Showing posts with label Flint Divorce Attorney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Flint Divorce Attorney. Show all posts

Friday, January 9, 2015

VICTEM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STUCK WITH ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT

WIFE BEATER STILL GETS THE BENEFIT.

Discussed  are Issues of Divorce, Validity of the parties' antenuptial agreement and  "Change in circumstances" (COC); Presented by FLINT DIVORCE LAWYER Terry R. Bankert 235-1970 1/9/15.#flintdivorce

The Michigan Court of Appeals  Decided 12/18/14,  among other issues  that the parties' antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, concluding that to invalidate it on the basis of one party's fault would contravene the agreement's clear and unambiguous language, and that as a matter of law, the defendant-wife failed to show that a change of circumstances [ COC] was sufficient to void it.[1] The claimed change in circumstances was the domestic violence  inflicted on the  wife  by the husband.

The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145. [2]

The definition of an #antenuptial .  A prenuptial agreement, antenuptial agreement, or premarital agreement, commonly abbreviated to prenup or prenupt, is acontract entered into prior to marriage, civil union or any other agreement prior to the main agreement by the people intending to marry or contract with each other.[3]
The content of a prenuptial agreement can vary widely, but commonly includes provisions for division of property and spousal support in the event of divorce or breakup of marriage.[3]
They may also include terms for the forfeiture of assets as a result of divorce on the grounds of adultery; further conditions of guardianship may be included as well.[3]
It should not be confused with the historic marriage settlement which was concerned not primarily with the effects of divorce but with the establishment and maintaining of dynastic families.[3]
In some countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands, the prenuptial agreement not only provides for the event of a divorce, but also to protect some property during the marriage, for instance in case of a bankruptcy.[3]
Postnuptial agreements are similar to prenuptial agreements, except that they are entered into after a couple is married.[1]     [3]

The  Defendant wife in this case is trying to set aside the prenuptial agreement she signed.
Her argument is essential she could not foresee her husband would be a wife beater when she signed the prenuptial agreement.

Defendant  here did not provide any case law supporting "her position that someone's 'fault' in a divorce can constitute an unforeseen" COC. Further, assuming that the alleged abuse "occurred and was unforeseeable," this COC was "not sufficient to void the parties' antenuptial agreement in this instance.[1]

The types of changes of circumstances that may void an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement must relate to the issues addressed in the antenuptial agreement.[1]

Since the primary focus of the antenuptial agreement addressed spousal support and the division of the parties' assets, any changes of circumstances must relate to these aspects, and here, the domestic abuse does not." The court found that Hutchison did not stand for the proposition that abuse, alone, can constitute a sufficient COC to void an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement.[1]

Defendant here  appeals as of right a judgment of divorce entered by the trial court. We  the Michigan COurt of Appeals affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. [2]

The parties signed an antenuptial agreement on September 9, 1993, two days before their wedding on September 11, 1993. This case primarily deals with the validity and enforcement of that antenuptial agreement.[2]

THE FOLLOWING ARE PARTS OF THAT AGREEMENT

It said “ In the event that the marriage . . . terminate[s] as a result of divorce, then, in full satisfaction, settlement, and discharge of any and all rights or claims of alimony, support, property division, or other rights or claims of any kind, nature, or description incident to marriage and divorce (including any right to payment of legal fees incident to a divorce), under the present or future statutes and laws of common law of the state of Michigan or any other jurisdiction (all of which are hereby waived and released), the parties agree that all property acquired after the marriage between the parties shall be divided between the parties with each party receiving 50 percent of the said property”.[2]

