Saturday, April 30, 2011

GOOD DIVORCE ATTORNEY (810) 235-1970 FLINT MICHIGAN

-


Did you say “ I need a good divorce attorney or lawyer in Flint?”  Terry R. Bankert lectures and will answer your questions in any of the following areas of Family Law. Call (810 235-1970. Or Contact him through his web sites. http://www.attorneybankert.com/
or http://www.dumpmyspouse.com/
 or http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/



-

LECTURES
LECTURE 1 . Overview
General Considerations
The divorce process
The economics of divorce
Initial Pleadings
Service
Parties in the Armed Services
Motions for Temporary Relief
The Friend of the Court
Domestic Relations Referees
Pretrial Conferences
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Mediation, and Arbitration
Settlement Agreements
Separations agreements
Retirements Benefits
Entering Judgments
Selected Trial Issues
Modification of Judgments
Relief from Judgments
Enforcement  of support and property provisions.
Proceudure
Pets
pre-Post nupptial agreements
Tax Issues
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 2. Overview
Marriage
Annulment
Separate Maintenance
Dissolution of a Marraige
modifications
Footnotes
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 3 Overview CHILD CUSTODY
Adoption

Authority to Decide Child Custody Disputes
Is There an Established Custodial Environment?
The “Best Interests of the Child” Standard
The Lawyer–Guardian ad Litem
Sole and Joint Custody
The Custody Order
Reaching an Agreement on Custody
Modification of the Custody Order
Change of Domicile -child relocation
Third-Person Custody
The Role of the Friend of the Court
The Role of Domestic Relations Referees
Interstate Custody Disputes
International Custody Disputes
modifications
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 4 Overview PARENTING TIME


General Principles
Parental preference
Grandparent rights to Michgian parenting time
3rd party rights
Factors to Be Considered inDetermining Parenting Time
Orders for Parenting Time, visitation
Parenting Time Enforcement
Parenting Time Enforcement Underthe Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
Parenting Time and Support Payments
Parenting Time Modification
Grandparenting Time
Parenting Time and Personal Protection Orders
modifications
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 5 Overview CHILD SUPPORT


Children’s Right to Support
Parents’ Obligation to Support
Jurisdictional Requirements
Authority for Ex Parte and Temporary Ordersfor Child Support
Determining the Amount of Support
Parental Agreements Regarding Child Support
Domestic Relations Referees, Mediation, and Arbitration
Provisions in Support Orders and Judgments
Modification
Abatement, Credit for Overpayments,Cancellation, and Termination
Enforcement of Support Orders
Interstate Enforcement Remedies:The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
Additional Interstate Enforcement Remedies
modifications
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 6 Overview SPOUSAL SUPPORT


General Considerations
Factors Affecting Spousal Support
The Amount and Duration of Support
Requirements for Judgmentsand Spousal Support Orders
Tax Considerations
Enforcement
Enforcing Spousal Support Ordersfrom Other States
Modification of Spousal Support
The Effect of Bankruptcy
Alimony in Gross
modifications
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 7 Overview FRIEND OF THE COURT


Governing Statutes
Friend of the Court Cases
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Recommendations
Enforcement
Review and Modification of Order
Interstate Matters
Complaints Against the Friend of the Court
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 8 Overview PROPERTY


General Principles
Effect of Agreements Concerning Property
Distinguishing Marital and Separate Property
Specific Types of Property: Marital or Separate
Valuation
Standards for Distributing Marital Property
Separate Property
Dividing Pension and Retirement Benefits
Bankruptcy
Enforcement Measures
modifications
Footnotes
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 9 Overview TAX CONSIDERATIONS


Spousal Support and Section 71 Payments
Property Settlements and Taxes AffectingMarital Property
Dependency Exemptions for Children ofDivorced or Separated Parents
Tax Treatment of Divorce-Related Legal andAccounting Fees
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and EligibleDomestic Relations Orders
Filing Status and Related Matters
Sale of the Marital Residence
Footnotes
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 10 Overview PATERNITY


Proceedings Under the Paternity Act
Acknowledgment Under the Adoption Code
The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act
The Child Custody Act
Divorce Proceedings
Child Protective Proceedings
Interstate Adjudication of Paternity
Footnotes
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 11 Overview ADOPTION


In General
Temporary Placements
Basic Adoption Procedures
Consents and Releases
Involuntary Termination ofa Biological Parent’s Rights
Adult Adoptees
Challenging an Institutional Guardian’s Withholding of Consent (a “Section 45” Hearing)
Compensation Under the Adoption Code
Identifying and Nonidentifying Information
Birth Records
Adoption Attorneys—Direct Placement Adoptions
Footnotes
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 12 Overview GUARDIANSHIP


Overview
Full Guardians of Minors
Temporary Guardians
Limited Guardians
Court Review of Guardianships
Termination of Guardianships
Guardians’ Standing to Seek Custody of Minors
Guardianships and Termination of Parental Rights
Conservators for Minors and Protective Proceedings
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 13 Overview INDIAN FAMILY LAW


Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act
Does the Indian Child Welfare Act Apply to This Case?
Jurisdiction over the Indian Child
Notice of the Child Custody Proceeding
Involuntary Foster Care Placement
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Involving Status Offenses
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
Adoptive Placement Following Involuntary Termination
Voluntary Foster Care Placement
Consent to Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption
Footnotes
Forms and Exhibits
Related Resources You Own



LECTURE 14 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE



LECTURE 15 BANKRUPTCY
OVERVIEW


LECTURE 16 ELDER LAW
OVERVIEW


LECTURE 17 SOCIAL MEDIA
OVERVIEW
e-discover


LECTURE 18 FAMILY LAW PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW


LECTURE 19 FAMILY LAW  ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
OVERVIEW
Alternative dispute reolution
Arbitration
mediation
collaborative law

LECTURE 20
DISCOVERY

LECTURE 21 misc issues
Business evalution
The Emancipation of a Minor

Changing an Adult’s Name
Choosing or Changing a Minor’s Name
Parental Consent and Abortions Involving Unemancipated Minors
palimony
same sex parents / marraige
military issues
probate/estate
dns
reproductive technology
surrogacy

*** FORMS AND EXHIBITS

______________________________________________________________________________
Dailey internet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, April 28, 2011

WHAT IS THE COST OF FLINT BANKRUPTCY CHAPTER SEVEN? CHAPTER 13? DIVORCE? BANKRUPTCY AND MEDIATED DIVORCE?$99 down 30 day payment plan.(810)-235-1970 ATTORNEYBANKERT


BANKRUPTCY COST? NINETY NINE DOLLARS DOWN ( $99) BANKRUPTCY! FLINT ATTORNEY BANKERT (810) 235-1970. WHY WAIT CALL THE FLINT BANKRUPTCY  & DIVORCE LAWYER NOW! NEED A DIVORCE $99 DOLLARS DOWN. YOU AND SPOUSE WANT A BANKRUTPCY AND MEDIATED DIVORCE WITH ATTORNEY BANKERT THE  COST IS $99 DOLLARS DOWN. CALL (810) 235-1970

DID YOU SAY " I NEED A CHEAP FLINT BANKRUTPCY!" OR " I NEED A CHEAP DIVORCE!"

FACING BANKRUPTCY? OVERWHELMED ABOUT THE THOUGHT OF FILING? OVERWHELMED WITH YOUR FAMILY SITUATION?



WHAT IS THE COST OF FLINT BANKRUPTCY CHAPTER SEVEN? $750 Plus costs , $99 down 30 day payment plan. We will make the paperwork easy for you. We understand how you feel and will take the time to listen. You will not be given the fast shuffle and pawned off on staff Attorney Bankert , http://www.attorneybankert.com/  will be there for you at appointments and in court.

Our fees are like putting a bankruptcy on layaway. Chapter 13 a few more fees during plan, not much. What can I keep in a chapter 7 (seven) ? What can I get rid of in a Chapter 7? QUESTIONS? Bankruptcy Lawyer Terry R. Bankert will answer all your questions at a free initial meeting. File now if you have a garnishment, house foreclosure or repossession. See also http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/  We are a debt relief law firm/agency that helps you file bankruptcy. Families in Bankruptcy also have other problems. See http://www.dumpmyspouse.com/


Want to work out all issues together then go on your way. Attorney Bankert is a family law mediator you and your spouse can use Attorney Bankert FOR a  joint bankruptcy then mediate a fair divorce judgment. Call 810-235-1970. Attorney Bankert can offer you and your spouse a joint bankruptcy ( under federal law he is is a debt relief agency that helps you to file bankrutpcy.And he is a trained and certified family law mediator. Terry Bankert will help you both reach a fair divorce judgement with no other attorneys  and their fees  involved.

Call (810) 235-1970. Package deal Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and mediated  simple divorce $1.500, $99 down with an easy payment plan. Best pricde in town call (810) 235-1970

Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, April 23, 2011

I live near and need help filing for Bankruptcy and Divorce. WHo do I call? ...235-1970


How do I file for Bankruptcy in Flint ,Bay City, Saginaw, Lapeer, Owosso or Burton Michigan? Call (810) 235-1970 to Flint Bankruptcy Lawyer Terry Bankert. Or through http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/



Or http://www.attorneybankert.com/


Do you have Divorce or Child Custody and parenting time questions try http://www.dumpmyspouse.com/





Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Friday, April 22, 2011

FLINT ,WOMEN 2 WOMEN, COMEDY STEVE LIND,COOKING DEMONSTRATION CHEF "BESH" FLINT MI

PSSSST! JUST BETWEEN YOU AND ME! Guys take your gal to this, act like it was your idea, I'LL GIVE YA A THUMBS UP WHEN I SEE YOU THERE!

Thursday, May 5, 2011
6:00 - 10:00 pm
Flint Institute of Arts
1120 East Kearsley St.
Flint, Michigan 48503

• Comedy by Steve Lind


Cooking Demonstration by International Chef "Besh"


• Food & Wine
Mélange of Tropical Fruits
Old Fashioned Southern Honey Pecan Chicken
Salmon Vonokaw - Pouched Salmon with Caramelized Vegetables,
Thai Sweet Pepper Jelly and Citrus Dill Sauce
Aztec Meatless Burrito with Roasted Tomatillio Sauce
Spinach Pie Modern Style with Herb Yogurt Sauce
Dynasty - A White Chocolate Raspberry Dream
Sangria & Wine

•Strolling Fashion Show

Tickets $45.00 per person



Group of 10 tickets $400.00 includes VIP Recognition





Get tickets at http://www.w2wmichigan.com/
or by calling 810.694.2326
Direct Line 810.742.0932
Alternate Line 810.730.2964
Fax 810.694.2507




Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, April 21, 2011

FLINT DIVORCE AND BANKRUPTCY 810-235-1970

In re: Niedzeilski, ___ BR ___ (Bkrpcy WD Mich 2010)




Husband filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy after entry of a divorce judgment which included award of a horse farm and homestead to wife. He signed a quit claim deed transferring all interest to her as agreed and ordered. Relying on the quit claim deed, the credit union holding a mortgage on the property asserted the property was not part of husband’s bankruptcy estate and sought relief from the automatic stay. Husband pointed to another part of the judgment, which awarded him a share of the money from the sale of the farm, if there were net proceeds after payment of debt, claiming an interest that his bankruptcy estate could protect. The bankruptcy court disagreed with husband, holding he had no in rem interest in the farm after the divorce and quit claim deed. Thus, husband’s bankruptcy did not prevent the credit union from taking steps to collect its debt secured by the mortgage on the farm, as against wife or the property.
http://www.attorneybankert.com/






Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE

Bankruptcy




In re: Crowley (Smith v Crowley), ___ BR ___ (Bkrpcy ED Mich 2010)



Wife’s attorney fees obligation to her divorce lawyer is dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding, where the fee agreement promised monthly statements, provided a mechanism for challenging amounts invoiced, and gave the attorney a lien against assets, including realty, wife owned or would be awarded. A second fee agreement was signed shortly before trial confirming the past due amount, erroneously reciting that monthly statements had been sent, promising payment for additional services, and also containing the lien on assets term, this time including a legal description for the marital home.



