CHILD CUSTODY Presented By Terry Bankert Flint Family Law (810) 235-1970

HOW WILL A COURT MAKE A CHILD CUSTODY DECISION CONCERNING YOUR CHILDREN . Presented here by Flint Family Law Attorney Terry Bankert (810)-235-1970,

www.AttorneyBankert.com

 ANALYSIS 

“Before any decision as to the custody of a child is made, the court must determine whether an established custodial environment exists. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).”

 “The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

 The trial court “shall not . . . issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

[Source. E-journal UnPublished Michigan Court of Appeals, 9-11-02018 NO.341025] 

“ Here, the trial court determined that an established custodial environment existed with plaintiff and defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal. “

“Therefore, going forward, defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that modification of the established custodial environment was in the children’s best interests.”

 “To determine the best interests of the children in child custody cases, a trial court must consider all the factors delineated in [MCL 722.23] applying the proper burden of proof.” Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 9; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).”

“ A trial court’s findings with regard to each factor “should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.”

 “This Court will defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Id. -3- MCL 722.23 cites 12 factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court to decide a child’s best interests.”

“ (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.

 (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. 

(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.

 (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

 (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

 (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

 (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.

 (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child's other parent. 

(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child. (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. [MCL 722.23].”

If you have additional questions feel free to make a no cost appointment. Terry Bankert Family Law Attorney Flint and Genesee County  (810) 235-1970)

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CHANGE IN CUSTODY BY TERRY BANKERT 235-1970

DID YOU KNOW.

MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that in a custody dispute, a trial court, for the best interests of the child at the center of the dispute, may “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances.” 

[Principle source e-journal #71713, Unpublished 11/14/19.No.349021. ]

But the court is not permitted to “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

“These initial steps to changing custody— finding a change of circumstance or proper cause and not changing an established custodial environment without clear and convincing evidence—are intended to erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). 

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the moving party has established proper cause or a change of circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 508-509.

In McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125, 131-132; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), this Court explained: Proper cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken. 

In order to establish a change of circumstances, a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.

To constitute a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child. [Citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted.] 

With respect to the issue of “proper cause,” the criteria outlined in the statutory best

interest factors, MCL 722.23, “should be relied on by a trial court in deciding if a particular fact raised by a party is a ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’ ground to revisit custody orders.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. 

In regard to “change of circumstances,” the relevance of facts presented should also “be[] gauged by the statutory best interest factors.” Id. at 514. “Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605. 

In Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512, this Court, addressing the threshold issue, observed: Obviously, trial courts must make this factual determination case by case. Although these decisions will be based on the facts particular to each case, we do not suggest that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this initial question. 

Often times, the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.

 MCR 3.210(C)(8) provides: In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.

 It is clear to us, and was effectively accepted by the trial court, that if the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s motion to modify custody are true, they would easily establish a change of circumstances and proper cause for purposes of revisiting the issue of custody under the statutory best-interest factors.

 But the trial court found it problematic that plaintiff had not submitted any statements, affidavits, reports, or other documentary evidence to support the allegations, let alone evidence that was current and relevant. 

The motion to modify custody was not verified, nor did plaintiff supply her own affidavit. MCR 3.210(C)(8) allowed the trial court to require “an offer of proof or otherwise” in relation to deciding whether to order an evidentiary hearing.

Under the circumstances of the case and given the remarks made by the trial court when ruling on the motion, the court’s hesitation and resistance at giving any weight to the allegations in plaintiff’s motion was plainly driven by the four CPS investigations instigated by plaintiff that resulted in determinations that allegations of abuse by defendant could not be substantiated.

The lack of substantiation, again and again, could reasonably call into question plaintiff’s motives and credibility on all matters.

 The trial court appeared more than open to further considering a motion to modify custody if plaintiff would come forward with supporting documentary evidence, explaining why the court took the unusual step of denying the motion without prejudice.

 Indeed, the record and the CPS history support the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to modify custody simply on the-1970 basis that plaintiff did not provide supporting documentation on the threshold issue of change of circumstances or proper cause."

Presented here by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce Attorney 810-235-1970 FlintFamilyLaw.com

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CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION. ATTORNEY BANKERT

MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

In this economically hard time parents may need to modify their child support. Sometimes the original order called for no child support by agreement of the parties. 

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“ While it is true that a court can generally only modify orders for child support upon a showing of a change in circumstances justifying the modification, see MCL 552.17; Aussie v Aussie, 182 Mich App 454, 463; 452 NW2d 859 (1990), “[w]hen a court order does not provide for child support, such maintenance may later be provided by the court and does not depend upon a change of circumstances,” Johns v Johns, 178 Mich App 101, 106; 443 NW2d 446 (1989).”