However, notwithstanding the above, the following property acquired after the marriage will remain the sole and separate property of the party acquiring the property and/or named on the property: [2]

a. As provided in paragraph Two and Three of this antenuptial agreement, any increase in the value of any property, rents, profits, or dividends arising from property previously owned by either party shall remain the sole and separate property of that party.[2]

b. Any property acquired in either party’s individual capacity or name during the marriage, including any contributions to retirement plans (including but not limited to IRAs, 401(k) plans, SEP IRAs, IRA rollovers, and pension plans), shall remain the sole and separate property of the party named on the account or the party who acquired the property in his or her individual capacity or name.[2]
* * *
8. Each party shall, without compensation, join as grantor in any and all conveyances of property made by the other party or by his or her heirs, devises, or personal representatives, thereby relinquishing all claim to the property so conveyed, including without limitation any dower or homestead rights, and each party shall further, upon the other’s request, take any and all steps and execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the other party any and all further instruments necessary or expedient to effectuate the purpose and intent of this agreement.[2]
* * *
10. Each party acknowledges that the other party has advised him or her of the other party’s means, resources, income, and the nature and extent of the other party’s properties and holdings (including, but not limited to, the financial information set forth in exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference) and that there is a likelihood for substantial appreciation of those assets subsequent to the marriage of the parties.[2]

Included with the agreement was plaintiff’s disclosure statement, which provided that he already had approximately $400,000 in net worth.[2]

Because the antenuptial agreement prohibited the award of any spousal support, the trial court did not award any.[2]

YOU MAY BE INTERESTED TO KNOW.

In Michigan, antenuptial agreements “may be voided (1) when obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact, (2) if it was unconscionable when executed, or (3) when the facts and circumstances are so changed since the agreement was executed that its enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable.” Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 142-143; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). The party challenging the validity of an antenuptial agreement carries the burden of proof and persuasion. Id. at 143. [2]

“To determine if a prenuptial agreement is unenforceable because of a change in circumstances, the focus is on whether the changed circumstances were reasonably foreseeable either before or during the signing of the prenuptial agreement.” Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 373;793 NW2d 63 (2010).[2]

DID YOU KNOW THE FOLLOWING IS HOW THE COURTS DECIDE TO DIVIDE YOUR PRIOPERTY.

However, generally, assets earned by one spouse during the marriage are nonetheless considered part of the marital estate. Korth, 256 Mich App at 291. When dividing the marital estate, trial courts may consider the following factors:
(1) the duration of the marriage, (2) the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) the age of the parties, (4) the health of the parties, (5) the life situation of the parties, Prenuptial agreements . . . provide . . . people with the opportunity to ensure predictability, plan their future with more security, and, most importantly, decide their own destiny.[2]

The overriding principle is that “parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.” Id. at 145. [2]

In this case, there is an antenuptial agreement that unambiguously provides that “[a]ny property acquired in either party’s individual capacity or name during the marriage . . . shall remain the sole and separate property of the party named on the account or the party who acquired the property in his or her individual capacity or name.” Nevertheless, defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly refused to consider dividing the property instead pursuant to MCL 552.23(1) and MCL 552.401. [2]
Presented by FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY  Terry R. Bankert 235-1970 1/9/15.#flintdivorce




SOURCE
[1]
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Published),Case Name: AXXXXX v. AXXXXX
e-Journal Number: 58909,Judge(s): Wilder, M.J. Kelly, and Fort Hood Decided 12/18/14


[2]
AXXXXX v AXXXXX,Before: M.J. Kelly, P.J., and Wilder and Fort Hood, JJ.,
Published Michigan Court of Appeals Opinion,Docket No(s) 308194
Lower Court Docket No(s) 10-110358-DM,Wilder, J.

[3]

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Sunday, October 20, 2013

#GUARDIANS DENIAL OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION WRONG! by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert 810-235-1970


#TERRY TALKS “Ideas worth sharing “

#GUARDIANS DENIAL OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION WRONG!

Terry R. Bankert P.C., 810-235-1970, Ideas Worth Sharing of Flint, of the law, and by Flint Michigan People. See also Facebook Group WWW.terrytalks.com
DATE: 10/20/13
TIME:12:00 PM

Here the “Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred by allowing defendant, the guardian, to utilize the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation. We  
(Michigan Court of Appeals) agree

Issues:

1. Motion for grandparent visitation (MCL 722.27b);

2. Whether the trial court properly allowed the intervening defendant (the guardian) to utilize the "fit parent presumption" of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation; Whitman v. City of Burton; In re Receivership of 11910 S. Francis Rd.; Johnson v. Recca; People v. Peltola; In re Hurd-Marvin Drain; Michigan Basic Prop. Ins. Ass'n v. Office of Fin. & Ins. Regulation; Maple Grove Twp. v. Misteguay Creek Intercounty Drain Bd.; Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc.;

