clause by delegating more power than the legislature possesses. The Act violates the
clause by granting emergency managers sole discretionary power and authority to:
a. Contravene, and thereby implicitly repeal, local laws such as city and
village charters and ordinances; See provisions including but not limited to
15
MCL §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2);
and
b. Explicitly repeal, amend, and enact local laws such as city and village
ordinances. See provisions including but not limited to MCL
§141.1519(1)(dd).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court order declaratory relief and declare that
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of
2011, MCL § 141.1501 et seq., violates Article IV, §29 of the Michigan Constitution, and that
this Court provide injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency managers appointed
under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers purportedly conveyed by
§141.1514a (9), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2).
COUNT III – Constitutional Violation
1963 Const. Art. VII, § 22
Electors’ Right to Form Charter
77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 76 above as though fully
stated herein.
78. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 at Article VII, §22 vests city and village
electors with exclusive power to “frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing
charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government
of the city or village.”
79. Once a city or village is incorporated and so long as it continues to exist, its
charter constitutes local law that is required to be followed by all public officials, the local
governing body, and all persons within the local government’s jurisdiction.
16
80. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act ,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the prohibitions of Article VII, § 22. The Act violates
the rights of local electors through provisions providing for consent agreements that, without a
finding of a local financial emergency, permit the state treasurer to delegate sole discretionary
power to a local government’s chief administrative officer, the chief financial officer, or other
executive officers of the local government to contravene, and thereby effectively suspend and/or
implicitly repeal, the provisions of city and village charters. See MCL §141.1514a (9).
81. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates local electors’ rights as vested by Article VII, §22. The
Act violates the local electors’ charter clause by granting emergency managers sole discretionary
power and authority to:
a. Contravene, and thereby effectively suspend and/or implicitly repeal, the
provisions of city and village charters. See provisions including but not
limited to MCL §141.1515(4), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and
(ff) and §141.1519(2).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court order declaratory relief and declare that
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of
2011, MCL § 141.1501 et seq., violates Article VII, §22 of the Michigan Constitution and that
this Court provide injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency managers appointed
under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers purportedly conveyed by
§141.1514a (9), §141.1515(4), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2).
17
COUNT IV – Constitutional Violation
1963 Const. Art. I, §§ 17 & 23 and Art. VII, §§ 21, 22 & 34
Electors Rights to Republican Form of Local Government and
to Elect Local Government Officials
82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 81 above as though fully
stated herein.
83. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 at Article I, § 17 provides that no person shall
be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. The Constitution’s due process
clause protects the rights of persons to both procedural and substantive due process.
84. Michigan’s due process clause requires that local governments observe procedural
due process during the repeal of local charter provisions and during the repeal, amendment, and
adoption of local ordinances.
85. Michigan’s due process clause protects local citizens’ substantive due process
rights to a republican form of local government and to choose the officials of local government
by democratic elections throughout the time that corporate body of local government remains in
existence.
86. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 at Article I, § 23 recognizes and protects
rights retained by the people of the state of Michigan. The retained rights of the people include a
right to a republican form of local government and to choose the officials of local government by
democratic elections throughout the time that corporate body of local government remains in
existence.
87. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 at Article VII, §§ 21, 22 & 34 establishes the
rights of the people of the state of Michigan to local government. Michigan citizens’ right to
local government inherently vests citizens with a right to a republican form of local government
18
and a right to choose the officials of local government by democratic elections throughout the
time that corporate body of local government remains in existence.
88. On its face, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates Article I, §§ 17 & 23 and Article VII, §§ 21, 22 & 34 of
the Michigan Constitution of 1963. The Act violates the due process clause, the retained rights
clause, and the inherent rights of the people by granting:
a. The State Treasurer power, without the finding of a financial emergency,
to delegate the sole discretionary powers and authorities of an emergency
manager to a local government’s chief administrative officer, the chief
financial officer, or other executive officers of the local government;
MCL §141.1514a (9);
b. Emergency managers sole discretionary power and authority to act for and
in the place and stead of the local governing body of cities and villages
over matters unrelated to the financial emergency and unrelated to the
fiscal policies, practices, and circumstances of the local government. See
MCL §141.1515(4), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and
§141.1519(2);
c. Emergency managers sole discretionary power and authority to rule by
decree over cities and villages on matters unrelated to the financial
emergency and unrelated to the fiscal policies, practices, and
circumstances of the local government through powers that permit the
emergency manager to contravene, and thereby implicitly repeal, local
laws such as city and village charters and ordinances and to explicitly
19
repeal, amend, and enact local laws such as city and village ordinances.
See provisions including but not limited to MCL §141.1515(4);
§141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and §141.1519(2); and
d. Emergency managers sole discretionary power and authority to overrule
and supersede and assume all the powers and authority of the local
governing body and of all local elected officials over matters unrelated to
the financial emergency and unrelated to the fiscal policies, practices, and
circumstances of the local government. See provisions including but not
limited to MCL §141.1515(4); §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and
(ff) and §141.1519(2).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court order declaratory relief and declare that
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of
2011, MCL § 141.1501 et seq., violates Article I, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution, and that this
Court provide injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency managers appointed
under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers purportedly conveyed by
MCL §141.1514a (9), §141.1515(4), §141.1517(1), §141.1519(1) (dd), (ee), and (ff) and
§141.1519(2).