The divorce judgment awarded wife the home and obligated her to refinance within 90 days, obligated each to pay their own lawyer, except husband was to pay $20,000 toward wife’s fees, and discharging counsel. The attorney’s lien effectively prevented the required refinancing, leading to contempt charges against her. The bankruptcy court suggests that the state court prompted wife to challenge her attorney’s lien, which resulted in a state court decision that the lien was set aside, and liquidated the amount of the fees due. The attorney sought a bankruptcy court determination that his remaining fees be determined nondischargeable under 11 USC 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), although only (B) applies to the claim of non-dischargeability based on debtor’s written statement of her financial condition. The bankruptcy court found no fraud in debtor/wife’s state court action to remove the lien, since actionable fraud in this bankruptcy context needs to have occurred at the time of the writing. There was no evidence that wife did not intend to honor the lien at the time she signed the fee agreements.
http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/






Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Flint Expatriates: Flint on Film

Flint Expatriates: Flint on Film

Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

BANKRUPTCY FLINT, BAY CITY, OWOSSO, LAPEER (810) 235-1970.Question cost of bankruptcy ? Call out Sam for chapter seven bankruptcy protection. Plea to Lee for Free consultation about bankruptcy evaluation. Stop repossession, stop foreclosure, stop garnishment because its www.nojokebeingbroke.com

BANKRUPTCY FLINT, BAY CITY, OWOSSO, LAPEER (810) 235-1970.Question cost of bankruptcy ? Call out Sam for chapter seven bankruptcy protection. Plea to Lee for Free consultation about bankruptcy evaluation. Stop repossession, stop foreclosure, stop garnishment because its http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/
.


April 19, 2011



BANKRUPTCY FLINT, BAY CITY, OWOSSO, LAPEER (810) 235-1970.Question cost of bankruptcy ? Call out Sam for chapter seven bankruptcy protection. Plea to Lee for Free consultation about bankruptcy evaluation. Stop repossession, stop foreclosure, stop garnishment because its http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/.




The BANKRUPTCY plaintiff in this adversary proceeding is the Chapter 7 trustee. The BANKRUPTCY trustee filed this adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant insurance company is required to provide coverage for certain claims asserted against the Chapter 7 debtor. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its contention that the insurance policy at issue does not provide coverage for the claims identified by the trustee. For the reasons explained in this opinion, the Court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.





Source-UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION (DETROIT) ,In re: Chapter 7 ,Romeo Montessori School Association, Inc., Case No. 09-63398 ,Debtor. Hon. Phillip J. Shefferly,Stuart A. Gold, Trustee, Adversary Proceeding No. 10-04884-PJS,Plaintiff, v.Consolidated Insurance Company, Defendant.OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Presented for consumer education by Flint Bankrutpcy lawyer Terry Bankert. Bankruptcy attorney Bankert contribution CAPS or cite [trb] see www.attorneybankert.com

.—



Jurisdiction

NON CORE PROCEEDING



This is a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case over which the Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(c)(1). The parties consent to have the Bankruptcy Court enter orders and judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) and Local District Rule 83.50(a)(3)(A) (E.D. Mich.).

Facts



The following facts are not in dispute. Romeo Montessori School Association, Inc.

(“Debtor”) is a corporation that operated a preschool through elementary private educational facility.

On July 28, 2009, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor ceased operating the educational facility at that time. Stuart A. Gold (“Trustee”) was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. After the case was filed, many of the parents and families (collectively referred to as “Parents”) whose children attended the school filed proofs of claims with the Bankruptcy Court indicating that they held claims against the Debtor because they had prepaid

tuition or for other educational services for the 2009-2010 school year. Although other proofs of claims have also been filed by other creditors in this bankruptcy case, a review of the claims register in the Debtor’s case indicates a total of 48 proofs of claims filed by Parents who prepaid tuition or other payments for the 2009-2010 school year in an aggregate amount of $178,458.69.



BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES FINDS INSURANCE POLICIES



After his appointment, the Trustee discovered in the Debtor’s books and records various insurance policies issued by the defendant, Consolidated Insurance Company (“Consolidated”). One of the policies issued by Consolidated provided “school leaders errors and omissions liability and employee benefits liability coverage” for the period beginning October 1, 2008 and ending October 1, 2009 (“School Leaders Policy”).



TRUSTEE DEMANDS THE INSURANCE COMPANY TO PAY UP.



After reviewing the Parents’ proofs of claims and the terms of the School Leaders Policy, the Trustee demanded in writing that Consolidated provide coverage under the School Leaders Policy for the claims filed by the Parents. On November 30, 2009, Consolidated wrote to the Trustee to inform him that it did not believe that the School Leaders Policy provided coverage for the claims identified by the Trustee based upon the proofs of claims filed by the Parents in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case.



INSURANCE COMPANY DENIES CLAIM



The letter explained specific reasons why Consolidated denied that there was coverage for those claims under the School Leaders Policy, but

also stated that by identifying specific reasons why there was no coverage, Consolidated was not waiving its right to raise other insurance policy language or other issues in determining coverage, and expressly reserved for Consolidated the right to raise additional policy language and issues.



BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE SUES THE INSURANCE COMPANY.

On March 15, 2010, the Trustee filed this adversary proceeding against Consolidated.

The complaint contains one count, and alleges that Consolidated breached the terms of the School Leaders Policy by failing and refusing to provide coverage for the loss of the prepaid tuition and other amounts set forth in the proofs of claims filed by the Parents. On April 29, 2010, Consolidated filed an answer and affirmative defenses. On May 19, 2010, Consolidated filed amended affirmative

defenses.



In addition to the reasons set forth in its November 30, 2009 letter denying coverage, Consolidated set forth in its affirmative defenses a number of other reasons why it does not believe that the Parents’ claims are entitled to coverage under the School Leaders Policy.

On December 28, 2010, Consolidated moved for summary judgment (docket entry no. 20).



The motion is based on one specific defense. The motion alleges that the Parents’ claims are in substance breach of contract claims and, therefore, are within an exclusion to coverage set forth in section I, C.7. of the School Leaders Policy. That provision of the School Leaders Policy excludes from coverage “any ‘claim’ alleging breach of contract.” The Trustee makes two arguments in response.



First, the Trustee argues that Consolidated has either waived, or is estopped from relying on, the contractual liability exclusion in the School Leaders Policy because Consolidated failed to raise that exclusion in its November 30, 2009 letter that denied the Trustee’s demand for coverage.



Second, the Trustee argues that even if Consolidated has not waived and is not estopped from relying on the contractual liability exclusion, Consolidated is still not entitled to summary judgment because the Parents’ proofs of claims do not expressly allege breach of contract but may be based upon theories of liability other than breach of contract. Therefore, the Trustee argues, the contractual liability exclusion contained in the School Leaders Policy does not apply.



On April 4, 2011, the Court heard Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment and, at the conclusion of the hearing, took the motion under advisement.

Standard for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment is incorporated into Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056.

Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48. A “genuine” issue is present “‘if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

“The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that an essential element of the non-moving party’s case is lacking.” Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International Corp., 171 F.3d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “The burden then shifts to the non- moving party to come forward with specific facts, supported by evidence in the record, upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248). “The non-moving party, however, must provide more than mere allegations or denials . . . without giving any significant probative evidence to support” its position. Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d at 566 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256).



Applicable Law



Insurance contracts are interpreted by reference to state substantive law. Policy provisions often identify the state from which governing law derives. The School Leaders Policy contains no such provision. Nevertheless, Consolidated points out that Michigan law should govern, and the Trustee apparently agrees by relying upon the state’s case law and statutes to argue his case.

Therefore, the School Leaders Policy shall be interpreted in accordance with Michigan law. See Irons Home Builders, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 839 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (“In cases involving the construction of an insurance contract, Michigan law requires the court to apply the law of the state where the insurance policy was issued.”).

Has Consolidated Waived or is it Estopped From Relying on

the Contractual Liability Exclusion in the School Leaders Policy?



Generally, in Michigan, “once an insurance company has denied coverage to an insured and stated its defenses,” the insurance company may be found to have waived or be estopped from raising new reasons to deny liability. Kirschner v. Process Design Assocs., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Mich. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.2122(1) (2011) (“An insurer or agent, upon making a declination of insurance, shall inform the applicant of each specific

reason for the declination.”). However, application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel is limited in Michigan, and ordinarily “the doctrines will not be applied to broaden the coverage of a policy to protect an insured against risks that were not included in the policy or that were expressly excluded from the policy.” Kirschner v. Process Design, 592 N.W.2d at 709-10 (citations omitted).



In Lee v. Evergreen Regency Co-Op Management Systems, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), the Michigan Court of Appeals identified two exceptions to the rule that coverage cannot be created by application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. The first exception is where an insurer has denied coverage and declined to defend an insured in underlying litigation. The second exception is where equity favors making an insurer provide coverage because the insurer misrepresented the terms of the policy to the insured, or defended the insured without

a reservation of rights. The two exceptions noted in Lee v. Evergreen Regency Co-Op were subsequently recognized by the Michigan Supreme Court in Kirschner v. Process Design, 592 N.W.2d at 709-10. Michigan law is well settled that except in these two limited circumstances, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel may not be applied to extend the scope of a policy to protect an insured against a risk that was not provided for in the policy, or to force an insurance company

to pay a loss for which it charged no premium.

The Trustee does not contend that either of the exceptions articulated in Lee v. Evergreen Regency Co-Op and Kirschner v. Process Design is applicable in this case. Therefore, the fact that Consolidated did not identify the contractual liability exclusion when it denied the Trustee’s demand for coverage in its November 30, 2009 letter does not mean that the Trustee can now prevail on its

complaint if coverage is not otherwise provided by the School Leaders Policy. In short, under Michigan law, Consolidated’s failure to identify the contractual liability exclusion in the November 30, 2009 letter is not fatal to Consolidated’s defense to the Trustee’s complaint, and Consolidated has neither waived nor is it now estopped from raising the contractual exclusion defense.



There are additional reasons why the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are not applicable in this case. First, Consolidated’s November 30, 2009 letter plainly stated that [b]y raising any policy provisions or issue [sic] in this letter Consolidated Insurance Company is not waiving the right to raise other policy language or issues in

determining coverage. Consolidated Insurance Company expressly reserves the right

to raise additional policy language and issues.

Although it may have been preferable for Consolidated to identify each and every defense to the Trustee’s demand in its November 30, 2009 letter, it is clear that Consolidated expressly reserved the right to raise additional defenses not specifically identified in the letter. That express reservation independently compels the Court to reject the Trustee’s arguments for application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.

Finally, Consolidated did expressly raise the contractual liability exclusion as a defense in its answer and affirmative defenses that it filed in this adversary proceeding on April 29, 2010.



Consolidated raised this defense in its first responsive pleading in this adversary proceeding, nearly a year ago. There was no unreasonable delay in asserting the defense in this adversary proceeding, and there certainly is no evidence that the Trustee has suffered any prejudice by reason of the fact that Consolidated did not specifically identify the contractual liability exclusion defense in its

November 30, 2009 letter. In sum, the Court rejects the Trustee’s arguments that Consolidated has either waived or is now estopped from asserting the contractual liability exclusion contained in the school Leaders Policy.



Are the Parents’ Claims Against the Debtor Within the

Contractual Liability Exclusion of the School Leaders Policy?



Section I, A.1. of the School Leaders Policy is titled “Coverage.” It provides that

Consolidated “will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of ‘loss’ arising from a ‘wrongful act’ to which this insurance applies.”



Section I, C. of the School Leaders Policy is titled “Exclusions.” It lists a number of specific exclusions to insurance coverage under the School Leaders Policy, including an exclusion in paragraph 7. titled “Contractual Liability.” Section I, C.7. provides that “[t]his insurance does not apply to . . . [a]ny ‘claim’ alleging

breach of contract.” Consolidated asserts that this exclusion applies to any loss that the Debtor may suffer in having to pay the Parents’ proofs of claim.

Consolidated argues that a review of the Parents’ proofs of claims reveals that all of those claims in substance allege a breach of contract. According to Consolidated, the Parents prepaid tuition and other payments in exchange for the Debtor’s agreement to provide educational services to their children. For support, Consolidated points to the documents that are attached to some of the Parents’ claims. First, Consolidated identifies an Enrollment Agreement pursuant to which the

Debtor agreed to provide educational and child-care services in exchange for payment (Exhibit D to Consolidated’s motion). Second, Consolidated identifies a Child Placement Contract (Exhibit E to Consolidated’s motion). Third, Consolidated identifies a School Summer Camp Registration Form (Exhibit F to Consolidated’s motion). Consolidated argues that these documents are, on their

face, contracts, because they memorialize an agreement of the Debtor to provide educational and child-care related services in exchange for payment of tuition by the Parents of the children enrolled in the educational facility. Therefore, these documents constitute contracts within the common,

everyday meaning of the term “contract.” Because the Parents’ claims filed in the bankruptcy case are all based upon the Parents prepaying tuition or other payments to the Debtor, Consolidated concludes that the claims of the Parents are necessarily claims for breach of contract, arising as a result of the Debtor’s failure to provide the agreed upon educational services when it closed its business and filed bankruptcy on July 28, 2009.

