Showing posts with label terry bankert. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terry bankert. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 27, 2019

CHANGE IN CUSTODY BY TERRY BANKERT 235-1970

DID YOU KNOW.

MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that in a custody dispute, a trial court, for the best interests of the child at the center of the dispute, may “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances.” 

[Principle source e-journal #71713, Unpublished 11/14/19.No.349021. ]

But the court is not permitted to “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

“These initial steps to changing custody— finding a change of circumstance or proper cause and not changing an established custodial environment without clear and convincing evidence—are intended to erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). 

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the moving party has established proper cause or a change of circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 508-509.

In McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125, 131-132; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), this Court explained: Proper cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken. 

In order to establish a change of circumstances, a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.

To constitute a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child. [Citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted.] 

With respect to the issue of “proper cause,” the criteria outlined in the statutory best
interest factors, MCL 722.23, “should be relied on by a trial court in deciding if a particular fact raised by a party is a ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’ ground to revisit custody orders.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. 

In regard to “change of circumstances,” the relevance of facts presented should also “be[] gauged by the statutory best interest factors.” Id. at 514. “Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605. 

In Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512, this Court, addressing the threshold issue, observed: Obviously, trial courts must make this factual determination case by case. Although these decisions will be based on the facts particular to each case, we do not suggest that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this initial question. 

Often times, the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.

 MCR 3.210(C)(8) provides: In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.

 It is clear to us, and was effectively accepted by the trial court, that if the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s motion to modify custody are true, they would easily establish a change of circumstances and proper cause for purposes of revisiting the issue of custody under the statutory best-interest factors.

 But the trial court found it problematic that plaintiff had not submitted any statements, affidavits, reports, or other documentary evidence to support the allegations, let alone evidence that was current and relevant. 

The motion to modify custody was not verified, nor did plaintiff supply her own affidavit. MCR 3.210(C)(8) allowed the trial court to require “an offer of proof or otherwise” in relation to deciding whether to order an evidentiary hearing.

Under the circumstances of the case and given the remarks made by the trial court when ruling on the motion, the court’s hesitation and resistance at giving any weight to the allegations in plaintiff’s motion was plainly driven by the four CPS investigations instigated by plaintiff that resulted in determinations that allegations of abuse by defendant could not be substantiated.

The lack of substantiation, again and again, could reasonably call into question plaintiff’s motives and credibility on all matters.

 The trial court appeared more than open to further considering a motion to modify custody if plaintiff would come forward with supporting documentary evidence, explaining why the court took the unusual step of denying the motion without prejudice.

 Indeed, the record and the CPS history support the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to modify custody simply on the-1970 basis that plaintiff did not provide supporting documentation on the threshold issue of change of circumstances or proper cause."
Presented here by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce Attorney 810-235-1970 FlintFamilyLaw.com

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Friday, January 9, 2015

VICTEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUCK WITH ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

WIFE BEATER STILL GETS THE BENEFIT.

Discussed  are Issues of Divorce, Validity of the parties' antenuptial agreement and  "Change in circumstances" (COC); Presented by FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER Terry R. Bankert 235-1970 1/9/15.#flintdivorce

The Michigan Court of Appeals  Decided 12/18/14,  among other issues  that the parties' antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, concluding that to invalidate it on the basis of one party's fault would contravene the agreement's clear and unambiguous language, and that as a matter of law, the defendant-wife failed to show that a change of circumstances [ COC] was sufficient to void it.[1] The claimed change in circumstances was the domestic violence  inflicted on the  wife  by the husband.