3. MCL 722.27b(1)(e);

4. Whether the trial court appropriately allowed the guardian to "step into the shoes" of the parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b); MCL 700.5215;In re Beck; University Ctr., Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs.; Hunter v. Hunter

COURTS INVOLVED

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Published)
FOR PUBLICATION,September 26, 2013 ,9:00 a.m. [2]
Case Name: Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf ,No. 308755 ,[1]
PRINCIPAL SOURCE e-Journal Number: 55461
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS Judge(s): Per Curiam – Fort Hood, Fitzgerald, and Ronayne Krause

THE LOCAL,LOWER,TRIAL  COURT  ERRED IN ALLOWING INTERVENING  GUARDIAN  TO STEP INTO A  FIT PARENTS  PRESUMPTION  WHEN DECIDING ON GRANDPARENT VISITATION.

The court held that the trial court erred by allowing intervening defendant-Tyndall (the guardian and relative of the minor child's deceased mother) to utilize the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) to deny grandparent visitation to intervening plaintiff-McCallister and by allowing a guardian to "step into the shoes" of a fit parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b)."[1]

MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES LOWER COURT/TRIAL COURT  ORDER  AND DENY’S THE GRANDPARENT MOTION FOR VISITATION

Thus, the court reversed the family court order [...AND...] denying plaintiff's (the minor child's paternal grandmother) motion for grandparent visitation, and remanded. "[1]

THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON MCL 722.27b(4)9b)

The trial court held that MCL 722.27b(4)(b) provided that deference was to be given to the decision of a fit parent to deny grandparenting time, and it was presumed that the denial of parenting time "does not create a substantial risk of harm to the child's mental, physical, or emotional health.""[1]

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A GUARDIAN AND PARENT

It acknowledged that defendant was not a parent, but a guardian. Nonetheless, it held that defendant had the right to make decisions as a fit parent, the right to deny grandparenting time, and plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption."[1]

THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INCLUDE GUARDIAN IN THE LAW

The court held that the trial court's holding was contrary to the plain language of MCL 722.27b(4)(b), which grants "fit parents" a presumption as to the denial of grandparenting time. The Legislature could have afforded a presumption to "custodians" or "guardians" of a grandchild, but did not include such language. "[1]

GUARDIANS DO NOT GET THE SAME DEFERENCE A PARENT WOULD.

The court cannot read into a statute what the Legislature did not include, and permitting guardians or custodians to derive the benefit of the fit parent presumption would require it to rewrite the statute"[1]

Defendant contended that a guardianship encompasses parental responsibilities, and thus, the trial court appropriately allowed the guardian to "step into the shoes" of the parent for purposes of MCL 722.27b(4)(b).[1]

The court held that despite the definition of guardian found in MCL 700.5215, there was no indication that the definition may be incorporated into the provisions of MCL 722.27b(4)(b).[1]

"The statutes fail to address the same subject matter, and they cannot be read in pari materia." More importantly, the court held that there are distinct differences between a natural parent and a guardian such that it would be inappropriate to read the term guardian into the text of the fit parent presumption of MCL 722.27b(4)(b) in the absence of a legislative provision.[1]

PARENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST GUARDIANS DO NOT

"Specifically, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.""[1]

"The presumption to a fit parent reflects the elevated status and rights a parent has to a minor child..[1]

" Further, a fit parent has a relationship to the grandparents "such that an informed decision may be made regarding the propriety of grandparent visitation. "[1]

On the contrary, a guardian or custodian of a grandchild may or may not have a relationship with the grandparent, and, in the absence of a relationship, could not make an informed decision regarding the risk of harm to a child during visitation."[1]

SOURCE
[1]
PRINCIPAL SOURCE e-Journal Number: 55461 Mostly the incited text
[2]
STATE OF MICHIGAN  COURT OF APPEALS ,ASHLEE BOOK-GILBERT,  Plaintiff,
andHEATHER MCCALLISTER,  Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellant,  FOR PUBLICATION
September 26, 2013 ,9:00 a.m. ,JERRY RYAN GREENLEAF Defendant,
And ANGELA TYNDALL, Guardian of XXXXX, Minor,  
Intervening-Defendant-Appellee.