Although there are two express exceptions to the contractual liability exclusion in the School Leaders Policy, the Trustee does not argue that the Parents’ claims for which the Trustee seeks coverage are within either of these two express exceptions. Also, the Trustee does not dispute that the Enrollment Agreement, Child Placement Contract, and School Summer Camp Registration Form

are themselves contracts. Nor does the Trustee dispute that the Debtor’s failure to provide educational services after receiving the prepaid tuition is a breach of contract. Instead, the Trustee argues that the Parents’ proofs of claims filed in the bankruptcy case for the tuition and other amounts that they prepaid to the Debtor do not constitute a “claim alleging breach of contract.”

The Trustee focuses on the specific language in the School Leaders Policy that sets forth the contractual liability exclusion. Section I, C.7. of the School Leaders Policy describes the contractual liability exclusion as “[a]ny ‘claim’ alleging breach of contract.” The Trustee then makes two basic points in arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. First, even though the Trustee does not deny that the Parents that filed these proofs of claims had entered into contracts with the Debtor

to provide educational services to their children in exchange for payment, nowhere do the Parents’ proofs of claims explicitly say “breach of contract,” which the Trustee argues is required by the contractual liability exclusion. Second, the Trustee posits that it is “possible” that the Parents’ claims against the Debtor could also conceivably be grounded in a tort theory, such as conversion or breach of fiduciary duty, or a quasi-contractual theory such as unjust enrichment. Because these

possible, albeit unarticulated, alternate theories of recovery may exist in favor of the Parents, even though they have not been explicitly stated by the Parents, the Trustee asserts that the Parents’ claims are not within the contractual liability exclusion in the School Leaders Policy. To support his two arguments, the Trustee relies upon the Parents’ proofs of claims and upon his own affidavit.

Although the Trustee does not list in his complaint the specific claims that he considers to be the “Parents’ claims,” and for which he is demanding coverage, the Trustee attached copies of the first page of 48 proofs of claims to the Trustee’s brief in opposition to Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment. As noted earlier, the claims register in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case reveals

a total of 48 claims filed by Parents who describe the basis for their claims, in one way or another, as tuition that they paid to the Debtor for the 2009-2010 school year or for other educational services during that school year. To consider the Trustee’s argument that the Parents’ claims do not allege breach of contract, the Court examined each of these proofs of claims. They are very similar to one

another. For example, in proof of claim no. 1-1 filed by Kristy Slanec, the basis for claim is described as “monies provided in advance for school term 2009-2010 and camp.” There are no documents attached to that proof of claim. Proof of claim no. 2-1 filed by Joe and Ban Dindo describes the basis of their claim as “tuition paid for 2009-2010 school year.” There are documents attached to that proof of claim, including documents on the Debtor’s letterhead describing the

required amounts and payments for tuition for the 2009-2010 school year. Proof of claim no. 3-1

filed by Oscar and Alma Catarino describes the basis for claim as “2009-2010 tuition and summer camp,” and attaches a copy of an “Enrollment Agreement 2009-2010” on the Debtor’s letterhead

that explains the amounts and dates of the payments required for enrollment of a child in the Debtor’s educational facility. Proof of claim no. 5-1 filed by Kim and Chuck Rummier describes the basis for claim as “Deposit + pre-payment for 2009-2010 school year tuition.” This proof of claim also has attached to it an agreement between the Parents and the Debtor with respect to the

amounts and timing of the payments required for tuition, as well as other documents. The Court has reviewed all 48 of the Parents’ proofs of claims. They do not all use the same precise verbiage in describing the basis for their claims, but it can fairly be said that all of the Parents’ proofs of claims

are based on the fact that the Parents paid the Debtor tuition or for other educational services for the 2009-2010 school year that the Debtor failed to provide to the Parents’ children once the Debtor closed the school.

Even though the Parents’ proofs of claims themselves may not contain the specific words “breach of contract,” it is obvious to the Court that the claims are squarely grounded in a breach of contract theory. The Parents claim that they prepaid tuition and other payments in exchange for the educational services for their children. They did not receive the bargained for educational services

because the Debtor closed the school. While the Parents’ proofs of claims may not expressly use the words “breach of contract,” and do not separately identify every possible legal theory of recovery in the same way that a complaint might, it is sophistry to argue that the Parents’ proofs of

claims do not allege a breach of contract by the Debtor. A review of the proofs of claims, with the asserted basis in all of them being prepaid tuition and other payments for educational services that

they did not receive, demonstrates that, in substance, these proofs of claims do allege breach of contract. Therefore, the Court finds that they fall within the exception to coverage under section I.C.7. of the policy as “‘claim[s]’ alleging breach of contract.”

The Trustee’s second argument is that because the Parents may conceivably have other theories of recovery in addition to a breach of contract theory, the fact that the claims are found to Consolidated misconstrues the Trustee’s second argument as somehow being based upon a theory of dual or concurrent causation, where multiple acts or events are the proximate cause of an injury. As a result, Consolidated’s reply to the Trustee’s brief in opposition to Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment extensively discusses case law dealing with dual or concurrent causation. That case law is irrelevant to Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment since the Trustee does not argue that there may be more than one act or event that is

the cause of the Parents’ loss. Instead, the Trustee argues that there may be other legal theories of recovery, in addition to breach of contract, that the Parents might be able to assert against the Debtor that are based upon the same acts and events that give rise to the breach of contract: the advance payments for tuition and for other educational services that the Debtor failed to deliver.

be within the breach of contract exclusion set forth in the School Leaders Policy does not end the Court’s inquiry. In other words, even if the Parents’ claims do allege breach of contract, summary judgment is not appropriate because there may be other non-contractual theories of recovery that the Parents may be able to assert, for which there is no exclusion in coverage. The Trustee correctly

points out that unlike a complaint filed in a lawsuit, a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy case is not required to describe specific theories of liability. Instead, official bankruptcy form B10 requires only that the claimant set forth in paragraph 2 of the official form the “basis for claim.”1 In support of this second argument, the Trustee relies primarily on Northland Insurance Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 327 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2003). Applying Michigan insurance law, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not stop its analysis in that case when it found that a breach

of contract claim was excluded from the insurance policy at issue in that case. Instead, because the underlying complaint also alleged multiple tort claims such as conversion, embezzlement, and breach of fiduciary duty, the court examined each of those theories to determine whether coverage extended to the insured. The Trustee argues that summary judgment is premature in this case because similar theories of recovery may possibly be alleged by the Parents in this case.

There are two problems with the Trustee’s position. First, the Northland Insurance case is easily distinguishable. It addressed the extent of coverage for purposes of considering the insurer’s duty to defend. 327 F.3d at 455-58. The duty to defend is independent of and much broader than the duty to indemnify. Dochod v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (citing City Poultry & Egg Co. v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 298 N.W. 114 (Mich. 1941)).

“[T]he insurer must defend a lawsuit even if there are theories of liability that the policy does not cover, so long as there are theories of recovery that fall within the policy’s scope.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Dochod v. Central Mutual, 264 N.W.2d at 123). An “insurer has a clear duty to defend the state court action suit until

all possible theories of recovery which could be covered by the policy are eliminated.” Northland Insurance, 327 F.3d at 457 (citations omitted). “When considering whether the insurer has a duty to defend the insured, it must be remembered that the duty to pay is severable from the duty to defend. The one is not dependent on the other.” Dochod v. Central Mutual, 264 N.W.2d at 123

(citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombough, 180 N.W.3d 775 (Mich. 1979)).



“That an insurer may ultimately be found not liable, therefore, is a matter separate and apart from its obligation to defend the insured.” Id.

In the case before the Court, unlike Northland Insurance, the Trustee’s complaint only asks for a declaration that Consolidated is required to provide coverage for the claims asserted by the Parents, not that Consolidated has a duty to defend those claims. In addition, the Trustee

cknowledges that the Debtor is liable to the Parents for the pre-paid tuition. So not only is there no request to defend, but there is no question as to the liability of the insured. Accordingly, this Court need not undertake the close examination conducted by the court in Northland Insurance, in combing through the underlying complaint, in this case the Parents’ proofs of claims, for any facts on which any possible theory of recovery might be based.

Second, as the nonmoving party responding to a motion for summary judgment, the Trustee “must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”

Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transportation, 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The Trustee “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted, in response to Consolidated’s motion

for summary judgment, the Trustee provided only his own affidavit.

The Trustee’s affidavit swears to certain uncontested facts, such as the existence of policies; that the Parents pre-paid for tuition; that the school closed prior to the beginning of the school year;

that the Parents’s claims exceed $160,000; and that the Trustee made a demand on Consolidated to provide coverage, which Consolidated denied. In addition, the Trustee’s affidavit states, in conclusory terms, that the funds paid by the Parents “were to be held by the Debtor for the purpose of providing educational services during the 2009-2010 school year.” The Trustee’s affidavit goes

on to state that “on information and belief . . . the Debtor utilized [the funds] for purposes other than providing educational services . . . and therefore those funds are not available for refunding to the Parents.” Most of the Trustee’s affidavit simply parrots allegations from the complaint.

The Trustee’s affidavit does not contain any probative evidence to support any alternate theories of recovery for the Parents. The Trustee supplied no affidavits from the Parents providing any explanation for the basis of their claims. Nor did the Trustee provide any affidavits from anyone else. The Trustee’s affidavit does not state any factual basis either for the Trustee’s assertion that the funds were “to be held by the Debtor” for a specific purpose, or for his “belief” that the funds

were not used for that purpose. Although speculating that the Parents might be able to assert some theory of recovery against the Debtor other than breach of contract, the Trustee’s response to Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment does not point to a single fact in the record that supports an alternative theory of recovery. The Trustee does not identify a single document or a

single witness who could provide any evidence to support some alternative theory of recovery against the Debtor. The Trustee merely tosses out names of other types of causes of action such as conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, but offers no affidavits, documents or facts of any kind to support any of those causes of action or to make them anything more than unsupported metaphysical possibilities. Discovery in this adversary proceeding has closed. Summary judgment is the time “to

put up or shut up.” Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d at 149. The Trustee cannot oppose Consolidated’s motion for summary judgment with bare allegations and speculation about other factual possibilities. In sum, the Trustee has not come forward with any probative evidence to support the Trustee’s assertion that the Parents may hold claims other than or in addition to their breach of contract claims.

Conclusion

Where the issue is one of insurance coverage and not one of a duty to defend, Consolidated

is correct that one exclusion from the obligation to pay for a loss under the policy ends the inquiry.

Although “[e]xclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly construed in favor of the

insured[,] . . . coverage under a policy is lost if any exclusion within the policy applies to an

insured’s particular claim.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 489 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Mich.

1992) (citation omitted); see also Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Mich. Ct. App.

2004) (finding that coverage requiring an insurer to pay a claim “is lost if any exclusion in the policy

applies to an insured’s particular claims . . . because an insurance company cannot be liable for a

risk it did not assume”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The School Leaders Policy in this

case covers a loss arising from a wrongful act to which the insurance applies. But the insurance

policy expressly excludes coverage for a claim alleging a breach of contract.

The Court holds that the Parents’ proofs of claims upon which the Trustee bases his

complaint for declaratory relief against Consolidated do allege breach of contract by the Debtor.

It is irrelevant that they do not contain the label “breach of contract” since the substance of the

claims is clearly based upon breach of contract. The Parents’ claims against the Debtor, identified

in the Trustee’s complaint for declaratory relief against Consolidated, are all within the contractual

liability exclusion set forth in section I.C.7. of the School Leaders Policy. The Trustee’s bare

speculation that there may be facts to support other theories of recovery that could also form a basis

for the Parents’ claims against the Debtor is not only unsupported, but is irrelevant. The

section I.C.7. exclusion is dispositive. Auto-Owners Insurance v. Churchman, 489 N.W.2d at 434.

The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that Consolidated is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.

.

Signed on April 19, 2011




Dailey intrenet new from Flint MI USA

Sphere: Related Content

Sunday, April 17, 2011

BANKRUTPCY ATTORNEY or LAWYER 810-235-1970 , Terry Bankert, will answer Flint MI, Bay City, Owosso, Lapeer and Corunna questions.

BANKRUTPCY ATTORNEY or LAWYER 810-235-1970 , Terry Bankert, will answer Flint MI, Bay City, Owosso, Lapeer and Corunna question from people in debt that just need some answers. The topics you can ask as as follows. Remember we know its http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/





ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT;



bankruptcy foreclosure



foreclosure vs bankruptcy



CAN BAY CITY OR FLINT HOME FORECLOSURE BE PREVENTED?