The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145. [2]

The definition of an #antenuptial .  A prenuptial agreement, antenuptial agreement, or premarital agreement, commonly abbreviated to prenup or prenupt, is acontract entered into prior to marriage, civil union or any other agreement prior to the main agreement by the people intending to marry or contract with each other.[3]
The content of a prenuptial agreement can vary widely, but commonly includes provisions for division of property and spousal support in the event of divorce or breakup of marriage.[3]
They may also include terms for the forfeiture of assets as a result of divorce on the grounds of adultery; further conditions of guardianship may be included as well.[3]
It should not be confused with the historic marriage settlement which was concerned not primarily with the effects of divorce but with the establishment and maintaining of dynastic families.[3]
In some countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands, the prenuptial agreement not only provides for the event of a divorce, but also to protect some property during the marriage, for instance in case of a bankruptcy.[3]
Postnuptial agreements are similar to prenuptial agreements, except that they are entered into after a couple is married.[1]     [3]

The  Defendant wife in this case is trying to set aside the prenuptial agreement she signed.
Her argument is essential she could not foresee her husband would be a wife beater when she signed the prenuptial agreement.

Defendant  here did not provide any case law supporting "her position that someone's 'fault' in a divorce can constitute an unforeseen" COC. Further, assuming that the alleged abuse "occurred and was unforeseeable," this COC was "not sufficient to void the parties' antenuptial agreement in this instance.[1]

The types of changes of circumstances that may void an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement must relate to the issues addressed in the antenuptial agreement.[1]

Since the primary focus of the antenuptial agreement addressed spousal support and the division of the parties' assets, any changes of circumstances must relate to these aspects, and here, the domestic abuse does not." The court found that Hutchison did not stand for the proposition that abuse, alone, can constitute a sufficient COC to void an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement.[1]

Defendant here  appeals as of right a judgment of divorce entered by the trial court. We  the Michigan COurt of Appeals affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. [2]

The parties signed an antenuptial agreement on September 9, 1993, two days before their wedding on September 11, 1993. This case primarily deals with the validity and enforcement of that antenuptial agreement.[2]

THE FOLLOWING ARE PARTS OF THAT AGREEMENT

It said “ In the event that the marriage . . . terminate[s] as a result of divorce, then, in full satisfaction, settlement, and discharge of any and all rights or claims of alimony, support, property division, or other rights or claims of any kind, nature, or description incident to marriage and divorce (including any right to payment of legal fees incident to a divorce), under the present or future statutes and laws of common law of the state of Michigan or any other jurisdiction (all of which are hereby waived and released), the parties agree that all property acquired after the marriage between the parties shall be divided between the parties with each party receiving 50 percent of the said property”.[2]

However, notwithstanding the above, the following property acquired after the marriage will remain the sole and separate property of the party acquiring the property and/or named on the property: [2]

a. As provided in paragraph Two and Three of this antenuptial agreement, any increase in the value of any property, rents, profits, or dividends arising from property previously owned by either party shall remain the sole and separate property of that party.[2]

b. Any property acquired in either party’s individual capacity or name during the marriage, including any contributions to retirement plans (including but not limited to IRAs, 401(k) plans, SEP IRAs, IRA rollovers, and pension plans), shall remain the sole and separate property of the party named on the account or the party who acquired the property in his or her individual capacity or name.[2]
* * *
8. Each party shall, without compensation, join as grantor in any and all conveyances of property made by the other party or by his or her heirs, devises, or personal representatives, thereby relinquishing all claim to the property so conveyed, including without limitation any dower or homestead rights, and each party shall further, upon the other’s request, take any and all steps and execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the other party any and all further instruments necessary or expedient to effectuate the purpose and intent of this agreement.[2]
* * *
10. Each party acknowledges that the other party has advised him or her of the other party’s means, resources, income, and the nature and extent of the other party’s properties and holdings (including, but not limited to, the financial information set forth in exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference) and that there is a likelihood for substantial appreciation of those assets subsequent to the marriage of the parties.[2]

Included with the agreement was plaintiff’s disclosure statement, which provided that he already had approximately $400,000 in net worth.[2]

Because the antenuptial agreement prohibited the award of any spousal support, the trial court did not award any.[2]

YOU MAY BE INTERESTED TO KNOW.