COUNT V – Constitutional Violation
1963 Const. Art. IX, § 29
Headlee Amendment
89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 88 above as though fully
stated herein.
90. In 1978, the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution of 1963 at Article
IX, § 29 was enacted to prohibit the state from:
20
a. Requiring a new activity or service by local government, unless a state
appropriation is made and disbursed to pay for any necessary increased
costs; and
b. Enacting an increase in the level of any activity or service by units of local
government beyond that required by existing law, unless a state
appropriation is made and disbursed to pay for any necessary increased
costs.
91. At the time that the Amendment was adopted in 1978, the state did not intervene
in local financial emergencies, emergency managers were not appointed by the state, and local
governments were not required to pay costs and fees related the appointment of emergency
managers.
92. The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4,
Public Acts of 2011 violates Article IX, § 29 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 by imposing
new and increased activities upon local government without making an appropriation and
disbursement to pay for necessary increased costs to local government.
93. New and increased activities imposed upon local government by the Act include,
but are not limited to:
a. Requiring the local government to pay the compensation, salary, benefits,
and expenses of the Governor’s appointed emergency manager. See MCL
§141.1515(5)(e);
b. Requiring the local government to pay the compensation, salary, benefits,
and expenses of any employee, agent, appointee, or contractor of the
emergency manager including inspectors, auditors, and technical
21
personnel hired at the discretion of the emergency manager; See
MCL§141.1515(6) and §141.1519(1)(o) and (p);
c. Requiring the local government to pay the costs and expenses of the
attorney general to defend in civil lawsuits brought against the emergency
manager; See MCL §141.1525(3);
d. Requiring local government to pay general liability insurance, professional
liability insurance, workers compensation insurance, automobile
insurance, and other insurance for the benefit of the emergency manager
and any employee, agent, appointee, or contractor of the emergency
manager; See MCL §141.1525(4); and
e. Requiring local government to pay for attorney fees and all costs of civil
litigation brought against the emergency manager and any employee,
agent, appointee, or contractor of the emergency manager if such expenses
are not covered by applicable insurance policies; See MCL §141.1525(5);
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court order declaratory relief and declare that
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of
2011, MCL § 141.1501 et seq., violates IX, § 29 of the Michigan Constitution, and that this
Court provide injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency managers appointed
under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers purportedly conveyed by
MCL §141.1515(5)(e) and (6), §141.1519(1)(o) and (p), and §141.1525(3), (4) and (5).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Elizabeth Brown, Tameka Ramsey, Emma Kinnard, Hon.
Juanita Henry, Barbara Ford, Edith Lee-Payne, Evelyn Forman, Jacqueline Steingold, Leslie
22
Little, Michelle Martinez, Suzanne Sattler IHM, Barbara Davenport, Irene Wright, Patrick
O’Connor, Paul Jordan, Michael Merriweather, Marcia Sikora, Ahmina Maxey, Maryion Lee,
Lisa Oliver-King, Kimberly Spring, Brenda Reeber, George Reeber, David Frederick, John
David Ivers, Lori Christenson, Betsy Coffia, and James Clancey pray this Honorable court enter
Judgment against Defendants providing:
a. For declaratory relief holding that the Local Government and School District Fiscal
Accountability Act, Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011 violates the Michigan
Constitution of 1963;
b. For injunctive relief restraining present and future emergency managers appointed
under the Act from implementing or exercising authority and powers purportedly
conveyed by the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,
Act No. 4, Public Acts of 2011;
c. For attorneys’ fees and costs; and
d. For such further relief as is just and equitable.
_________________________________
John C. Philo (P52721)
Anthony D. Paris (P71525)
SUGAR LAW CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL JUSTICE
4605 Cass Avenue, Second Floor
Detroit, Michigan 48201
(313) 993-4505/Fax: (313) 887-8470
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Herbert A. Sanders (P43031)
THE SANDERS LAW FIRM PC
615 Griswold St Ste 913
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 962-0099/Fax: (313) 962-0044
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
23
Richard G. Mack, Jr. (P58657)
Keith D. Flynn (P74192)
Robert D. Fetter (P68816)
MILLER COHEN PLC
600 W Lafayette Blvd Fl 4
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 964-4454/Fax: (313) 964-4490
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)
William H. Goodman (P14173)
Brandon M. Stump (P74418)
GOODMAN & HURWITZ PC on behalf of the
DETROIT & MICHIGAN NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD
1394 E Jefferson Ave
Detroit, MI 48207
(313) 567-6170/Fax: (313) 567-4827
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Darius Charney
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway 7th floor
New York, NY 10012
Co-Counsel - Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date: June 22, 2011
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