If a FLINT OR BAY CITY RESIDENT gets behind on his or her house payments, the creditor may call the loan in default, accelerate the debt, and begin foreclosure proceedings. DO NOT GIVE UP YET IN FLIONT OR BAY CITY. When a debt is accelerated, the full balance of the note, WHO CAN PAY THAT, not just the monthly payments, is due, in full, immediately. This is usually preceded by the creditor's refusal to accept monthly payments.



In the event a creditor begins foreclosure, BAY CITY AND FLINT DEBTORS will receive a notice of the foreclosure proceeding. Unless the creditor is willing to accept payments to reinstate the loan, DEBTORS will have to either pay the full balance remaining on the loan, or file bankruptcy for protection to stop the foreclosure. One additional option is to contact HUD for mortgage assistance. Sometimes creditors will agree to stop foreclosure while HUD is reviewing your file.



The beginning of a FLINT OR BAY CITY bankruptcy case, if before the foreclosure sale date, will stop the foreclosure sale from taking place.



Under a Chapter 13 plan, you can make regular monthly payments and be given a reasonable period of time to bring your loan payments up to date to save your property.



Bankruptcy may be the best solution for extreme financial hardship. However, it should be used as a last resort, since it can have long- lasting consequences in relation to your credit.



ASK MORE QUESTION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING



bankruptcy vs foreclosure



pros and cons of bankruptcy



foreclosure bankruptcy



bankruptcy and foreclosure



foreclosure bankruptcy auction



foreclosure process



what is bankruptcy



does bankruptcy stop foreclosure



foreclosure



foreclosures



bankruptcy stop foreclosure



can bankruptcy stop foreclosure



bankruptcy options



what is foreclosure



avoid foreclosure



foreclosure information



bankruptcy trustee



foreclosure listings



bankruptcy questions



bankruptcy facts



when to file bankruptcy



claiming bankruptcy



bankruptcy process



business bankruptcy



pre foreclosure



how does bankruptcy work



about bankruptcy



bankruptcies



bankruptcy law



how to declare bankruptcy



will bankruptcy stop foreclosure



bankruptcy means test



bankruptcy calculator



bankruptcy 13



bankruptcy faq



foreclosure homes



filing bankruptcy online



bankruptcy forum



how to claim bankruptcy



credit counseling for bankruptcy



is bankruptcy right for me



stop foreclosure



bankruptcy discharge



foreclosure law



should I file for bankruptcy



To reach me on line SEE http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/




OR



http://attorneybankert.com/




OR



http://dumpmycreditors.wordpress.com/




OR



http://goodmorningflint.blogspot.com/


Sphere: Related Content

Auto Repair, Fix cars, Tune up, Oil change, Burton, Flint, Grand Blanc, Swartz Creek, Flushing, call 513-6766

CLARKS AUTO REPAIR , local call 513-6766,

FIXES YOUR CAR PROBLEMS HE DOES :


AUTO REPAIR he says “ We install Customer Parts”

CAR REPAIR , Clark Pledges “ We will beat all written estimates”

FIX YOU CAR, Rick Clark Owner/technician.

FIX VEHICLE, Clarks Auto Repair G-4232 S. Dort Hwy Burton MI 48529.
See: http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/

Rick Clark , 810-513-6766, is my friend and we take all of our vehicles to him and have done so for years.



FIX TRUCKS Real good.

TUNE UP that will have you whistling Dixie.

OIL & FILTER CHANGE to get rid of damaging sludge.

WHERE DO CLARKS AUTO REPAI CUSTOMERS come from ?

Burton, Flint, Grand Blanc, Clio, Montrose, Flint Township, All around Michigan, Swartz Creek, Linden, Saginaw, Bay City, Fenton, Flushing, Genesee County, and referrals from satisfied customers.



CLARKS AUTO REPAIR ALSO DOES:

BRAKE PAD,BRAKE SERVICE & REPAIR at the best price in town.

CLUTCH REPAIR with precision.

AIR CONDITIONING REPAIR inexpensively.

SPARK PLUG REPLACEMENT using your parts if you can get a better price.You are welcome to bring in your AUTOZONE parts.

CHARGING SYSTEM CHECK call 810-513-6766

TRANSMISSION REPAIR to keep old Bessie moving.

SUSPENSION REPAIR unless you like bouncing around. Best price in town.

TIMING BELT REPLACEMENT, big job but we do it sweet and cheap.

COOLING SYSTEM REPAIR & SERVICE to beat the summer heat.

CAR REPAIR THAT WILL NNOT WEAR YOU OUT FINANCIALLY.

AND THESE OTHER SERVICES:

SERVICE ENGINE SOON LIGHT

RADIATOR REPAIR

BELTS & HOSES REPLACEMENT

USED CAR INSPECTIONS

ENGINE REPAIR & REPLACEMENT

DEALER RECOMMENDED SERVICES &REPAIRS

HEAD GASKET REPLACEMENT

WATER PUMP REPLACEMENT

(4X4)FOUR WHEEL DRIVE SERVICE

CHECK ENGINE LIGHT INSPECTION

BATTERY SERVICE


FLEET VEHICLE REPAIR

CAR SERVICE

AUTO REPAIR MECHANIC

FREE TOWING, WITH REPAIR

SHOCK ABSORBER REPLACEMENT

FUEL PUMP REPLACEMENT

WHEEL BEARING REPLACEMENT

For additional information and answers to your questions see
http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/



Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, April 16, 2011

FIX MY CAR! CHECKOUT CLARKS AUTO REPAIR- AUTO MECHANIC “REFECTIONS” ON WHAT TO DO IF YOUR BURTON OR FLINT MI CAR STALLS.

FIX MY CAR! CHECKOUT CLARKS AUTO REPAIR- AUTO MECHANIC “REFECTIONS” ON WHAT TO DO IF YOUR BURTON OR FLINT MI CAR STALLS.


GRAND BLANC, BURTON & FLINT DRIVERS WITH CAR PROBLEMS AND NEEDING AN AUTO SHOP TO “FIX MY CAR“: CALL (810) 513-6766

Check out- http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/



BURTON , FLINT MICHIGAN Car Drivers thinking about Flint or Burton Auto repair and car stalling ,there are several car problems , gliches, that could cause that important “my car” to stall. IT’S PROBABLY NOT YOUR MUFFLER. Vehicle repair estimates in Flint & Burton if done properly usually show vehicle stalling does not signal a major auto repair to your car or vehicle, and it can generally be fixed through some relatively minor adjustments or cheap repairs. Clarks Auto repair will put on your AUTOZONE parts.

Car stalling in an auto repair shop probably will be found caused by either a problem in the car electrical system or in the vehicle fuel system. Your car engine stops running because it is not igniting gas in the car cylinders. WHY ? Auto Mechanics will find this car servicing problem occurs either because there is not any gas to ignite, or because it lacks the electrical charge to ignite it. This is not rocket science if you know what your are doing. The auto mechanics at Clarks Auto repair know their stuff.

HOW TO FIX YOUR CAR? You can try this test. Drive your car up and down steep hills. Does this change the performance of the car engine, or cause it to stall? This might indicate a clogged vehicle fuel filter. Replacing the car fuel filter is relatively cheap and easy once you find out where it is located.

FIX STALLED CAR FLINT AND BURTON MI. Does your Genesee County located car idle roughly and stall when at idle? If your Burton car has a distributor, you may need to adjust the timing. With the right tools and know how, this is an easy and free task. If your Flint vehicle has fuel injection, you can check the car injector by using a screwdriver or mechanics scope. The injectors will make a clicking/snapping sound if working. No sound may indicate a bad injector available at most auto parts stores. It could also indicate an electrical failure with the car electrical circuit that drives the auto fuel injector. Also, check the ICM, idle control motor that controls the air mixture. We suggest an experienced auto mechanic at this point.

What most people need is a trusted auto mechanic who will listen to your description of the problem make a quick determination of the problem and give you a reasonable if not cheap auto repair estimate.

YOU WILL NOT BE RIPPED OFF AT CLARKS AUTO REPAIR. Rick Clark the owner of CLARKES AUTO REPAIR , Dort Hwy in Flint and Burton MI is your auto mechanic call 810-513-6766 today.
Check out his web site at

OR MORE GOOD AUTO REPAIR INFORMATION AT
http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/2011/04/burton-mi-automotive-repairauto-repair.html

http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/




Sphere: Related Content

Friday, April 15, 2011

FLINT AND BURTON MI AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR,AUTO REPAIR, LET CLARK PUT ON YOUR AUTO ZONE PARTS

FLINT AND BURTON MI AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR,AUTO REPAIR, LET CLARK PUT ON YOUR AUTO ZONE PARTS


NEED PEACE OF MIND. WOMEN NEEDING AUTO REPAIR WE WILL LISTEN TO YOU AND GIVE THE BEST PRICE IN TOWN.



OLDER CAR owners do not need an auto repair expense caused by a slipping transmission. Avoid the need for AUTO REPAIR ESTIMATES .You can reduce - or even avoid - such AUTO repairs if you learn to recognize early signs of this transmission slipping, signs such as these below.



IF THE SIGN BELOW ARE HAPPENING TO YOU AND YOU QUESTION WHAT TO DO CONTACT RICK CLARK OWNER "CLARKS AUTO REPAIR" BURTON MI 810-513-6766

WED SITE: http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/2011/04/burton-mi-automotive-repairauto-repair.html


1. Car has a delay in acceleration - When placing your vehicle into gear, there is a delay before the car begins accelerating.



2. AVOID EXPENSIVE AUTO REPAIRS BY LOOKING FOR A Delay in shifting - In moving forward, there is a delay in the shifting of your transmission to the next gear.



3. STAY OUT OF AN AUTO REPAIR SHOP BY WATCHING YOUR FLUID LEVELS. Watch for Higher engine RPM's - As you accelerate, your car engine's RPM (revolutions per minute) is higher than normal.



OTHER AUTO REPAIR ISSUES CLARKS WILL HELP YOU WITH: STARTER, OIL LEAK, ENGINE KNOCK, ENGINE TUNE UP,ENGINE REPLACE, TRANSMISSION.

AUTO REPAIR SHOP ON DORT HWY BURTON MICHIGAN :(1) We will beat all written estimates. (2) Get a good buy? We install customer parts. Save a ton of money!



FOR PEACE OF MIND CALL CLARKS TODAY local call 513-6766



AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR .







Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, April 14, 2011

BURTON AUTO REPAIR, FLINT AUTO REPAIRS, AUTO PARTS INSTILLATION DORT HWY (810) 513-6766


BURTON AUTO REPAIR,FLINT AUTO REPAIRS,AUTO PARTS INSTILLATION DORT HWY (810) 513-6766

RICK CLARK AUTO REPAIR RECOMMENDATIONS.

http://clarksautorepair.blogspot.com/


DON’T BE IN THE AUTO CONFUSION ZONE. AUTO PARTS INSTILLATION WITH CONFIDENCE.





AUTO REPAIRS AND Service Engine Soon Light FAQ:



1) Can the vehicle be driven? Or auto repair estimate needed.



The general rule in auto repair manuels is: if the Service Engine Soon Light is on, and the car seems to be running ok, you can

If you have questions call Rick Clark at 810-513-6766 CLARKS AUTO REPAIR DORT HWY BURTON MI


If your car is running poorly—bucking, stalling, hesitating, or you just don’t feel safe, tow it. When in doubt always tow it for auto repairs !



2) The check engine light went out on its own. Is it ok now?



Reputable auto repair service shops will say probably not. Check Engine Lights often come and go. Even if the light is out, your vehicle’s computer system will retain information that will allow the problem to be diagnosed. To avoid long term issues, get it checked out and if needed get auto repair.



3) My check engine light stays on. What should I do?



If your check engine light stays on constantly, follow the instructions above, under “Can the car be driven?” Don’t panic.



4) Can I disconnect the battery, or pull a fuse to reset the service engine soon light?



Battery cable or an ECM or PCM fuse may clear the code, but it is not universally recommended in the industry. Most manufacturers advise against it.




Sphere: Related Content

FLINT DIVORCE,GENESEE DIVORCE FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER,ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT (810)-235-1970






FLINT DIVORCE,GENESEE DIVORCE FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER,ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT (810)-235-1970



TODAY THE KEYWORDS FOR A RESPONSIBLE DIVORCE ARE SHARE PROPERTY AND BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.



Grounds for divorce. §1.2.

UNFORTUNATELY THIS NATIONS DIVORCE RATES ARE HIGH. YOU ARE NOT ALONE.

“[There has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.”

THE EMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL COST OF DIVORCE IS HIGH DO NOT ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE BY PUTTING MEAN STATEMENTS IN YOUR DIVORCE COMPLAINT

The plaintiff may not include any other explanation of the grounds in the complaint. The defendant may admit or deny the grounds. The court may consider an admission but is not bound by it.