In Michigan, antenuptial agreements “may be voided (1) when obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact, (2) if it was unconscionable when executed, or (3) when the facts and circumstances are so changed since the agreement was executed that its enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable.” Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 142-143; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). The party challenging the validity of an antenuptial agreement carries the burden of proof and persuasion. Id. at 143. [2]

“To determine if a prenuptial agreement is unenforceable because of a change in circumstances, the focus is on whether the changed circumstances were reasonably foreseeable either before or during the signing of the prenuptial agreement.” Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 373;793 NW2d 63 (2010).[2]

DID YOU KNOW THE FOLLOWING IS HOW THE COURTS DECIDE TO DIVIDE YOUR PRIOPERTY.

However, generally, assets earned by one spouse during the marriage are nonetheless considered part of the marital estate. Korth, 256 Mich App at 291. When dividing the marital estate, trial courts may consider the following factors:
(1) the duration of the marriage, (2) the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) the age of the parties, (4) the health of the parties, (5) the life situation of the parties, Prenuptial agreements . . . provide . . . people with the opportunity to ensure predictability, plan their future with more security, and, most importantly, decide their own destiny.[2]

The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145. [2]

In this case, there is an antenuptial agreement that unambiguously provides that “[a]ny property acquired in either party’s individual capacity or name during the marriage . . . shall remain the sole and separate property of the party named on the account or the party who acquired the property in his or her individual capacity or name.” Nevertheless, defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly refused to consider dividing the property instead pursuant to MCL 552.23(1) and MCL 552.401. [2]
Presented by FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY  Terry R. Bankert 235-1970 1/9/15.#flintdivorce




SOURCE
[1]
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Published),Case Name: AXXXXX v. AXXXXX
e-Journal Number: 58909,Judge(s): Wilder, M.J. Kelly, and Fort Hood Decided 12/18/14


[2]
AXXXXX v AXXXXX,Before: M.J. Kelly, P.J., and Wilder and Fort Hood, JJ.,
Published Michigan Court of Appeals Opinion,Docket No(s) 308194
Lower Court Docket No(s) 10-110358-DM,Wilder, J.

[3]

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Sunday, July 6, 2014

CELEBRITY WOMEN WHO PAY GAL-IMONY by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce Attorney 810-235-1970



GAL-IMONY CELEBRITY WOMEN WHO PAY SUPPORT.[3]

Thank You Gloria Steinamn.

Halle Berry’s case and others mentioned here, Madonna  , Kirstie Alley and Britney Spears are not Michigan cases or from #Flint.

Genesee Flint Michigan law of spousal support is found here using the celebrity cases as a backdrop.

Halle Berry falls in line with a growing number of women who pay child support.[3]

"The law is gender neutral and support is the right of the child not the parent," said Jonathan Wolfe, an attorney and partner with Skoloff & Wolfe. "If you are the higher wage earner, man or woman, be prepared to pay."[4]

IN MICHIGAN,The court may award spousal support as is just and reasonable if the property award is insufficient for the suitable support of either party and any children of the marriage of whom the party has custody. The court must consider “the ability of either party to pay and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case.” MCL 552.23(1).[5]

A 2013 Pew report found that women are the sole or primary breadwinners in 40 percent of households with children under 18. [2]

Halle Berry  is now a ranking member of an exclusive club in Hollywood: celebrity women who've had to pay their exes after their split.[3]

More than half of divorce lawyers surveyed by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers cited an increase in the number of mothers assigned to make child support payments in the past five years.[4]

The long-lived child support battle between Halle Berry and ex-lover, Gabriel Aubrey, appears to be over—for now at least.[1]

According to People, the Academy Award-winning actress has been ordered to pay Gabriel $16,000 per month in child support for their daughter, Nahla, until she either turns 19 years old or finishes high school. That’s a pretty long time considering that Nahla is only six.[1]

The Oscar-winner will fork over $200,000 per year plus tuition money for the ex-couple’s six-year-old daughter Nahla. Berry must also make a retroactive payment of $115,000 and another $300,000 to Aubry’s attorneys to cover their fees.[2]