“When  properly motioned for a change in child support  the Court may deny the motion. The question then is  has “...trial court correctly decided that it should not modify its previous child support order and that the parties should be held to their agreement that defendant not pay child support. MCL 552.605(3) states that a court is not prohibited “from entering a child support order that is agreed to by the parties and that deviates from the child support formula, if the requirements of subsection (2) are met.” (Emphasis added.)”

“ MCL 552.605(2) states: (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court shall order child support in an amount determined by application of the child support formula developed by the state friend of the court bureau as required in section 19 of the friend of the court act, MCL 552.519.”

“ The court may enter an order that deviates from the formula if the court determines from the facts of the case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate and sets forth in writing or on the record all of the following:

 (a) The child support amount determined by application of the child support formula.

 (b) How the child support order deviates from the child support formula. 

(c) The value of property or other support awarded instead of the payment of child support, if applicable.

 (d) The reasons why application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the case.”

“In Burba v Burba, 461 Mich 637, 644; 610 NW2d 873 (2000), our Supreme Court held that “the criteria [in MCL 552.605(2)(a)-(d)] for deviating from the formula are mandatory.” 4 The Burba Court emphasized that “[t]he importance the Legislature attached to courts carefully articulating these factors when deviating from the formula cannot be underestimated, for the Legislature prescribed their use when courts deviate from the formula in no less than eight different sections of the Michigan Compiled Laws.” Id. “To impress upon the courts the gravity of deviating from the formula, the Legislature has required them to meticulously set forth these factors when deviating.” Id. at 645-646. “

“Thus, as required by MCL 552.605(2), when deviating from the formula, the trial court fulfills its statutory duty only when the court has articulated its rationale in accordance with subsection 2(a) through (d).” Peterson, 272 Mich App at 517. “ [Source and Unpoublished Michigan Court of Appeals,11/14/19, case e-journal, #71700 Ncheugium v Tegadjourfrom Saginaw Circuit Court.]

5-1970

If you have additional questions about Divorce, child support or other Family Court Issues Please call Terry R. Bankert, Flint and Genesee County Attorney, 810-235-1970

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Mentally Ill Parent and Child Custody. Terry Bankert (810) 235-1970

Will mental illness cause a loss of custody?

"... while mental illnesses may create unfortunate barriers for parents in child custody cases, it is the best interests of the child that must guide a trial court in making custody and parenting time decisions."

"Unlike cases involving the termination of parental rights, in which courts must balance the best interests of minors against the constitutional rights of their parents, a trial court’s singular focus in cases brought under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., is “ ‘to promote the best interests of the child and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted custody changes.’ ” Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 78; 900 NW2d 130 (2017), quoting Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 243; 765 NW2d 345 (2009). With respect to parenting time decisions in particular, MCL 722.27a(1) provides, in pertinent part: (1) Parenting time shall be granted in accordance with the best interests of the child. It is presumed to be in the best interests of a child for the child to have a strong relationship with both of his or her parents. Except as otherwise provided in this section, parenting time shall be granted to a parent in frequency, duration, and type reasonably calculated to promote a strong relationship between the child and the parent granted parenting time. -5- However, if “it is shown on the record by clear and convincing evidence that it would endanger the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health,” parenting time need not be ordered. MCL 722.27a(3); Luna v Regnier, 326 Mich App 173, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (Docket No. 343382); slip op at 3. "
(e-journal 70441, Jackson v Appling Mich. App. Unpublished 5/7/19.No. 345488.

Presented here by Flint Family Law ,Divorce, Attorney Terry Bankert. www.attorneybankert.com .

Call Lawyer Terry Bankert  (810) 235-1970

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Spousal Support Modification

What will you need to do to change a spousal support order.

“A divorce judgment entered upon the settlement of the parties represents a contract, which, if unambiguous, is to be interpreted as a question of law.” Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 587; 760 NW2d 300 (2008). A trial court may modify spousal support based on new facts or different circumstances arising after entry of the divorce judgment. Ackerman v Ackerman, 197 Mich App 300, 301; 495 NW2d 173 (1992). The burden is on the party seeking modification to establish that the facts warrant modification. Id"

Presented here by Attorney  Terry Bankert, 810-235-1970, Flint Family Law , Divorce, Lawyer.