MICHIGAN DIVORCE LAWS DETERMINE IF YOU CAN FILE FOR DIVORCE IN MICHIGAN

Jurisdiction; venue. §1.3.

On the filing date, one party must have resided in Michigan for at least 180 days and in the county of filing for at least 10 days. Residence means the place of a permanent home where the party intends to remain.

The 10-day county residency requirement need not be met if there is information that would allow the court to reasonably conclude that the parties’ minor children are at risk of being taken outside the U.S. and kept in a foreign country by a defendant who was born in a foreign country or who is not a U.S. citizen.



If you have family law/divorce question call for a free consultation Attorney Terry Bankert 235-1970 or reach him through http://www.attorneybankert.com/


FAMILY IN ECONOMIC DISTRESS try his informational site http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/
 if you have bankruptcy questions.







Principal source

Michigan Family Law Benchbook ch 1 (ICLE 2d ed 2006), at http://www.icle.org/modules/books/chapter.aspx/?lib=family&book=2006553550&chapter=01
 (last updated 04/01/2011

Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

GARNISHMENTS: Flint Bankruptcy ( 810-235-1970)or Bay City ,Owosso, Lapeer, Livingston and Michigan Bankruptcy

GARNISHMENTS: Flint Bankruptcy ( 810-235-1970)or Bay City Owosso Lapeer Livingston and Michigan Bankruptcy have two objective to give you the debtor a fresh start and to treat creditors in a just manner. Your Attorney for Bankruptcy will explain no preferences to be shown between creditors. Just treatment of creditors means you treat them all equally unless the Law puts them in a priority class.




BANKRUTPCY LAW AND GARNISHMENTS



BANKRUPTCY QUESTION can a Bankruptcy trustee get back the money I repaid my mom a month before I filed for bankruptcy? YES!



WAGE GARNISHMENTS: Bankruptcy Trustees will look at your filing and their extensive data base or otherwise discovered information and determine if you have made any payments to creditors within 90 days of filing your bankruptcy or within a year if it was made to a relative.



Some debtor think that is a good strategy to pay off one creditor before filing bankruptcy to continue the credit relationship after bankruptcy or possibly to pay off a loan from a family member.



Trustees will call that a preference payment if made within 90 days of filing.



Debtors when you file how you spend your money until bankruptcy discharge will be looked at by a trustees, U.S. Attorney and possibly a Federal bankruptcy Judge.



Debtors preference payments after you become insolvent can be forced to be returned from your creditor to a trustee. Here are the rules you should follow.

1. Individual debtors with everyday consumer debt cannot pay any one debtor more than 600 within 90 days of filing.

2. You cannot pay a relative or business associate more than $600 within one year of filing.



DO NOT USE YOUR TAX REFUND TO PAY A RELATIVE THEN FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY.



It gets worse if you have a joint debtor who is a relative because they may have to pay the trustees these preference payments.



To be fair or just to the creditor you should not be allowed to single out certain creditors for special payments just before you file.



THE TRUSTEE CAN TAKE THAT MONEY BACK FROM YOUR CREDITOR AND DIVIDE IT EQUALLY AMOUNG YOUR UNSECURED CREDITORS.



IF YOU REFIANANCE YOUR HOME MAKE SURE THAT YOU WAIT AT LEAST 90 DAYS AFTER REFINANCING YOUR HOME OR PAYING DOWN AN EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT BEFORE YOU FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY.



The trustee can sue your relative or other preferred creditor to get the money or property back. Its just easier to go after your joint debtor. it’s a fraudulent transfer when you give away real property to a relative before filing for bankruptcy. The look back period for real property is two years.



Did you know that fraudulent transfer allow the trustee the ability to grab the real property sell it keep part and distribute the rest of the proceeds to your creditors. This could also cause your bankruptcy to be dismissed and your creditors could start harassing you again.



ITS NOT SMART TO PAY OFF A CREDIT CARD JUST BEFORE YOU FILE BANKRUPTCY.

If you have question Contact Attorney Terry Bankert who helps you file bankruptcy and get debt relief at 810-235-1970 of through his informative site http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/








Sphere: Related Content

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

FACING FLINT BANKRUPTCY, NEED BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION,ATTORNEY FOR FLINT BANKRUTPCY 810-235-1970 TERRY BANKERT.

You will ask yourself may times “ Can I file for Bankruptcy”, “ What are the costs of bankruptcy?”





FACING FLINT BANKRUPTCY, NEED BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION,ATTORNEY FOR FLINT BANKRUTPCY 810-235-1970 TERRY BANKERT.


You should know that actions you take before you file at the United State Bankruptcy court affect your Bankruptcy Protection. Did you know that when you enter bankruptcy protection what you have done with gifts or sale of your property for two years before will be intensely reviewed by the Bankruptcy Court and its trustees.



Debtors are tempted to get out of their name some assets like real property or savings accounts so that the Trustee assigned to you will not seize property and sell it to pay your creditors. If you think you can sell property to a friend and relative before bankruptcy with a promise to have it returned to you after bankruptcy you are wrong. This could cause your property to be taken ,your bankruptcy ended and creditors will come At you again.



If you have questions contact Terry Bankert through his popular informational website http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/  or call 1-810-235-1970.

Sphere: Related Content

FACING OWOSSO BANKRUPTCY CALL 1-810-235-1970. SHIAWASSEE BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION

ARE YOU FACING BANKRUPTCY IN OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE MICHIGAN, 810-235-1970 CALL TERRY BANKERT.




WHEN file for bankruptcy you will need an OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE, Bay City or Michigan Bankrutpcy lawyer. How to find one? 1-810-235-1970



Do you live in Owosso or Shiawassee County and  FACING BANKRUPTCY IN Owosso of Shiawassee County?



BANKRUPTCY QUESTIONS.OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE Bankruptcy attorney internet search involves the use of Keywords. Try OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE Bankruptcy and you will find Terry Bankert, go to his popular web site http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/.   You may have seen the billboards on M-21 and M-52 in or near Owosso Michigan.



BANKRUPCY PROTECTION.Are you looking for bankruptcy protection in Shiawassee County to include Owosso and Cournna Michigan?



MY LAWFIRM IS ACCESSABLE AND WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.My practice regularly places bankruptcy information on face book .



FACING BANKRUPTCY?Join my Michigan Bankrutpcy Group on face book for information on Owosso Chapter 7 Bankruptcy or Shiawassee Chapter 13 bankruptcy.



Hotels in monopoly are no better than finding a good Bankrutpcy attorney. You will do well going to www.attorneybankert.com

http://www.nojokebeingbroke/  can be found touting Bankruptcy on youtube.



OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE Bankruptcy lawyers can be found on http://www.craigslist/.
 .



FOR BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION Google OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE Bankrutpcy and you will find bankruptcy lawyer Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970 .



Bankruptcy discharges make a debtor yell http://www.yahoo/.



Bankruptcy valuations may be what it would sell for on http://www.ebay/ .



Ask Bankruptcy questions in OWOSSO & SHIAWASSEE by first doing a http://www.facebook.com/
 login then going to Michigan Bankruptcy with Terry Bankert.



YOUR Bankrutpcy lawyers may answer your questions through yahoo mail



The Bankruptcy land of aquarius is at the discharge.



Bankrutpcy attorney Terry Bankert uses http://www.gmail/ some other lawyers use http://www.hotmail/ .



The location of your bankruptcy attorney can be found on http://www.mapquest/.



What you see is an exercise to get my message to you using high volume key words. Call 810-235-1970 for a free bankruptcy consultation. OR REACH ME THROUGH http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/


Sphere: Related Content

Monday, April 11, 2011

BANKRUPTCY IN FLINT, 235-1970 CALL TERRY BANKERT

BANKRUPTCY IN  BAY CITY  OR FLINT, 235-1970 CALL TERRY BANKERT.




Before you file for bankruptcy you need a Flint ,Bay City or Michigan Bankrutpcy lawyer. How to find one?



Flint Bankruptcy attorney internet search involves the use of Keywords. Try Flint Bankrutpcy and you will find Terry Bankert, go to his popular web site http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/




My practice regularly places bankruptcy information on face book .

Hotels in monopoly are no better than finding a good Bankrutpcy attorney. You will do well going to http://www.attorneybankert.com/




http://www.nojokebeingbroke/  can be found touting Bankruptcy on youtube

Flint Bankruptcy lawyers can be found on craigslist .

Google Flint Bankrutpcy and you will find bankruptcy lawyer Terry R. Bankert

Bankruptcy discharges make a debtor yell yahoo.

Banruptcy valuations may be what it would sell for on ebay

Ask Bankruptcy question in Flint by first doing a facebook login then going to Michigan Bankruptcy with Terry Bankert.



Bankrutpcy lawyers may answer your questions through yahoo mail

The Bankruptcy land of aquarius is at the discharge.

Bankrutpcy attorney Terry Bankert uses gmail some other lawyers use hotmail .

The location of your bankruptcy attorney can be found on mapquest. What you see is an exercise to get my message to you using high volume key words. Call 810-235-1970 for a free bankruptcy consultations.



Sphere: Related Content

Saturday, April 9, 2011

PARENTS WHO SEEK BANKRUPTCY KEEP TUTION LOANS IN SEPARATE ACCOUNT , Terry Bankert Flint Bankruptcy lawyer 810-235-1970

-


MOM AND DAD TRY TO PAY SONS TUTITION THEN FILE BANKRUPTCY



In this BANKRUPTRCY adversary proceeding, the Chapter 7 BANKRUPTCY Trustee seeks to avoid and recover, as fraudulent transfers, four payments that the BANKRUTPCY Debtors made to Defendant Marquette University (“Marquette”). The BANKRUPTCY Debtors made these payments, totaling $21,527.00, to pay for their 18-year old son’s tuition and certain other expenses to attend Marquette.







________________________________________/

Flint & Bay City Bankruptcy Attorney Terry R. Bankert is presenting these issues in a i-style to show the types of issues your Bankruptcy Lawyer must be competent to handle. Bankerts popular web site http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/  and his practice style demonstrate his commitment to your debtor education in the bankruptcy process. If you have questions contact Attorney Terry Bankert at 1-810-235-1970 or through http://www.attorneybankert.com/  . CAPS or [trb] are the presentors. Thank You

_______________________________________/









WHEN YOU FILE BANKRUPTCY AND IT GOES BAD IT GOES REAL BAD!





_______________________________________________________/ primary source with modification

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION, In the matter of: Case No. 08-68186,WILLIAM R. LEONARD,Chapter 7,and CARMEN U. LEONARD, Debtors. / STUART A. GOLD, Trustee, Plaintiff, vs. Adv. Pro. No. 10-4608 MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant. Judge Thomas J. Tucker,Signed on April 8, 2011

_________________________________________/

BANKRUPTCY JUDGE OPINION REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT



ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDING





The Bankruptcy Trustee and Marquette have each filed motions for summary judgment. The motions involve a number of issues, including allegations of an oral express trust; alternative allegations of a constructive trust; and

what is “reasonably equivalent value” for fraudulent transfer purposes.



IT’S A SPLIT DECISION



For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court will grant each party’s motion in part anddeny it in part.





I. Facts



HUSBAND AND WIFE FILE JOINT BANKRUPTCY



Except as noted, the following facts are undisputed. The Debtors in this case, William Leonard and Carmen Leonard, filed their joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on November 17, 2008.

BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE HAD ISSUES AND WENT TO THE JUDGE

The Chapter 7 Trustee, Stuart A. Gold, filed this adversary proceeding on February 17, 2010, and later filed an amended complaint on June 14, 2010. In his First Amended Complaint,1 the Trustee alleges that the Debtors paid Marquette $21,527.00 for their son’s tuition expenses

for the 2008-2009 academic year.





The Trustee alleges that the Debtors made the following transfers, by means of checks drawn on their joint checking account:

Date Check No. Amount

05-08-08 6959 $ 400.00

08-18-08 7012 $11,084.00

10-30-08 7064 $10,000.00

11-02-08 7061 $ 43.00

Total $21,527.002





A SON IN COLLEGE MONEY PAID WAS A PREFERENCE PAYMENT



At the time of these transfers, the Debtors’ son, Benjamin J. Leonard, was 18 years old. He began attending Marquette in the Fall of 2008.

Marquette admits that the Debtors made these four payments, by means of Debtor Carmen Leonard writing checks payable to Marquette in the amounts listed above. In his summary judgment motion, the Trustee continues to assert that the transfers were made on the

above dates.