IN MICHIGAN, Factors to be considered  in awarding spousal support include the following:
  • Past relations and conduct of the parties. How the parties conducted the marriage as well as fault in the breakdown of the marriage. Fault is only one factor and should not be assigned disproportionate weight.
  • Length of the marriage. A long-term marriage is especially relevant where one spouse has no career or marketable skills and his or her standard of living may be reduced because of the divorce.
  • Ability of the parties to work.
  • Source of and amount of property awarded to the parties.The focus is on the income-earning potential of the assets rather than their value; a spouse is not required to dissipate property awarded to meet daily needs where spousal support can be available.
  • Ages of the parties.
  • Ability of the parties to pay spousal support. Sources considered in determining the ability to pay include earnings, pension plans, unemployment compensation, tax refunds, and Social Security benefits. Ability to pay includes the payer spouse’s unexercised ability to earn if income is voluntarily reduced to avoid paying spousal support. Factors relevant to the ability to pay include (1) the parties’ employment histories, (2) reasons for any termination of employment, (3) work opportunities available, (4) diligence in trying to find employment, and (5) availability of employment.
  • Present situation of the parties.
  • Needs of the parties.
  • Health of the parties. The parties’ health is relevant to the ability to work and to the personal needs of the spouse seeking support.
  • Prior standard of living of the parties.
  • Whether either party is responsible for the support of others.
  • General principles of equity.
The court must make findings on each factor relevant to the claim before it.[5]

Berry and Aubry have been locked in a bitter custody battle over their daughter, Nahla, since 2012, the same year a judge blocked the actress from moving with their daughter to France.[3]

Halle Berry’s... shocking ruling was delivered in a Los Angeles court room on May 30. ... Halle has also been ordered to pay Gabriel $300,000 in attorney’s fees. Court documents reveal that the two share equal custody of Nahla.[1]

IN MICHIGAN, Factors relevant to the amount of support.
  • duration of the marriage
  • the parties’ contribution to the joint estate
  • the parties’ ages
  • the parties’ health
  • the parties’ stations in life
  • the parties’ necessities and circumstances
  • the parties’ earning abilities


Halle and Gabriel’s co-parenting situation certainly has not been the most ideal over the past couple of years.[1]

[T]he former couple’s 2012 Thanksgiving was stained with memories of bloodshed and a prison cell after Gabriel got into a physical altercation with Halle’s now-husband, Olivier Martinez.[1]

Aubry, 38, and Berry, 47, dated from 2005 to 2010 but never married. In 2012, the couple became involved in a custody dispute over Nahla, when a judge blocked the X-Men: Days of Future Past star from moving their daughter to France to live with her and her now-husband Olivier Martinez. The fight culminated in a physical altercation between Aubry and Martinez in November of 2012, People reported. Aubry and Berry now share equal custody of the girl, according to court documents.[2]

Because the number of female breadwinners is at a peak and more men are asking for shared custody, cases of women paying child support are likely on the rise, too. A 2012 survey of divorce lawyers in the United States found that 56 percent of attorneys saw an increase in numbers paying child support since 2009.[2]

"Courts look at income from all sources, such as earned income and income earned from their assets," Wolfe told MainStreet. "When fixing the rate of return for unearned income, courts will be guided by the actual historical returns or impute a reasonable assumed rate of return."[4]

IN MICHIGAN TO DETERMINE HOW LONG SPOUSAL SUPPORT SHOULDLAST THE FOLLOWING IS USED.
Rehabilitative spousal support.
Rehabilitative spousal support is temporary spousal support to help the dependent spouse make the transition to self-support. It can be appropriate to
  • encourage a spouse to seek full-time employment and self-sufficiency
  • allow a spouse to complete an advanced degree or obtain a marketable skill when he or she had worked while the other spouse obtained a degree
  • allow a spouse to adjust to a lifestyle not based on combined incomes
  • allow a spouse to obtain new job skills and enter the workforce
Permanent spousal support (generally until death or remarriage).
It has been found appropriate when there is
  • a long-term marriage with a spouse who has no career or marketable skills
  • a long-term marriage, one spouse with superior earning skills, and the other spouse with questionable earning capacity
  • great discrepancy between incomes and a wife who devoted most of her adult life to homemaker role
  • serious doubt that a spouse could support himself or herself because of a disability[5]