[trb]
TERRY BANKERT comments are in BLOCK HEADLINE  or quoted [trb]



_______________________________________________________
TERRY TALKS  CONNECTIONS:
-TERRY TALKS .COM- www.terrytalks.com --
-TERRY TALKS Twitter -www.twitter.com/terrybankert -
-MICHIGAN FAMILY LAW ADVOCATE -http://terrybankert.blogspot.com/ -
- BANKRUPTCY AND MICHIGAN FAMILIES - http://dumpmycreditors.wordpress.com/ -
_________________________________________________________________

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Monday, February 25, 2013

PERSONAL INJURY AND DIVORCE AWARDS-DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970

PERSONAL INJURY AND DIVORCE AWARDS-DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970

DID YOU KNOW;
www.attorneybankert.com
The question presented follows.
“It was a very serious accident, it happened in 2008. I stayed home from work for my 12 allotted weeks to care for him. I worked every day, 12 hrs a day to ensure we got could hold out till the settlement and not lose our house. We got the settlement and he decided he wants a divorce and refuses to give me any money even though he got enough that if he gave me 1/3 I would not have to work ever again. If I hadn't worked the way I did he would have never gotten that much. We have 2 children and he is verbally abusive to them and me. Am I entitled to anything?” The short answer is yes.

DID YOU KNOW;
www.goodmorningflint.blogspot.com
The presumption is the jurisdiction is Michigan and that the husband has to yet file for divorce. The wife should file for divorce or separate maintenance to stop dissipation of assets. The court will divide the assets as they exist on the date the judgment is entered or tried. A temporary order is used to preserve the assets. The wife is entitled to 50% of the joint assets and should be advised to file immediately

DID YOU KNOW;
www.terrybankert.blogspot.com
To reach an equitable division of marital property, a trial court should consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital estate,each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and needs, fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance. McDougal, 451 Mich at 89; Sparks, 440 Mich at 158-160. [1]

DID YOU KNOW;
www.dumpmycreditors.wordpress.com
The determination of relevant factors will vary with the circumstances of each case, and no one factor should be given undue weight.[1]

DID YOU KNOW;
www.occupyflintlegal.wordpress.com

Generally, an award for pain and suffering is separate property, but it may be divisible as separate property on a proper showing of need or contribution. Lee v Lee, 191 Mich App 73, 477 NW2d 429 (1991) (accident settlement); see also Wilson v Wilson, 179 Mich App 519, 446 NW2d 496 (1989). However, a recipient could be ordered to pay spousal support based on his or her enhanced estate or income from investing an award for pain and suffering. Bywater v Bywater, 128 Mich App 396, 340 NW2d 102 (1983).[2]

DID YOU KNOW;
www.twitter.com/terrybankert
Generally, marital assets are subject to division between the parties but the parties’ separate assets may not be invaded. McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183. [1]


DID YOU KNOW;
www.facebook.com/attorneybankert
Stoudemire v Stoudemire, 248 Mich App 325, 639 NW2d 274 (2001), upheld the trial court’s finding that injured plaintiff’s pain and suffering award was his separate property, and that the lost wage portion of his award was marital property to be divided 50-50. The court relied on expert testimony to calculate what portion of the award was truly for economic damages.[2]

SOURCES
[1]
Woodington v Shokouhi, 288 Mich App 352, 792 NW2d 63, published 5/4/10

[2]
Michigan Family Law Benchbook ch 8 (ICLE 2d ed 2006), at http://www.icle.org/modules/books/chapter.aspx?lib=family&book=2006553550&chapter=08 (last updated 02/15/2013)

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Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Flint Divorce Attorney reviews decision on Parenting time. property valuation and reliance on Friend of the Court reports. 235-1970 by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert.