COLLEGE SAID TRUSTEE GOT IT WRONG



But the evidence presented by both the Trustee and Marquette in support of their

motions shows that the dates of two of these transfers were different from the dates alleged byt he Trustee. The evidence shows, beyond any genuine dispute, that the checks at issue were paid

by the Debtors’ bank, and therefore the transfers were made, on the following dates:3

Date Check No. Amount

05-08-08 6959 $ 400.00

08-18-08 7012 $11,084.00

11-05-08 7064 $10,000.00

11-20-08 7061 $ 43.00

Total $21,527.00 4





SOME OF THESE PAYMENTS WERE MADE AFTER THE BANKRUPTCY WAS FILED



Thus the first three of these transfers were made within the seven months preceding the Debtors’ bankruptcy, but the last transfer was made three days after the Debtors filed bankruptcy on November 17, 2008.

Marquette claims that the August 18, 2008 and November 5, 2008 transfers, ($11,084.00 and $10,000.00 respectively) were made with the proceeds of a student loan that the Debtors’ son Benjamin obtained in August 2008.5



UNDISPUTED FACTS



While there are certain disputes between the parties regarding this subject, the following facts are undisputed.



SON APPLIED FOR STUDENT LOAN PARENT CO SIGNED



In July 2008, Benjamin Leonard applied to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) for a student loan, in the amount of $35,000.00. In the application, which was a document entitled “Private Education Loan Application/Promissory Note and Credit Agreement,” Benjamin was designated as the “student borrower.” Benjamin’s father, the Debtor William Leonard, was designated as “co-signer.”6







CHECK TO SON AND FATHER DEBTOR



Benjamin and William signed this document, in these stated capacities, on July 23, 2008. Chase approved the student loan, and mailed a check to Benjamin and William, jointly, at their home in Birmingham, Michigan.



CHECK ENDORSED AND GIVEN TO MOTHER DEBTOR FOR DEPOSIT IN HER ACCOUNT





The $35,000.00 check was made payable to “Benjamin J. Leonard &

William R. Leonard.”7 Benjamin Leonard indorsed the check and gave it to his mother, Debtor Carmen Leonard, for deposit into her bank account. There is no specific evidence in the record at this point that the Debtor William Leonard, the co-payee on the student loan check, indorsed the check, but the check was deposited into the joint checking account of the Debtors, William

and Carmen Leonard, at Comerica Bank on August 8, 2008.8









SCHOOLS SAYS THESE FUNDS WERE HELPD IN TRUST BY THE DEBTORS FOR SON



Marquette claims that when Benjamin Leonard indorsed the $35,000.00 student loan check and gave it to his mother to deposit it into her bank account, Benjamin and his parents understood that these funds were to be held in trust and used for education expenses for Benjamin at Marquette and for Benjamin’s sister, who was then in high school.





TRUSTEE SAYS OH NO YOU DON’T! DEMANDS THE SCHOOL GIVE THE MONEY TO THE TRUSTEE FOR CREDITORS



The Trustee disputes this.



Section 548(a)(9 1)(A) states, in pertinent part, that:

The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in

property, . . . that was made. . . on or within 2 years before the date of

the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—

(A) made such transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that

such transfer was made . . ., indebted; . . .11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).







The Michigan statute is similar. It permits avoidance of transfers made within

the preceding six years on several grounds, including a transfer made “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(1)(a). Such a transfer is avoidable under Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.37(1)(a).



As a result, the Trustee seeks to avoid the transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), which permits the trustee to avoid “any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property. . . that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under

section 502(e) of this title.”



II. Course of proceedings



A. The Trustee’s claims



In the single count of his First Amended Complaint, the Trustee seeks to avoid the four transfers as fraudulent transfers, and recover them from the transferee, Marquette.



The Trustee’s single count alleges four separate grounds for avoiding the transfers.



First, the Trustee alleges that the transfers were made with “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” Debtors’ creditors, and that the transfers are therefore avoidable under § 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and

under Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 566.34(1)(a) and 566.37.9







Second, the Trustee alleges that the transfers are avoidable under the following provisions

of § 548(a)(1)(B):

The Trustee may avoid any transfer. . . of an interest of the debtor

in property,. . . that was made. . . on or within 2 years before the

date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or

involuntarily—



10 Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.35(1) states:

A transfer made. . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim

arose before the transfer was made. . . if the debtor made the transfer. . .

without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

transfer. . . and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor

became insolvent as a result of the transfer. . . .

11 Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(1)(b) is similar to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(II)

and (III). It states:

A transfer made. . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the

creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made. . ., if the

debtor made the transfer. . . in either of the following:

. . .

(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

transfer. . . , and the debtor did either of the following:

(continued...)



(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in

exchange for such transfer. . . ; and

(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was

made. . . or became insolvent as a result of such transfer. . . ; and

(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about

to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property

remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; [or]

(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would

incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as

such debts matured; . . .

11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).



Third, the Trustee alleges that the transfers are avoidable under Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.35(1), which is virtually identical to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(I).10





Fourth and finally, the Trustee alleges that the transfers are avoidable under Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(1)(b).11





11(...continued)

(i ) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for

which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in

relation to the business or transaction.

( ii) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed

that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they

became due.

12 The Trustee does not seek summary judgment on his “actual intent” theory of fraudulent

transfer, which require the Trustee to prove that the Debtors made the transfers “with actual intent to

hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A); Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(1)(a).



B. The cross-motions for summary judgment



The Trustee seeks partial summary judgment, avoiding the four transfers as fraudulent under the constructive fraudulent transfer grounds in Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.35(1).



The Trustee argues that each transfer was a transfer of property of the

Debtors, made while the Debtors were insolvent, for which the Debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange.12





Marquette seeks summary judgment on all of the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer theories, with respect to each of the transfers. Marquette does not dispute the Trustee’s evidence and argument that the Debtors were insolvent when the transfers were made. Rather, Marquette argues that, at least with respect to the last three of the four transfers, there was no transfer of property of the Debtors.



And Marquette seeks summary judgment on the Trustee’s constructive

fraudulent transfer claims on the additional ground that the Debtors received “reasonably equivalent value” for each of the transfers.





The Court held a hearing on the motions, and then permitted limited post-hearing briefing relating to issues of “reasonably equivalent value.” The motions are now ready for decision.





III. Jurisdiction



The quoted 13 language is from the version of Rule 56 as amended effective December 1, 2010.

Before the 2010 amendment, Rule 56(c)(2) stated that a motion for summary judgment should be granted

“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

This Court’s decision on the motions now before it is unaffected by the 2010 amendment to Rule 56; it

would be the same under either version of Rule 56.



1334 (B)





This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a) and 157(b)(1), and Local Rule 83.50(a) (E.D. Mich.).



The single count of the Trustee’s complaint seeks to avoid fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548, and under the combination of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) and Michigan fraudulent transfer statutes.



The complaint also seeks to recover the transfers, once avoided, under 11 U.S.C. § 550.



All of the Trustee’s claims are core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H); Bliss Techs., Inc. v. HMI Indus., Inc.

(In re Bliss Techs., Inc.), 307 B.R. 598, 603-06 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004).





IV. Discussion



A. Summary judgment standard



Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056, provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”13 In Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1995), the court elaborated:



The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine

issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. To meet this burden, the moving

party may rely on any of the evidentiary sources listed in Rule

56(c) or may merely rely upon the failure of the nonmoving party

to produce any evidence which would create a genuine dispute for

the [trier of fact]. Essentially, a motion for summary judgment is a

means by which to challenge the opposing party to ‘put up or shut

up’ on a critical issue.



If the moving party satisfies its burden, then the burden of going

forward shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence that

results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by [the trier of

fact]. In arriving at a resolution, the court must afford all

reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. However, if the evidence is

insufficient to reasonably support a . . . verdict in favor of the

nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment will be

granted. Thus, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.

. . .

Finally, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that, in the “new

era” of summary judgments that has evolved from the teachings of

the Supreme Court in Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242 (1986)], Celotex [Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)] and

Matsushita [Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574 (1986)], trial courts have been afforded considerably

more discretion in evaluating the weight of the nonmoving party’s

evidence. The nonmoving party must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. If

the record taken in its entirety could not convince a rational trier of

fact to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, the motion

should be granted.



Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, a court must “believe the evidence of the nonmovant, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir.1999)(relying on Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (6th Cir.1992)).







B. Marquette’s motion for summary judgment



1. Marquette’s argument that there was an oral express trust



a. The argument



Marquette argues that none of the transfers, except possibly the first transfer of $400.00 on May 8, 2008, was a transfer of “an interest of the debtor[s] in property,” one of the necessary elements of a fraudulent transfer under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B).



Rather, Marquette argues, the transfers were made from student loan funds held by the Debtors in trust for their son Benjamin.



There was no written trust agreement regarding these funds, but Marquette argues that an oral express trust existed, under which the Debtors held the proceeds of Benjamin Leonard’s $35,000 student loan in their joint checking account in trust for Benjamin, to be usedat Benjamin’s direction and for the purposes of paying Benjamin’s tuition and expenses to attend

Marquette, as well as high school tuition and expenses of Benjamin’s sister.





As noted above, the $35,000 student loan check was deposited into the Debtors’ joint checking account on August 8, 2008, and the Debtors made two pre-petition check transfers from that account to Marquette for Benjamin’s tuition, of $11,084.00 on August 18, 2008 and $10,000.00 on November 5, 2008.





The other two transfers alleged in the Trustee’s First Amended Complaint are not subject to Marquette’s express trust argument. The first transfer, of $400.00 on May 8, 2008, could not have come from Benjamin’s student loan funds, because the loan funds were not received until August 8, 2008.



Marquette does not otherwise argue that this transfer was not a transfer of

Debtors’ property. And as discussed elsewhere in this opinion, the fourth transfer, of $43.00 on November 20, 2008, was a post-petition transfer, and for that reason is not subject to avoidance under the any of the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer theories.



b. Why Marquette’s argument matters



The Sixth Circuit has held that when a debtor holds property in trust for another, and makes a pre-petition transfer of such property, the transfer is not subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer under Bankruptcy Code § 548. See Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 849-52 (6th Cir. 2002).



The court held that because the debtor holds only legal title, and not equitable title, to such trust property, the transfer of such property is not a

transfer of “an interest of the debtor in property” within the meaning of § 548. Id.; see also Meoli v. Kendall Electric., Inc. (In re R.W. Leet Electric, Inc.), 372 B.R. 846, 852-53 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007).





Unlike Bankruptcy Code § 548, the Michigan fraudulent transfer statutes relied upon by the Trustee do not explicitly require that a transfer be a transfer of the debtor’s property in order to be avoidable. But the Michigan avoidance statutes are available to the Trustee through Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)(1), and § 544(b)(1) does require that there be a transfer of the debtor’s property.





It uses the same phrase that is used in § 548, in authorizing avoidance only of a

“transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable under applicable law . . ..” 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)(emphasis added).





Thus, whether avoidance is based on § 548 or on the combination of state law and § 544(b)(1), the Trustee cannot prevail if the transfer was only a transfer of trust property in which the Debtors held only legal title.

10-04608-tjt Doc 44 Filed 04/08/11 Entered 04/08/11 15:25:10 Page 11 of 29

12



c. Michigan law on oral express trusts



As the parties note, property interests generally are determined by reference to state law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); accord French v. Frey (In re Bergman), 467 F.3d 536, 538 (6th Cir. 2006)(citing Butner)(“Unless a federal interest is at issue, property rights are defined by state law.”)





Under Michigan law, an express trust may be established orally, at least with respect to personal property. Osius v. Dingell, 134 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. 1965) (citation omitted), cited by both parties, held that “a valid trust in personalty may be created by parol.” But “[t]o establish a trust of personalty, [the] parol evidence must be clear and satisfactory and find some support in the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties.” Id. (citation omitted). “It is a general

principle of trust law that a trust is created only if the settlor manifests an intention to create a trust, and it is essential that there be an explicit declaration of trust accompanied by a transfer of property to one for the benefit of another.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Children of Chippewa, Ottawa and Potawatomy Tribes v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 305 N.W.2d 522,

526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)(same); see generally Scarney v. Clarke, 275 N.W. 765, 767 (Mich. 1937)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(“To constitute an express trust there must

be an explicit declaration of trust, or circumstances which show beyond reasonable doubt that a trust was intended to be created.”).



d. The evidence



Marquette argues that the facts support a finding of an express oral trust. Marquette claims that the $35,000 in student loan proceeds were the res of the trust; that there was an “unambiguous trust relationship” in the form of a parent-child relationship; and that the Debtor



Carmen Leonard undertook a “specific, affirmative duty” to pay the educational expenses of Benjamin and his two sisters.14





Marquette’s express trust claim is supported by the affidavits of Benjamin Leonard and both of the Debtors. Benjamin’s affidavit states that he indorsed the student loan check and gave it to his mother, Debtor Carmen Leonard, “for deposit into her bank account and to be held in trust” for his and his sister’s educational expenses.15



Similarly, Debtor Carmen Leonard’s affidavit states her understanding that the student loan proceeds were to be deposited into the Debtors’ checking account “to be held in trust and used for tuition payments to both Marquette” and the sister’s high school. Debtor William Leonard’s affidavit states that “at all times” he understood that the loan proceeds “were being held in trust for the funding of Benjamin[’]s and [his sister’s] educations.”16





In deciding Marquette’s motion for summary judgment, however, the Court “must afford all reasonable inferences, and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” here the Trustee. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d at 149-50.