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BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD FACTORS

#Bestinterestsofthechild is the Standard used by your #Divorce #Attorney when advocating for your #ChildCustody in #Flint #Genesee or around the State 

The best interests of the child is the standard usedby  #Lawyers in custody disputes between parents, agencies, and third parties.

The court must consider each factor and make findings on the record.Contact attorneybankert.com for more information.

The factors need not have equal weight; the court determines the weight of each factor.

Factors.

• (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. This factor focuses on the emotional bond that already exists between the parent and the child.
• (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. This factor tries to project the parent’s ability to foster an emotional bond in the future, and the parent’s impact on such matters as education, guidance, and religious training.
• (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
• (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
• (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.This factor focuses solely on the permanence of the family environment, not the acceptability of the home or child care arrangements.
• (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. This factor evaluates the parties’ moral fitness only as it relates to how they will function as a parent and not as to who is the morally superior adult.
• (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. This factor should not impair or defeat the public policy goal of integrating disabled persons into the mainstream of society.
• (h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
• (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference. The court must take the preference of the child into account if it decides that the child is old enough to express a preference. The court is not required to disclose the child’s preference. The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh other factors; it is only one element used to make the determination.
• (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child’s other parent. [Amended by 2016 PA 95 (eff. Aug 1, 2016).]
• (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
• ( l ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. The court may not consider the race of a parent’s spouse in considering whether to change custody.@terrybankert posted here 

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(PPO) Personal Protection Orders

When you are in a domestic relationship  a  PPO is appropriate if  you can demonstrate that  you have  been assaulted or threatened with harm by the  your partner  MCL 600.2950.

Presented here by Genesee Flint Divorce Attorney, Lawyer Terry Bankert 810-235-1970

Specifically, the Judge must issue a PPO if it is  found that there is  reasonable cause to believe that  your partner  might commit one of the prohibited acts. MCL 600.2950(4).

When you file a PPO you must include specific incidents of assaults or threats and describe the injuries resulting from the specific incidents of abuse.

We know that Emotional abuse can be as devastating as physical battering; therefore, such incidents should be included in your petition.

In ruling on the motion, your judge  must consider testimony, documents, and other evidence and whether  your partner previously committed or threatened to commit acts of violence. Id.

You should ask for entry of the order ex parte if notice to  your partner  might precipitate additional harm.

To justify a request for an ex parte PPO, the you must clearly allege facts that support the conclusion that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate adverse action before the PPO can be issued.” MCL 600.2950(12).

Most domestic violence survivors can easily meet this standard with specific reference to their partners  past violence and allegations that prior notice will result in the partners further violence or coercion of  you to dismiss the petition.

The ex parte provisions of the PPO statute were declared constitutional in Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 603 NW2d 295 (1999).

The PPO petition should focus on the imminence of the actual or threatened harm and the irreparable injury  you will suffer if the PPO is not granted.

The attorney representing  you must allege facts, not merely generalizations. The petition must give persuasive reasons why  you need the protection of a PPO.

For example, a threatened harm could be a promise to kill  you, to beat  you senseless, or to never allow  you to sleep. A completed harm might be sexual assault, punching, kicking, slapping, choking, or stabbing  you. Especially chilling are the acts designed to defeat criminal detention by inflicting maximum pain with minimal evidence of physical injury, such as pulling hair and squeezing or bending limbs and fingers. Completed harm could also include frequent or late-night telephone calls at home or at work, following the victim, slashing car tires, banging on or breaking into doors and windows at the victim’s home, burning the victim’s house, or torturing or killing pets.

A pattern of past and an expectation of future harm and the degree of seriousness of the harm are essential concepts. To establish such a pattern, the complaint should recite the specific dates that incidents occurred, along with the extent of bodily harm, the extent of property damage, the explicit content of threats, whether medical treatment was necessary, whether any of the couple’s children were present during the assault or were in danger, and whether the police were involved.

Repeated minor offenses or at least one serious incident coupled with indications of continuing trouble may justify issuance of a PPO. By the same token, one isolated incident or a pattern that ended some time ago (without an explanation of why a PPO is needed now) may not be sufficient.

There are few reported appellate decisions that address domestic relationship PPOs and the facts that are sufficient to justify their issuance. In Kampf, allegations of verbal abuse, spousal rape, bruising, pushing, and shoving were sufficient. In Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 702, 659 NW2d 649 (2002), partner’s threats to break down a door that you had braced shut, “rage” in partner’s voice, and partner’s use of a yardstick to probe underneath the braced door were sufficient to authorize a PPO. However, the judge of appeals noted that the facts in Pickering made the issuance and continuation of the PPO a “close call.” 253 Mich App at n3. In Jannaro v Schamp, No 210740, 1999 Mich App LEXIS 2235 (Dec 21, 1999) (unpublished), partner’s use of abusive language, violent behavior, and threats to kill you and her family were sufficient to justify a PPO.