Berry isn't the first female star to be on the hook for child support. [Others]... who had to pay big.[3]

MADONNA

The Material Girl's reported $76-$96 million settlement in 2008 with Guy Ritchie was considered a record payout, let alone one by a woman. Even her publicist, Liz Rosenberg, acknowledged its significance.[3]

ANNE HECHE

When the marriage broke up five years later, Laffoon sought at least $33,000 a month in spousal support and custody of Homer, claiming that Heche was a poor parent with "bizarre and delusional behavior," according to a court filing obtained by People magazine. [3]

KRISTIE ALLEY

In one filing,...Kristi Alley’s husband... Stevenson asked for "sufficient support" to "maintain a lifestyle commensurate to that which Kirstie and I had enjoyed during our marriage," including $18,000 a month to pay rent on a home in Bel Air.[3]

Though Stevenson once enjoyed the spotlight, he claimed that his earnings were only a fraction of what Alley earned and he did not expect to ever approach her income. Ultimately, he settled for a one-time payout of $6 million, according to Forbes.com.[3]

BRITNEY SPEARS

Federline was embroiled in a custody battle with Spears, who only had visitation rights to see their children. In 2008, she gave up her custody fight but gained more visiting time with the boys. At the same time, her child support payments to Federline reportedly increased by $5,000 to $20,000 a month.[3]

Spears was also on the hook for Federline's legal fees to the tune of nearly half a million dollars.[3]

What can these Ladies do now?

IN MICHIGAN THESE STARS COULD ASK TO HAVE THEIR SUPPORT MODIFIED. THE COURT WILL LOOK AT THE FOLLOWING.

Modification. §§6.43–6.51.

If the court had personal jurisdiction over the payer at the time of the judgment, the court has continuing jurisdiction to revise or amend the order.

No minimum period must elapse before modification can be requested.

Retroactive modification is not available. However, the court can approve the parties’ agreement for retroactive modification.

Modification is possible only on a showing of new facts or changed circumstances since the judgment that justify a revision. The petitioner has the burden of justifying a change by a preponderance of the evidence.

Once a change in circumstances is shown, the court considers all the circumstances in deciding what modification to make.[5]
Factors indicating a change in circumstances.
  • Remarriage—can trigger modification or termination unless specifically stated otherwise in the judgment, but remarriage can be only one consideration.
  • Cohabitation—does not constitute a de facto marriage; can be relevant where it improves a spouse’s financial position.
  • Changes in need—see examples in §6.48.
  • Changes in ability to pay—see examples in §6.49.
  • Retirement—effect appears to depend on whether parties fashioned award with retirement in mind; see examples in §6.50.
  • Death of the payer—does not terminate the support obligation, which can be enforced against the estate, unless stated otherwise.[5]



------------------


[1]
http://madamenoire.com/437039/halle-berry-pay-gabriel-aubrey-16000-per-month-child-support/
[2]
http://time.com/2853415/halle-berry-ordered-to-pay-almost-200k-per-year-in-child-support/

[3]

[4]

[5]
Michigan Family Law Benchbook ch 6 (ICLE 2d ed 2006), at http://www.icle.org/modules/books/chapter.aspx?lib=family&book=2006553550&chapter=6
(last updated 06/27/2014).

see

see

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Saturday, October 26, 2013

POWER OF ATTORNEY for Parent going into Drug Rehab


AVVO QUESTION 10/26/13:I am on probation if I go into rehab my ex will fight for my daughter. My family stated of need be they will take my daughter.What do I do?

ANSWER: DELEGATE YOUR PARENTAL POWERS TO A FAMILY MEMBER, CALLED AN AGENT,  WHILE YOU ARE IN REHAB.

I will presume you are on a criminal probation and you have a drug problem. Since you stated your concern your” ex will fight for your daughter “ it appears your have physical custody of your daughter. If your custody is challenged the criminal probation and drug use will work against you in a Best Interest Factor analysis MCL  722.23 . On these facts  being in rehab should not. What is important is that your daughter is taken care of. Do not leave the child with a family member without  also giving them legal authority through a power of attorney as your agent.