GOOD MORNING FLINT! date 01/08/2013,Divorce, property and parenting time!
-----
By Terry R. Bankert [trb] terry@attorneybankert.com
www.attorneybankert.com , https://www.facebook.com/attorneybankert, Flint Divorce & Bankruptcy 810-235-1970, The purpose here is media consult counsel before reliance.
-----
Presented here for media to include WFLT 1420  8:45 am radio broadcast on 01/08/13. Also discussed on this program is my unbundeling of services to economically help those that want a do it yourself divorce [ initial consultation free], Chapter 7 Bankruptcy initial payment $200. Congratulations to Larry Watkins the  current Superintendent of Flint Community Schools, and comments on the vacancy on the Mott College Board of Trustees, you should apply.

Issues:
Divorce; Parenting time; Shade v. Wright; MCL 722.27a; [1]

HUSBAND APPEALED AN OAKLAND COUNTY FAMILY COURT DECISION

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the established
custodial environment of the children, failing to define the burden of proof, and failing to make
findings under the best-interest factors of MCL 722.23. [2]

HUSBAND CHANGED IS POSITION ON APPEAL, BAD IDEA.

A party need not take exception to a finding of fact or ultimate decision by the trial court
in order to preserve the issue on appeal. MCR 2.517(A)(7). However, “‘[a] party may not take a
position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court that is based on a
position contrary to that taken in the trial court.’”Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 587-
588; 760 NW2d 300 (2008), quoting Czymbor’s Timber, Inc v Saginaw, 269 Mich App 551, 556;
711 NW2d 442 (2006), aff’d 478 Mich 348 (2007).[2]

HUSBANDS PARENTING TIME APPEAL.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a best-interest
analysis before making a determination regarding parenting time. We disagree.[2]

“‘Orders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court’s
findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed a palpable abuse of
discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major issue.’” Shade v Wright, 291 Mich
App 17, 20-21; 805 NW2d 1 (2010), quoting Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 5; 706
NW2d 835 (2005). [2]

MCL 722.27a governs a trial court’s determination of parenting time and states that
“[p]arenting time shall be granted in accordance with the best interests of the child.” MCL
722.27a(1). When making parenting-time decisions, the court need not address every bestinterest
factor, but must at least make findings with respect to the contested issues.
Shade, 291 Mich App at 31-32. [2]



The trial court's reliance on the FOC's report; [1]

The parties have continued to struggle over the issue of parenting time in post-judgment
proceedings, some of which were filed after this Court granted defendant’s delayed application
for leave to appeal. In light of the parties’ disagreement over parenting time, the trial court was
required to consider the best interests of the children. Defendant claims the court failed to do so.
However, the trial court explicitly relied on the FOC report and adopted its recommendations.
When a trial court relies on FOC reports in making a determination, the FOC findings are
examined to determine whether they comport with the best-interest analysis mandate of MCL
722.23 and MCL 722.27a(1). In re Stevens, 86 Mich App 258, 263; 273 NW2d 490 (1978).[2]

Defendant also argues that the court should have examined the parenting-time factors in
MCL 722.27a(6) before making a determination with respect to parenting time. However, that
statute states only that “[t]he court
may consider the following factors when determining the
frequency, duration, and type of parenting time to be granted.” MCL 722.27a(6) (emphasis
added). Because the trial court had separately considered each of the best-interest factors of
MCL 722.23, and had already made clear on the record that it was concerned with the minor
children’s best interests in determining parenting time, it was unnecessary for the court to
additionally make findings under the parenting-time factors of MCL 722.27a(6). See
Shade, 291 Mich App at 32. [2]


In re Stevens; Best interest factor (i); [1]


Bowers v. Bowers; Weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations; [1]


Shann v. Shann; MCL 722.27a(6); [1]


Division of the marital assets; Berger v. Berger; Reed v. Reed; Sparks v. Sparks; Washington v. Washington; [1]

A judgment of divorce must include a determination of the parties’ property rights. MCR
3.211(B)(3). The property and liabilities of the parties need not be equally divided; they need
only be equitably divided.
Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 673; 770 NW2d 908
(2009). However, any significant departure from congruence must be clearly explained.
Berger,
277 Mich App at 717. When making its determination regarding division of the marital
property, the trial court should consider:
(1) the duration of the marriage, (2) the contributions of the parties to the
marital estate, (3) the age of the parties, (4) the health of the parties, (5) the life
situation of the parties, (6) the necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) the
parties’ earning abilities, (8) the parties’ past relations and conduct, and (9)
general principles of equity. [
Id.] [2]