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" ITS NO JOKE BEING BROKE"03/24/11 FLINT BANKRUPTCY LAWYER SAYS YOU HAVE TO FOLLOW THE RULES.(Terry Bankert 235-1970)

DID YOU KNOW IF YOU ARE IN BANKRUPTCY you must file a motion for approval of the certification, serve it on all parties, and file a certificate of service.




BANKRUPTCY posting by Bankruptcy lawyer Terry R. Bankert.UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION (DETROIT),In re: Chapter 13,Carlos B. Oxholm, Case No. 11-46348 Debtor. March 15, 2011 Hon. Phillip J. Shefferly



ORDER DENYING DEBTOR’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE CREDIT COUNSELING CERTIFICATE



BANKRUPTCY FLINT ,ATTORNEY POSTING BY Flint Bankruptcy Lawyer Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970.[Comments of Flint Bankruptcy lawyer Terry R.Bankert ,810-235-1970 ,in bracket or CAP headlines. If you have bankruptcy questions call today-trb.810-235-1970]



DEBTOR FILED 03/01/11



On March 9, 2011, the Debtor filed this Chapter 13 case.



MOTION FILED 03/1/2011



On March 11, 2011, the Debtor filed a motion (docket entry no. 8) seeking an extension of time to file a certificate of budget and credit counseling.



DEBTOR SAYS NO CREDIT COUNSELING BEFORE FILING.



The motion does not cite any Bankruptcy Code section or rule, but explains that the Debtor did not obtain budget and credit counseling prior to filing the bankruptcy petition

because of exigent circumstances.



DEBTOR WANTS EXTENSION



The Debtor’s motion requests that the Court grant the Debtor

an extension of time to file the certificate of budget and credit counseling on an ex parte basis.



BANKRUPTCY CODE SAYS YOU CAN ASK



Section 109(h)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to



[1]obtain a waiver of the requirement of obtaining budget and credit counseling pre-petition,



[2]provided that the debtor files a certification that complies with § 109(h)(3)(A).



[3]The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has a specific local bankruptcy rule that sets forth the procedure for filing a motion under § 109(h)(3)(A).



CREDIT COUNSELING CERTIFICATION



Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-6 is entitled “Credit Counseling

Compliance.” Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-6(a) provides that



[]a debtor filing a certification under § 109(h)(3)(A)



[]must file a motion for approval of the certification, serve it on all parties, and file a certificate of service. Further,



[]the local rule provides that parties in interest have

14 days within which to object to the motion.



[]If no timely response is filed, the certification shall be deemed satisfactory under § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) without a hearing or further order.



[]The 11-46348-pjs Doc 12 Filed 03/15/11 Entered 03/15/11 14:46:56 motion must be accompanied by a notice that the deadline to file responses is 14 days after

service.



DEBTOR ASKED FOR EX PARTE, NOT ALLOWED IN RULES



The Debtor’s motion in this case seeks relief under § 109(h)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, but does not comply with L.B.R. 1007-6(a).



RULES SAYS JUDGES CANNOT LOOK EX PARTE



That local rule does not permit the Debtor’s

motion to be considered on an ex parte basis. Accordingly,



DEBTOR REQUES DENIED BUT DOOR LEFT OPEN TO DO IT RIGHT



IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Debtor’s motion (docket entry no. 8) for extension of time to file certificate of budget and credit counseling is denied without prejudice to the Debtor’s right to file and serve a motion that complies with L.B.R. 1007-6(a).

--END



If you have bankruptcy question please contact Flint Bankruptcy Attorney Terry r. Bankert P.C. 810-235-1970, http://www.attorneybankert.com/
 This law firm acts as a debt relief agency by helping you file for bankruptcy.

http://dumpmycreditors.wordpress.com/2011/03/24/when-in-bankruptcy-you-must-filed-credit-counseling-certificate-before-you-file/

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Post Judgement can a Judge make a lump sum payment a periodic one ?

Terry R. Bankert a Flint Divorce Lawyer discusses several issues surrounding a Divorce appeal recently decided by the Michigan Court of Appeals.

The case we will look at is not a Geneses County, Flint Michigan, divorce case. It is from St. Clair County.