DELEGATION OF PARENTAL POWERS

I found the following information.see sources below.

Step 1: Determine who you want to name as agent ..
An agent should be someone in whom you have  highest degree of confidence.

Step 2: Determine the extent of the powers delegated to the agent.
Most parents will wish to delegate full power to the agent to do everything required for the child’s care.
SEE-MCL.700.5103  Delegation of powers by parent or guardian
Sec. 5103.  (1) By a properly executed power of attorney, a parent or guardian of a minor or a guardian of a legally incapacitated individual may delegate to another person, for a period not exceeding 6 months, any of the parent’s or guardian’s powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child or ward, except the power to consent to marriage or adoption of a minor ward or to release of a minor ward for adoption.

(2) If a parent or guardian is serving in the armed forces of the United States and is deployed to a foreign nation, and if the power of attorney so provides a delegation under this section is effective until the thirty-first day after the end of the deployment.

(3) If a guardian for a minor or legally incapacitated individual delegates any power under this section, the guardian shall notify the court within 7 days after execution of the power of attorney and provide the court the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney-in-fact.
As amended by 2000 PA 54 (eff. Apr 1, 2000), 2004 PA 93 (eff. May 7, 2004).

Step 3: Include examples of the types of powers that you are  delegating.
Some examples of power delegated to the agent are the power to consent to
  • any medical, diagnostic, or surgical procedure
  • any dental procedure
  • use of any medication or other items related to the child’s health

Step 4: Have the document signed, witnessed, and notarized.
While a delegation can be executed without  any judicial proceedings, it must be signed, witnessed, and notarized.

When to Use

A delegation of parental powers is frequently used when parents take a vacation or when a parent joins the armed forces. A delegation of parental powers may also be used to avert a guardianship proceeding if a parental surrogate is needed for a relatively short time due to a parent entering drug treatment or being sent to prison.

You should desire to vest in the agents full powers as a substitute parent  to do anything and everything required for the child’s care You should the agent as your attorney-in-fact to do any of the things you, as parent could do on behalf of your child, including, but not limited to the following:
  1. Give parental consent to any medical, diagnostic, or surgical procedure and/or other treatment of any type or nature;
  2. Give parental consent to any dental procedure;
  3. Give parental consent to admission to any hospital or medical center;
  4. Give parental consent to the use of any drugs, medication, therapeutic devices, or other medicines or items related to the child’s health; and
  5. The power in general to take and authorize all acts with respect to our your health and wellbeing, the same as we could do.

Primary Sources

SEE-MCL.700.5103  Delegation of powers by parent or guardian

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Sunday, October 20, 2013

#GUARDIANS DENIAL OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION WRONG! by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert 810-235-1970


#TERRY TALKS “Ideas worth sharing “

#GUARDIANS DENIAL OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION WRONG!

Terry R. Bankert P.C., 810-235-1970, Ideas Worth Sharing of Flint, of the law, and by Flint Michigan People. See also Facebook Group WWW.terrytalks.com
DATE: 10/20/13
TIME:12:00 PM

Here the “Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred by allowing defendant, the guardian, to utilize the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation. We  
(Michigan Court of Appeals) agree

Issues:

1. Motion for grandparent visitation (MCL 722.27b);

2. Whether the trial court properly allowed the intervening defendant (the guardian) to utilize the "fit parent presumption" of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation; Whitman v. City of Burton; In re Receivership of 11910 S. Francis Rd.; Johnson v. Recca; People v. Peltola; In re Hurd-Marvin Drain; Michigan Basic Prop. Ins. Ass'n v. Office of Fin. & Ins. Regulation; Maple Grove Twp. v. Misteguay Creek Intercounty Drain Bd.; Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc.;

3. MCL 722.27b(1)(e);

4. Whether the trial court appropriately allowed the guardian to "step into the shoes" of the parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b); MCL 700.5215;In re Beck; University Ctr., Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs.; Hunter v. Hunter