Applying this standard, the Court concludes that the Trustee has pointed out circumstantial evidence upon which a trier of fact “could reasonably find” that there was no oral express trust. Id.





First, the evidence indicates that even though Benjamin Leonard was 18 years old (and therefore an adult) at the time, the $35,000 student loan check was made payable jointly to both Benjamin Leonard “and” Debtor William Leonard. This is evidence that the Debtor William



17 William signed the loan documents as a “co-signer.” For purposes here, this means that

William had, at least, contingent liability for the student loan. Cf. In re Lipa, 433 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich. 2010) (“Generally the classic example of a contingent debt is a guaranty because the guarantor has no liability unless and until the principal defaults.”)(citation and quotation marks omitted). It is not necessary at this point for the Court to decide whether William was actually just a codebtor on the loan, with the same non-contingent liability that Benjamin had, as the Trustee contends.



Leonard, who was at least contingently liable as a “co-signer” on the loan,17 had a one-half ownership interest in the loan proceeds. See Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Citizens First Bank, No. 08- 15129, 2010 WL 1417798, at *3 (E.D. Mich. April 5, 2010)(citation omitted)(“A check is considered the personal property of the designated payees.”); Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.3110(4)

(check paid to two or more persons not in the alternative is payable to all, and can only be negotiated by all payees); see also Progressive Universal Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Taylor, 874 N.E.2d 910, 915 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007)(citations omitted)(the “issuance of an instrument to joint payees creates a presumption that each payee has an equal ownership interest in the instrument”)(applying Illinois law).



If Benjamin only owned one half of the student loan funds,

he could not have acted as settlor and created an oral express trust in the other half of the funds.



Instead, the other half of the funds were property of the Debtor, William Leonard.

Second, the fact that the $35,000 student loan check was deposited into the joint account of the Debtors, in which Benjamin Leonard had no ownership interest, creates a rebuttable presumption under Michigan law that those deposited funds were the property of the Debtors, as the owners of the account, and not Benjamin.



To rebut such presumption, “an adverse claimant must show a clear and perfect title” to such funds. See Muskegon Lumber & Fuel Co. v.

Johnson, 62 N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Mich. 1954)(citation omitted); see also Danielson v. Lazoski, 531 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)(rebuttable presumption that holders of joint bank account share equal ownership); Taunt v. Hurtado (In re Hurtado), 342 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir.

2003)(citing Muskegon Lumber for the proposition that funds deposited into the bank account of the debtor’s mother were “presumptively hers”).





Third, the assertion of an express trust is called into question, at least somewhat, by the fact that the student loan funds were deposited into Debtors’ general checking account, and thereby commingled with the other funds in that account, which belonged only to the Debtors.





Neither Benjamin nor the Debtors created a separate account to hold only the student loan funds.



Nor did Carmen set up a joint account with Benjamin that would permit her to write checks on the account to pay Benjamin’s educational expenses.



Any of these steps might have indicated an intent to hold the loan funds in trust.

Fourth, there is evidence that after the student loan funds were deposited into Debtors’ joint checking account, the Debtors used the loan funds for their own benefit, for purposes other than paying the education expenses of Benjamin and his sister.



BANKRUTPCY DEBTOR USED SCHOOL LOAN FINDS TO ;PAY THEIR PROPERTY TAXES



It is undisputed, for example, that on September 3, 2008, Debtor Carmen Leonard used $12,398.14 of the loan funds to pay the property taxes on the Debtors’ home.18



This evidence tends to show that the student loan funds were not held in trust for the sole purpose of paying the educational expenses of Benjamin and his sister, as Marquette alleges.





Marquette attempts to explain this evidence away by citing Debtor Carmen Leonard’s explanation — that before she made this large property tax payment, she made an agreement with Benjamin that the funds would be replenished shortly with a federal income tax refund of approximately $18,800 that the Debtors were expecting.



The affidavits of Carmen Leonard and



Id. at ¶ 22, 23, 19 28-30; Docket # 27, Benjamin Leonard Aff., ¶¶ 22-23, 25-26.

20 Because the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the existence of an express oral trust, it is not necessary, at this time, to discuss the Trustee’s arguments regarding tracing.



(The Trustee argues that Marquette has the burden, but has not met its burden, to trace the alleged trust funds under the “lowest intermediate balance rule.” See Meoli v. Kendall Electric, Inc.(In re R.E. Leet Electric, Inc.), 372 B.R. 846, 853-57 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007)(holding that under Sixth Circuit precedent express trust funds must be traced; the burden to do so is on defendant; and tracing “involves application

of the ‘lowest intermediate balance rule’”).)



Benjamin Leonard support these assertions. And Debtors in fact did receive such a tax refund, totaling $18,870.00, in two installments that were direct-deposited into their joint checking account on September 25 and 29, 2008.19





Viewing all of the evidence in the current record in a light most favorable to the Trustee, however, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether an oral express trust was created. There is evidence both in support of and refuting the existence of an oral express trust.



The Court therefore must deny Marquette’s summary judgment motion to the

extent it is based on the existence of an oral express trust.20



2. Marquette’s alternative argument, that if there was not an oral express trust, then a constructive trust existed





Marquette makes an alternative argument, that if there was not an oral express trust, then the $35,000.00 in student loan funds were impressed with a constructive trust, for the benefit of Benjamin Leonard and his sister, under Michigan law. Under this alternative theory, Marquette argues, the funds transferred were not the property of the Debtors.



COURT SAYS NO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST



The Court must reject this argument. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994) and its progeny preclude Marquette’s constructive trust argument. In Omegas Group, the Sixth Circuit held that “[b]ecause a constructive trust, unlike an express trust, is a remedy, it does not exist until a plaintiff obtains a judicial decision finding him to be entitled to a judgment ‘impressing’

defendant’s property or assets with a constructive trust.” Id. at 1451. Under Omegas Group, only “‘property already impressed with a constructive trust by a court in a separate proceeding prepetition’ [is] to be excluded from a bankrupt’s estate.” McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1996)(emphasis added)(quoting Omegas Group, 16 F.3d at 1451).





In this case, no prior judicial action imposed a pre-petition constructive trust on the student loan funds. Nor is this a case like the McCafferty case, in which the Sixth Circuit held that because of an Ohio state court divorce judgment awarding property to one of the spouses, a constructive trust arose by operation of Ohio law. See McCafferty, 96 F.3d at 197; see also In re Combs, 435 B.R. 467, 477-79 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010)(constructive trust existed by operation

of Michigan law in pension funds held by debtor for the benefit of former spouse, based on state court divorce judgment). Unlike McCafferty, in this case there was no “judicial action” of any kind regarding the student loan funds at issue, prior to Debtors’ bankruptcy. See McCafferty, 96

F.3d at 199. Nor does Marquette cite any Michigan statute that creates a trust in this situation.

See Omegas Group, 16 F.3d at 1451 (Omegas court was not “address[ing] property that a state by statute has declared to be held in trust for particular purposes.”)



Because no pre-petition judicial action imposed a constructive trust on the student loan funds, the Court cannot now find or impose a constructive trust. The Court, therefore, must deny Marquette’s summary judgment motion to the extent it is based on the argument that the student loan funds were subject to a constructive trust.



3. Marquette’s argument that the Debtors received “reasonably equivalent value” for the transfers in any event



Marquette argues that even if the transfers were transfers of the Debtors’ property, the Debtors received “reasonably equivalent value” for the transfers, because the transfers enabled their son to attend and receive a college education at Marquette.



This argument, if successful, would negate an essential element of all of the Trustee’s constructive fraudulent transfer theories under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B) and Michigan law.





The Trustee argues that the entire “value” received in exchange for the tuition paid by Debtors was received by a third party, Benjamin. Marquette acknowledges this direct benefit to Debtors’ son, but argues that Debtors also received “value,” and indeed, “reasonably equivalent value,” for the tuition payments made to Marquette, in the form of intangible benefits:



(1) “their son received an education” which “bestowed peace of mind” on the Debtors that Benjamin “will be afforded opportunities” in life that would not have come but for the education; and



(2) Debtors “anticipate that they will not remain financially responsible” for Benjamin.21





The Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase “reasonably equivalent value.”



But the Code defines “value,” for purposes of § 548, as “property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but [it] does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).





Similarly, the Michigan fraudulent transfer statutes use, but do not define, the phrase “reasonably equivalent value.” See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 566.35(1), 566.34(1)(b), quoted in footnotes 10 and 11 of this opinion. And they define “value” in terms virtually identical to



That 22 statute says, in pertinent part, that:

Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the

transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is

secured or satisfied. Value does not include an unperformed promise

made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to

furnish support to the debtor or another person.

23 Lisle is an unpublished Sixth Circuit case. The Sixth Circuit’s rules now permit the citation of unpublished decisions, without limitation. 6th Cir. R. 28(f). When Lisle was decided in 2006, however,

the Sixth Circuit’s rules restricted the citation of its unpublished opinions. Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g) then

in effect stated, in pertinent part:

Citation of unpublished decisions in briefs and oral arguments in this

Court and in the district courts within this Circuit is disfavored, except

for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the

case. If a party believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition

has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case, and that

there is no published opinion that would serve as well, such decision

may be cited if that party serves a copy thereof on all other parties in the

case and on this Court.

The Sixth Circuit amended this local rule, effective January 27, 2007. The amendment was made in

response to the adoption of Fed.R.App.P. 32.1, effective December 1, 2006, which precludes courts from

(continued...)







Bankruptcy Code § 548’s definition. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.33(1).22 Thus, “reasonably equivalent value” under the Michigan statute means the same thing that it does under Bankruptcy Code § 548. See generally Steinberg v. Young, No. 09-11836, 2010 WL 1286606, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2010) (“Michigan Courts have imported the analysis used in the Federal

Bankruptcy Code” in determining “reasonably equivalent value” under the Michigan Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act)(citing Willecke v. Toth, No. 07-14676, 2009 WL 3153081, at *4 (E.D. Mich. September 30, 2009)).





The Sixth Circuit discussed the § 548 concepts of “value” and “reasonably equivalent value” in Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (In re Wilkinson), 196 Fed.App’x. 337, No. 05-5744, 2006 WL 2380887 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006).23 In Lisle, the court held that “[a] court considering



23(...continued)

prohibiting the citation of federal judicial opinions that are designated as unpublished and that are “issued on or after January 1, 2007.” But the current Sixth Circuit Rules do not limit the use even of unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 2007. Rather, current Sixth Circuit Rule 28(f) broadly

states that “[c]itation of unpublished opinions is permitted.”



[the question of “reasonably equivalent value”] should first determine whether the debtor received any value in the exchange. If so, the court should determine if the value received was reasonably equivalent.” 196 Fed.App’x. at 341 (emphasis in original)(citation omitted). The court further held that “[v]alue can be in the form of either a direct economic benefit or an indirect economic benefit.” Id. at 342. The court discussed the situation in which the

debtor/transferor does not receive a direct benefit in exchange for the transfer, but rather receives an “indirect” benefit, “through benefit to a third person.”



The court noted:

“It is well settled that ‘reasonably equivalent value can come from one

other than the recipient of the payments, a rule which has become known

as the indirect benefit rule.’ ” (citations omitted). The indirect benefit rule

was first explained in Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.:

[A] debtor may sometimes receive “fair”

consideration even though the consideration given

for his property or obligation goes initially to a third

person.... [T]he transaction's benefit to the debtor

need not be direct; it may come indirectly

through benefit to a third person.... If the

consideration given to the third person has

ultimately landed in the debtor's hands, or if the

giving of the consideration to the third person

otherwise confers an economic benefit upon the

debtor, then the debtor's net worth has been

preserved, and [the statute] has been satisfiedprovided,

of course, that the value of the benefit

received by the debtor approximates the value of

the property or obligation he has given up.

661 F.2d 979, 991-92 (2d Cir.1981)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Id. at 342 (bold emphasis added).



WHO HAS THE VALUE?