In this case the trial court erred in ordering the $310,000 lump sum payment provided for in the parties' settlement agreement incorporated into the consent divorce judgment could be paid in installments, contrary to the terms of the consent judgment.

One Divorce or Family Law issue discussed is whether the trial court properly,, ordered the lump sum payment provided for in the parties' settlement agreement could be paid in installments (contrary to the terms of the consent judgment); The trial court is the local family law court where the divorce attorneys or lawyers argued the case then one or both appealed. See In re Lobaina Estate; Construing unambiguous contract provisions; Rory v. Continental Ins. Co.;

In this case the Court of Appeals found the lower court was in error. They said "We do not believe that any of these provisions authorized the court to convert the lump sum payment negotiated between the parties, and memorialized in this consent judgment of divorce, to installment payments. MCL 600.6107 refers to judgment creditors and debtors. The marital relationship is not that of a debtor and creditor. Lindner v Lindner, 137 Mich App 569,572; 358 NW2d 376 (1984).

The second divorce issues discussed is whether MCL 600.6107 and MCL 600.6201 gave the trial court authority to allow the defendant-husband to pay the judgment in installments; The Court of Appeals found that it did not.

The Court of Appeals pointed out "We first note that while the trial court referred to its powers to enforce an agreement, the agreement was for a lump sum payment, and the trial court did not enforce this provision.

Instead, the trial court altered it. Modifications of property settlements in divorce judgments are strongly disfavored. Baker v Baker, 268 Mich App 578, 586; 710 NW2d 555 (2005)"

The third issues discussed is the applicability of MCL 600.6107 (referring to judgment creditors and debtors); Lindner v. Lindner; Modifications of property settlements in divorce judgments; Baker v. Baker; Lentz v. Lentz; Bers v. Bers; Alexander v. Alexander; Molnar v. Molnar;

To clarify this State Statute MCL 600.6107 refers to judgment creditors and debtors. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that marital relationship is not that of a debtor and creditor. Lindner v Lindner, 137 Mich App 569, 572; 358 NW2d 376 (1984).

Here we will discuss Whether the trial court denied the plaintiff-wife her right to foreclose on her liens against defendant's properties and to obtain a judicial sale in order to enforce the lump sum payment; Draggoo v. Draggoo; Wiand v. Wiand;

Divorce proceedings are conducted in the same manner as other suits in courts of equity;and these courts have the power to award issues, to decree costs, and to enforce its decrees.Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 428; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). A court possesses inherent authority to enforce its own directives. Wiand v Wiand, 178 Mich App 137, 144; 443 NW2d 464 (1989).
Our fourth issues is whether the trial court properly limited plaintiff's recovery of attorney fees and costs; In re Temple Marital Trust;

Once again, the parties negotiated an agreement to enforce the provisions of the judgment by requiring the other party to pay the costs and fees of enforcing its provisions.

While the record demonstrates that plaintiff had been attempting to collect the lump sum owed to her prior to the case’s reassignment, the trial court nevertheless limited the award of costs and fees.

Because the specific language in the judgment leaves no room for interpretation, the trial court’s limitation constituted an abuse of discretion. See In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 122, 128; 748 NW2d 265 (2008).

Our fifth issue is whether there should be Interest awarded on the defaulted amount; Olson v. Olson;

The statutory interest on money judgments, MCL 600.6013, does not apply to divorce judgments, but in appropriate circumstances a court may award interest in its exercise of equitable powers. Olson, supra at 351. In its discretion, a trial court may award a party interest where the payments due on a property settlement are overdue. Reigle v Reigle, 189 Mich App 386, 394; 474 NW2d 297 (1991).

Our final issue is whether the following state statute is applicability . It is MCL 600.6013; Reigle v. Reigle; Request for assignment of the case to another judge on remand; Bayati v. Bayati; People v. Pillar

A case should be assigned to a different judge on remand if it would be unreasonable to expect the trial judge to be able to put previously expressed findings out of mind without substantial difficulty. People v Pillar, 233 Mich App 267, 270-271; 590 NW2d 622 (1998).

The Michigan Court of Appeals found However, our review of the entire record does not demonstrate that the trial judge will be unable to put his previous rulings out of his mind, and justly resolve the issues at a subsequent hearing. Pillar, supra at 271; Bayati, supra at 603.

See:Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished),Case Name: Slota v. Slotae-Journal Number: 45029,Judge(s): Per Curiam - Servitto, Fort Hood, and Stephens ,UNPUBLISHED,February 9, 2010 ,No. 285676,St. Clair Circuit Court,LC No. 02-002811

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