COURTS INVOLVED

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Published)
FOR PUBLICATION,September 26, 2013 ,9:00 a.m. [2]
Case Name: Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf ,No. 308755 ,[1]
PRINCIPAL SOURCE e-Journal Number: 55461
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS Judge(s): Per Curiam – Fort Hood, Fitzgerald, and Ronayne Krause

THE LOCAL,LOWER,TRIAL  COURT  ERRED IN ALLOWING INTERVENING  GUARDIAN  TO STEP INTO A  FIT PARENTS  PRESUMPTION  WHEN DECIDING ON GRANDPARENT VISITATION.

The court held that the trial court erred by allowing intervening defendant-Tyndall (the guardian and relative of the minor child's deceased mother) to utilize the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation to intervening plaintiff-McCallister and by allowing a guardian to "step into the shoes" of a fit parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b)."[1]

MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES LOWER COURT/TRIAL COURT  ORDER  AND DENY’S THE GRANDPARENT MOTION FOR VISITATION

Thus, the court reversed the family court order [...AND...] denying plaintiff's (the minor child's paternal grandmother) motion for grandparent visitation, and remanded. "[1]

THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON MCL 722.27b(4)9b)

The trial court held that MCL 722.27b(4)(b) provided that deference was to be given to the decision of a fit parent to deny grandparenting time, and it was presumed that the denial of parenting time "does not create a substantial risk of harm to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health.""[1]

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A GUARDIAN AND PARENT

It acknowledged that defendant was not a parent, but a guardian. Nonetheless, it held that defendant had the right to make decisions as a fit parent, the right to deny grandparenting time, and plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption."[1]

THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INCLUDE GUARDIAN IN THE LAW

The court held that the trial court's holding was contrary to the plain language of MCL 722.27b(4)(b), which grants "fit parents" a presumption as to the denial of grandparenting time. The Legislature could have afforded a presumption to "custodians" or "guardians" of a grandchild, but did not include such language. "[1]

GUARDIANS DO NOT GET THE SAME DEFERENCE A PARENT WOULD.

The court cannot read into a statute what the Legislature did not include, and permitting guardians or custodians to derive the benefit of the fit parent presumption would require it to rewrite the statute"[1]

Defendant contended that a guardianship encompasses parental responsibilities, and thus, the trial court appropriately allowed the guardian to "step into the shoes" of the parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b).[1]

The court held that despite the definition of guardian found in MCL 700.5215, there was no indication that the definition may be incorporated into the provisions of MCL 722.27b(4)(b).[1]

"The statutes fail to address the same subject matter, and they cannot be read in pari materia." More importantly, the court held that there are distinct differences between a natural parent and a guardian such that it would be inappropriate to read the term guardian into the text of the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) in the absence of a legislative provision.[1]

PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST GUARDIANS DO NOT

"Specifically, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.""[1]

"The presumption to a fit parent reflects the elevated status and rights a parent has to a minor child..[1]

" Further, a fit parent has a relationship to the grandparents "such that an informed decision may be made regarding the propriety of grandparent visitation. "[1]

On the contrary, a guardian or custodian of a grandchild may or may not have a relationship with the grandparent, and, in the absence of a relationship, could not make an informed decision regarding the risk of harm to a child during visitation."[1]

SOURCE
[1]
PRINCIPAL SOURCE e-Journal Number: 55461 Mostly the incited text
[2]
STATE OF MICHIGAN  COURT OF APPEALS ,ASHLEE BOOK-GILBERT,  Plaintiff,
andHEATHER MCCALLISTER,  Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellant,  FOR PUBLICATION
September 26, 2013 ,9:00 a.m. ,JERRY RYAN GREENLEAF Defendant,
And ANGELA TYNDALL, Guardian of XXXXX, Minor,  
Intervening-Defendant-Appellee.



[trb]
TERRY BANKERT comments are in BLOCK HEADLINE  or quoted [trb]



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