In this case the “value,” in the form of a benefit that was given by Marquette in exchange for the Debtors’ making tuition payments for their son, went directly to the Debtors’ son Benjamin, who was able to attend and receive a college education at Marquette. The benefit from this to the Debtors, if any, was indirect, because any benefit to the Debtors was derived from the benefit to their son.



This is not a case, for example, where the Debtors’ tuition

payments to Marquette satisfied some antecedent debt that the Debtors owed to Marquette.





In that scenario, not present in this case, Debtors’ tuition payments could be deemed “value” in the form of a direct economic benefit to the Debtors.

The Lisle case also involved an indirect benefit to the debtor/transferor. In Lisle, the bankruptcy debtor Wallace Wilkinson paid $1 million from his personal funds to John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), a book publisher, for a shipment of books that Wiley sold to Wallace’s Bookstore, Inc. (“WBI”).



The debtor Wilkinson was the majority shareholder of WBI. At the

time of Wilkinson’s $1 million transfer to Wiley, Wilkinson owed $60 million to WBI. WBI credited Wilkinson with a $1 million reduction in Wilkinson’s debt to WBI. 196 Fed.App’x at

337-38, 342. Thus, in exchange for Wilkinson’s $1 million payment to Wiley, the following benefits flowed: (1) a direct economic benefit flowing from Wiley to WBI, in the form of a

shipment of books that Wiley sold to WBI; and (2) an indirect economic benefit flowing from WBI to the debtor Wilkinson, in the form of a $1 million credit against Wilkinson’s debt to WBI.





The Sixth Circuit characterized the latter benefit as “indirect,” because “the benefit Wilkinson received did not come from Wiley,” the transferee of Wilkinson’s $1 million transfer, but rather from WBI. Id. at 342.



In Lisle, the Sixth Circuit held that when the benefit to the debtor/transferor is indirect, the fraudulent transfer defendant has the burden of showing that the indirect benefit to the debtor/transferor is “concrete and quantifiable,” and has the burden of quantifying the benefit. Id. (citing cases, with approval).

VALUE MUST BE CONCRETE AND QUANTIFIABLE

This burden can be difficult to meet in the case of an intangible,

indirect benefit; as the Lisle court noted:



The burden of showing that the benefit is concrete and quantifiable can be

challenging in a case where the alleged benefit is goodwill, corporate

synergy, a business opportunity, the continuation of a business

relationship, or some other intangible benefit.



Id. (citations omitted). In the Lisle case, the court found that the indirect benefit to the debtor Wilkinson — a $1 million reduction in Wilkinson’s debt to WBI — was concrete and quantifiable. Id.





Finally, the Lisle court held that whether the benefit to a debtor from a transfer is direct or indirect, it must be an “economic” benefit to the debtor in order to be considered “value.” Id.



(“Value can be in the form of either a direct economic benefit or an indirect economic benefit.”)

As the Lisle court held: “The district court rightly stated that ‘the focus should be on the overall effect on the debtor's net worth after the transfer.’” Id. at 343 (citations omitted).



Thus, under the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lisle, an indirect benefit to the debtor from a transfer is not considered “value,” and therefore cannot be “reasonably equivalent value,” unless it is



(1) an “economic” benefit;



(2) concrete; and



(3) quantifiable.



PARNETS DID NOT GET VALUE



Applying these requirements to this case, it is clear that the Debtors did not receive any “value” for their tuition payments to Marquette, and therefore did not receive “reasonably equivalent value.” Marquette points to no economic benefit to the Debtors, other than to speculate that a college education for Debtors’ son may in the future enable him to be financially independent of his parents, and thereby relieve Debtors of any need to financially support their

son.



But Marquette does not argue, and cannot demonstrate, that Debtors had or would have any legal obligation to support their adult son, either at the time of the transfers, when Debtors’ son was 18 years old, or at any time in the future. And even if Debtors had such a legal obligation, it is nothing but speculation to suggest that Debtors’ payment of tuition for their son’s first semester of college at Marquette will make a difference between the Debtors needing to assist

their son financially in the future and not needing to do so.





And as noted above, Marquette does not claim that the Debtors had any legal duty under Michigan law to pay for their adult son’s college education. So Debtors’ payment of such college tuition did not discharge or satisfy any legal duty on Debtors’ part. Understandably, Debtors may have felt a moral obligation to help their son pay for college, which the tuition payments helped satisfy. And Marquette argues that paying Benjamin’s first-semester tuition “bestowed peace of mind” on the Debtors that Benjamin “will be afforded opportunities” in life that would not have come but for the education he received at Marquette.



While satisfying such a moral obligation and receiving such “peace of mind” may be very real benefits that are personally quite important to the Debtors, these intangible benefits are not “economic” benefits to the Debtors. Nor are they “concrete” and “quantifiable” benefits.

Under Lisle, then, such benefits do not qualify as “value” under § 548. The Debtors having received such benefits did not increase their “net worth,” nor did such benefits increase the Debtors’ assets in any way that could be used to pay their creditors. Rather, Debtors transferred To Marquette $21,084.00 (assuming that this was property of the Debtors, a disputed issue

discussed in part IV-B-1 of this opinion,) and they received no economic value in exchange.





Many cases hold, in similar situations, that there is not “reasonably equivalent value” received by a debtor who makes payments to a family member, or who makes payments to a third party for the benefit of a family member.



For example, in Dietz v. St. Edward’s Catholic Church

(In re Bargfrede), 117 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997), a husband used his assets to help pay his wife’s judgment debt to her church for embezzlement.



The Eighth Circuit held that the husband’s claimed receipt of “benefits in the form of a release of a possible burden on the marital relationship and the preservation of the family relationship” were “indirect, non-economic benefits” to the husband that “do not constitute reasonably equivalent value.” Id. at 1080 (citations omitted).



The court cited with approval cases holding that “moral obligations,” “love

and affection,” and “spiritual fulfillment” are not reasonably equivalent value. Id. See also Walker v. Treadwell (In re Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050, 1051 (11th Cir. 1983)(holding that debtor’s receipt of “love and affection” from his two daughters in exchange for transfers of money was not reasonably equivalent value; such love and affection “is of no benefit to the creditors”); Zubrod v. Kelsey (In re Kelsey), 270 B.R. 776, 781 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001)(debtor transferred money to his wife, in exchange for her agreement “to forego employment outside the

home, to take care of the family, and to provide comfort, advice, and society as [debtor’s] wife;” court held that debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value: “value is limited to economic or monetary consideration, and . . . the care and comfort one receives from a marital relationship

does not qualify”); Hanrahan v. Walterman (In re Walterman Implement, Inc.), No. 07-09043,2007 WL 2901151, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 28, 2007)(debtor corporation’s sole shareholder caused the corporation to pay his daughter’s college expenses, in exchange for daughter’s “love, affection, and promise to work hard in school;” court distinguished reasonably equivalent value under § 548 from “legal consideration necessary to form a legally binding

contract,” and held that reasonably equivalent value requires “a financial benefit to the debtor and thus to the creditors,” and “love and affection will rarely, if ever, constitute reasonably equivalent value because they are of no use to creditors”); Henkel v. Green (In re Green), 268 B.R. 628, 651 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)(debtors “understandably felt a moral or family

obligation” to pay for their daughter’s wedding or to make a sizeable wedding gift, but satisfying such a moral obligation is not reasonably equivalent value, nor is “love and affection”).





Nor can Marquette demonstrate that any alleged benefit to Debtors “is concrete and quantifiable . . . .” Lisle, 196 Fed.App’x at 342; see also Pension Transfer Corp. v. Beneficiaries Under the Third Amendment to Fruehauf Trailer Corp. Retirement Plan No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2006)(“[W]here value of intangible benefit could equal or exceed the value surrendered. . . , precise calculations are essential to allow the court to

determine equivalency properly.”); Dayton Title Agency, Inc. v. White Family Cos., Inc. (In re Dayton Title Agency, Inc.), 292 B.R. 857, 875 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003)(“[T]he economic value of any indirect benefits must be fairly concrete and quantifiable to merit consideration by the court.”) (citing SPC Plastics Corp. v. Griffith (In re Structurelite Plastics Corp.), 224 B.R. 27, 31

(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)).



While Marquette claims that Debtors received value in the form of the “substantial benefit conferred upon parents when their child is educated,”24



Marquette did not attempt to quantify this value in any manner. When questioned during the hearing on the motions about how to value this claimed indirect benefit, Marquette’s counsel replied only that it would be an

“extremely difficult determination.” Speculative and unquantifiable claims of psychological benefits cannot meet Marquette’s burden. See, e.g., SPC Plastics Corp., 224 B.R. at 31 (where no evidence provided as to the value of indirect benefits, claim that the opportunity to acquire additional loans and receive new management talent found to be “speculative value”); Dayton Title, 292 B.R. at 875 (no attempt made “to measure or quantify” claims of “goodwill and

continuation of business relationships,” instead fraudulent conveyance defendants “only speculate[d], without evidentiary support,” that the value was reasonably equivalent).





For these reasons, the Court must reject Marquette’s argument, and in fact must conclude that the Debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for any of the transfers at issue.



This is so with respect to the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims based on Bankruptcy Code § 548 as well as his claims based on Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes.



4. Conclusion regarding Marquette’s summary judgment motion



For the reasons discussed above, the Court must deny Marquette’s summary judgment motion, with one exception.



Marquette is entitled to summary judgment on all of the Trustee’s

fraudulent transfer claims with respect to the last of the four transfers alleged in the Trustee’s complaint.



As discussed in part I of this opinion, the evidence shows without dispute that this $43.00 transfer was made on November 20, 2008, after Debtors’ bankruptcy petition was filed on November 17, 2008.



Because that was a post-petition transfer, it cannot be avoided as a

fraudulent transfer under either § 548 or § 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. And the Trustee’s First Amended Complaint does not allege any other basis for avoiding this post-petition transfer. Section 548 applies only to transfers made “on or within 2 years before the date of filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(emphasis added).





So it does not apply to post-petition transfers. E.g., Hoffman v. Cheek (In re Meltzer), 90 B.R. 21, 23 (D. Conn. 1988).



The Trustee’s claims based on Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes are made through Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)(1), and the Trustee’s avoidance power under that section are also limited to pre-petition transfers. See Rieser v. Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP (In re Troutman Enters., Inc.), No. 05-8051)

2007 WL 205640, at *9, 10 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. January 26, 2007).





For the reasons stated, the Court will grant summary judgment for Marquette on all of the Trustee’s claims relating to the $43.00 transfer, but otherwise will deny Marquette’s summary judgment motion.





C. The Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment



The Trustee seeks partial summary judgment, avoiding all four of the transfers as fraudulent under the constructive fraudulent transfer grounds in Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(B) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.35(1).





The Trustee argues that each transfer was a transfer of

property of the Debtors, made while the Debtors were insolvent, for which the Debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange.





The Trustee presented substantial evidence that the Debtors were insolvent when each of the transfers was made. Marquette does not dispute the Trustee’s evidence, and does not dispute the Debtors’ insolvency.



Based on this, the Court finds that the Debtors were insolvent when the

transfers were made. For the reasons discussed in part IV-B-3 of this opinion, the Court has found that the Debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value for any of the transfers.



This leaves the disputed issues of whether and to what extent the transfers were transfers of property of the Debtors.



For the reasons discussed in part IV-B-1 of this opinion, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this element of the Trustee’s constructive fraudulent transfer theories, with respect to the second and third transfers (i.e., the transfers of $11,084.00 and $10,000.00 on August 18, 2008 and November 5, 2008, respectively.)



The Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment therefore must be denied with respect to these transfers.





In contrast, the Trustee’s motion must be granted with respect to the first transfer — i.e., the transfer of $400.00 on May 8, 2008. There is no genuine dispute that this transfer was a transfer of the Debtors’ property. As Marquette concedes, the May 8, 2008 transfer could not possibly have been a transfer of proceeds from the August 2008 student loan, so Marquette’s oral express trust argument does not apply to this transfer.



The Trustee has demonstrated, beyond any genuine dispute, all of the necessary elements for avoidance of the first transfer, under his

constructive fraudulent transfer theories.





V. Conclusion



For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court will enter an order (1) granting the Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the first transfer (the $400.00 transfer on May 8, 2008), and otherwise denying the motion; and (2) granting Marquette’s

motion for summary judgment with respect to the fourth transfer (the $43.00 post-petition

transfer on November 20, 2008), and otherwise denying the motion.

Signed on April 8, 2011 /s/ Thomas J. Tucker

Thomas J. Tucker

United States Bankruptcy Judge

-----end



If you have questions contcat Flint Bankruptcy attorney Terry R. Bankert at 810-235-1970 or through http://www.nojokebeingbroke.com/




Sphere: Related Content