Pension benefits; MCL 552.18(1); [1]


Valuation and distribution of the marital homes; [1]


MCR 3.211(B)(3); The trial court's obligation to put a valuation on the property being awarded; Olson v. Olson; [1]


Division of the retirement accounts; McNamara v. Horner; Custody; [1]


Whether the trial court considered the children's "established custodial environment" ; [1]


Whether the trial court defined the applicable burden of proof; [1]


Whether the trial court considered the statutory "best interest" factors; MCL 722.23; Taking contrary positions in the trial and appellate courts; Waiver; Holmes v. Holmes [1]



Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Edwards v. Edwards
e-Journal Number: 53418
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Jansen, Borrello, and Beckering [1]


Oakland Circuit Court,No. 308393, LC No. 2010-771759-DM [2]

OAKLAND FAMILY COURT JUDGE RULED AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

The court held that while the trial court's ruling went against the great weight of the evidence in adopting the FOC's recommendations on best interest factors (f), (g), and (h), the trial court's decision to grant the defendant-husband parenting time every other weekend, every day from after school until 4:30 PM, and on alternating holidays was not an abuse of discretion. [1]

DIVORCE COURT MUST GIVE CLARITY AS TO THE VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY

However, in light of the lack of clarity as to the value of the marital homes and the amount of equity each party contributed to them, the court concluded that remand was necessary to properly determine the value of the homes and to distribute them equitably. [1]


A BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY REVIEW OF A FRIEND OF THE COURT REPORT

Defendant argued on appeal, inter alia, that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a best interests analysis before making a determination as to parenting time. [1]

The court disagreed, noting that the trial court explicitly relied on the FOC report and adopted its recommendations, and the FOC "thoroughly examined" each of the factors in MCL 722.23. While the FOC found that factor (f) did not favor either party, the court concluded that the evidence showed this factor favored the plaintiff-wife. The court reached the same conclusion as to factor (g). While the FOC found that factor (h) favored plaintiff, the court determined that this factor favored the parties equally. Five of the factors favored plaintiff, four favored both parties equally, two were inapplicable, one favored neither party, and none favored defendant.

PROPERTY VALUATION

He also argued that the trial court did not divide the marital assets in a roughly "congruent manner," specifically challenging the division of the parties' retirement accounts and homes. [1]

THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT SAY REAL PROPERTY UNDER WATER SO NO VALUE.

The court concluded that it could not review the trial court's factual findings as to the value of the marital homes because the trial court declined to make any, and there was insufficient evidence to support a determination. The trial court never determined the value of either house, stating only that "[t]here is no equity in either home as both homes are underwater."

THE DIVORCE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR

The court held that it was error for the trial court to decline to make such findings. MCR 3.211(B)(3) requires that "[a] judgment of divorce . . . include . . . a determination of the property rights of the parties[.]"[1]

A TRIAL COURT WAS IN CLEAR ERROR BY NOT GIVING A DOLLAR AMOUNT ON REAL PROPERTY?

A trial court "is obligated to put a valuation on the property being awarded, and it is clear error for the court to fail to place a value on a disputed portion of marital property." [1]

COURT SAID RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS OFFSET EACH OTHER.

However, the court had no similar concerns as to the parties' retirement accounts and defendant's pension. The trial court allowed each party to keep his or her own retirement accounts, and permitted defendant to keep his pension. While it was true that plaintiff's two retirement accounts contained a higher balance than defendant's 401k, he will also have his pension - an asset that plaintiff never sought to invade - to offset this imbalance. Although the exact value of his pension was not offered in evidence, the court could not say that the trial court erred by determining that the award of plaintiff's two retirement accounts to her would be roughly congruent to the award of defendant's 401k plus his pension to defendant. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. [1]



[source]
[1]
e-Journal Number: 53418
[2]
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N ,C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MEGHAN KATHLEEN EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2012,v No. 308393,Oakland Circuit Court,
BRIANT JAMES EDWARDS , LC No. 2010-771759-DM,Defendant-Appellant.

[trb]
Comments of Terry Bankert to include uncited BLOCK HEADLINES

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